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ABSTRACT
THE ETHICAL IMAGINATION: A HERMENEUTICAL STUDY
By
Jeb G. Jungwirth
May 2013
Dissertation supervised by Professor Russell Walsh, Ph.D.
 
This research examines and describes the ways psychotherapists address ethical 
dilemmas through a hermeneutic analysis of how they responded to a portrayal of a 
therapy session represented in a television series.  Interview transcripts were analyzed 
and assessed for both how therapists navigate difficult ethical terrain, and upon what, 
thematically, they tend to direct their thought and concern.  Moreover, particular 
consideration is given to the role of imagination in the development of ethical meaning, 
intention, and understanding in the clinical context, which intersects with a critique of the 
American Psychological Association’s ethics code and its underlying philosophical 
assumptions.  Such theoretical underpinnings suggest a view of therapists as rational 
agents capable of applying ethical rules and codes to resolve dilemmas in a logical, 
formulaic manner, a view which is questioned for its failure to account for the 
empathetic, vitalizing, and hermeneutic value of imaginative thought, rehearsal, and 
reflection in practice.  Finally, implications for therapy, pedagogy, and interpersonal 
understanding are explored.    
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“What is most human is not rationalism but the uncontrolled and incontrollable continuous surge 
of creative radical imagination in and through the flux of representation, affects and desires.”
    -Cornelius Castoriadis 
    (Castoriadis, 1987, Modell, 2003). 
Introduction
This dissertation examines the role of the imagination in addressing ethical 
dilemmas in psychotherapy through a qualitative inquiry into psychotherapists’ respective 
reactions to a fictional portrayal of a clinically-relevant and value-laden ethical moment.  
Foucault’s distinction between formalized and informal knowledge provides a crucial 
basis for understanding how ethics is lived, narrated, and culturally constituted.  
Moreover, this research builds, in part, from his post-structuralist critique of 
modern psychiatry, wherein Foucault demonstrates that psychiatric treatment shrouds 
itself in scientific jargon only to obscure its actual status as “a certain moral 
tactic...covered over by the myths of positivism” (Foucault, 1988, p.276; Gutting, 1989, 
p.95; Gutting, 2013).  Consequently, our modern understanding of the psyche purports to 
free the mentally ill from madness while actually subjugating them to punitive moral 
systems, which in turn create further symptomatic responses, including those essentially 
arising from social marginalization and stigmatization.  In effect, this research will 
investigate the convergence of values-based therapeutic practice, personal and cultural 
meanings, and the ethical imagination for the sake of identifying and describing a 
phenomenology of practical ethics.  Such an inquiry holds heuristic, pedagogical, 
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liberatory, and psychotherapeutic relevance for those working both within and beyond the 
field of clinical psychology.   
Beginning with the hypothesis that ethical practice requires imagining otherwise
—a notion advanced by Ricoeur (2007)—this study investigates how psychotherapists 
rely on their imaginations to navigate difficult ethical terrain.   Rather than following 
from the application of institutionalized codes to corresponding events, such imaginative 
activity draws from personal experience and cultural narratives, is informed by multiple 
sources, and includes the visual image.  Furthermore, this study explores the polemical 
place of the imagination in Western thought as indicative of a broader tension between 
foundationalism and post-foundationalism, one in which ethical agency is frequently 
thrown into doubt.  These concerns lead to an emerging view—inspired by the work of 
Ricoeur (2007) as well as philosopher Kearney (1988, 1998)—in which the imagination 
is seen as vital to the everyday practices of psychotherapists, who cultivate an ethical 
sensibility through culturally-situated narratives that provide both a script and screen for 
negotiating dilemmas.  This is investigated through a hermeneutic inquiry into the 
sources of psychotherapists’ values, as reflected by participant interpretations of 
psychotherapy in film.  
Applying the ideas of a wide range of thinkers, this study provides a counterpoint 
to the postmodern erosion of both imagination and ethical agency, an affirmative 
response to what Kearney calls “the wake of imagination.”  This affirmation of the 
imagination is seen as indispensable to the process of engendering ethical agency and 
practical understanding insofar as formalized codes intentionally generalize, and thereby 
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fail to address ambiguous and marginalized ethical concerns.  What is more, these 
ambiguous situations are often the foundation upon which agency might be affirmed, 
recognized, and advanced.  Finally, these matters are considered in relation to courses of 
ethical action as narrated by specific therapists vis-à-vis images held in a wider cultural 
context; namely, through the use of a media clip from the television show In Treatment, 
which will initiate a semi-structured interview regarding the reactions of participants to 
ethical dilemmas.             
Situating Contemporary Understandings of Ethical Practice
It is widely recognized that a working knowledge of ethics is indispensable to the 
practice of clinical psychology (e.g. APA, 2002; Barnett and Johnson, 2008; Tjeltveit, 
1999).  Moreover, the acceptance of psychologists in the broader community is grounded 
in a basic trust—or social contract—between the profession and the public, rooted in 
ongoing ethical practice of psychologists working in the field.  This trust hinges on, 
among other things, decisions psychologists make about how they practice, as well as 
what sorts of institutional projects they explicitly or implicitly endorse (Tjeltveit, 1999).  
For example, the recent involvement of psychologists in interrogation procedures at the 
Guantanamo Bay Detention Camp and Abu Ghraib raised significant ethical concerns 
within medicine and psychology, but also among the general public (APA, 2005; 
Sharrock, 2009).  Such matters impact the individual psychologist, the profession, 
society, and particular patients served (or denied service), as all are potentially affected 
by what comes to pass as either morally defensible or objectionable practice.
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Across professions, ethical codes and standards are inextricably linked to a 
frequently implicit, yet nonetheless expected, social contract that exists between 
particular professions and the individuals or groups served by them.  These contracts, 
both ancient and modern, date back at least to the roughly 2,000 year-old Hippocratic 
Oath (Amundsen, 1995), and are reflected in contemporary debates in science and 
medicine to clarify the ethics of biotechnology, end-of-life care, stem-cell research, and 
the like (Rifkin, 1998; Silver, 1998; Silver, 2006).  Moreover, these agreements often 
highlight the basic expectations of conduct as well as desired ideals, thereby requiring 
respective professionals to take on special responsibilities in relation to those served, 
which embody a vision  of “right,” just, or appropriate treatment (Haas and Malouf, 
1995; Ozar, 1995). 
Psychotherapy is among those professions wherein ethics is seen as critically 
important for practitioners, related legislative and administrative stakeholders, and the 
public who entrust mental health professionals to address delicate issues of psychological 
and social well being (APA, 1992/2002; Doverspike, 2003; Bersoff, 1994).  Yet, its 
ethical nature is a profoundly unsettled topic, as disagreements flourish amid differing 
value systems and conflicting interpretations of how values impact clinical practice.  
These dilemmas are made increasingly complicated by the rich pluralism that is both 
characteristic of and celebrated within Western societies, thereby nourishing the dialogic 
basis of the psychotherapeutic relationship (Tjeltveit, 1999).  As Gadamer argued in Truth 
and Method (1960/1989), relational understanding “occurs through a process of 
dialogical exchange of views during which good will (a serious honest attempt to 
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understand) is extended to different perspectives” (1960/1989).  Ethical dilemmas test the 
strength of relationship insofar as the dialogism underlying interpersonal understanding is 
brought to the fore and possibly contested at a fundamental level.     
While Gurman and Messer identify twelve of the “most important forms of 
psychotherapy being practiced today” (1995), alongside these core models are countless 
variations, all of which espouse some inherent differences—some subtle, others profound
—in defining the basis of the good life, moral obligation, and values.  Despite a profusion 
of approaches, ethics has been identified as a crucial component of psychotherapeutic 
practice because values, including ethical, psychological, and cultural ones, saturate 
client and therapist understandings, performance, and communication (Tjeltveit, 1999).  
Indeed, empirical research confirms that “nontechnical aspects of the therapist’s 
contributions are among the most influential in facilitating outcomes” (Beutler, et. al., 
1986).  
Complicating matters, though, are varying definitions of ideal, desired, or “good” 
therapy, based in deeper philosophical distinctions over how best to define human beings.  
For instance, differences between humanistic, psychoanalytic, cognitive-behavioral, and 
social constructivist understandings of psychotherapeutic treatment reflect significant 
disagreements over how human subjectivity is best defined.  Rogers’ (1961) humanistic 
account of the good life, for example, privileges individual freedom and agency while 
Gergen’s (2009) social constructivist version subverts traditional notions of the 
autonomous subject, seeing value in movements toward greater relational notions of 
selfhood.  What is more, traditional psychoanalytic accounts see subjectivity through 
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Freud’s (1989) tripartite version of the embattled and divided-against-itself psyche, a 
view that gives rise to profound skepticism with regard to self-transparency and agency, 
ultimately seeing value in dismantling defenses for the sake of “changing the balance in 
favor of life [or Eros]” (Bass, 1998).  Meanwhile, cognitive-behavioral models envision 
an individual whose symptoms arise as a direct result of the link between cognition and 
action, a relationship that is considered malleable through intentional and willed changes 
to maladaptive cognitive patterns (Wilson, 2008).  These sorts of paradigmatic and 
intractable debates over subjectivity shape psychotherapy intervention, duration of 
treatment, and definitions of health.  Perhaps the only unifying principle of the field, then, 
is that effective practice is ethical, and that the role of the therapist is significantly blurred 
with that of the ethicist (Tjeltveit, 1999).  As a result, the complex question arises: what is 
ethical practice?  
In an effort to define ethical practice, the American Psychological Association has 
established and promoted the Ethical Principles of Psychologists and Code of Conduct 
(APA, 1992/ 2002), otherwise known as the APA Ethics Code.  Intended as a didactic 
document and not a legal one, the Ethics Code delineates two divisions: 1) General 
Principles—a set of five guidelines; and, 2) Ethical Standards.  While the five general 
principles are considered unenforceable—“aspirational goals to guide psychologists 
toward the highest ideals of psychology”—the standards advance expectations that, when 
unmet, are subject to disciplinary consequences (APA, 2002).  Practitioners are advised 
and required to consult the Ethics Code “in the process of making decisions regarding 
their professional behavior” (APA, 2002).  However, other than this general statement, 
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the Ethics Code provides virtually no practical commentary or insight concerning the 
psychological qualities behind resolving, voicing, or negotiating ethical matters.  Instead, 
intentionally broad rhetoric is employed, “in order to apply to psychologists in varied 
roles” (APA, 2002), while reserving the possibility that the standards are incomplete and 
may not cover the range of conduct that is, in fact, ethically ambiguous.  Such a rhetorical 
strategy has been criticized as a means of protecting the profession over prioritizing any 
substantive moral development or foundation, ostensibly the sort of clear moral 
conviction that is in the interest of public welfare (Bersoff, 1994).   
An attempt to provide practical commentary regarding how ethical dilemmas 
should be addressed may be found in a companion document, Ethics Desk Reference for 
Psychologists, which includes a subsection of the Ethical Standards, devoted to 
“Resolving Ethical Issues” (Barnett and Johnson, 2008).  Styled much like the Ethics 
Code itself, this segment provides a generalized account of recommended, step-by-step 
procedures.  For example, section 1.01 concerns the misrepresentation of one’s 
professional work by those within and outside of the discipline: “if attempts to resolve an 
issue informally are ineffective, consider a more formal action such as filing an ethics 
complaint” (2008, p. 25).  The same is true of section 3.05 concerning multiple 
relationships, which instructs that one should “work to balance good boundaries with the 
unique therapeutic needs and cultural expectations of clients” (2008, p. 62).  Such advice, 
while potentially informative and helpful, may explain courses of action to some degree; 
but fails to provide much in terms of understanding the complexity of how ethical 
dilemmas are enacted, narrated, negotiated, and meaningfully experienced.             
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Through its organizational and regulatory-like approach, the APA ethics code 
implies that dilemmas neatly map to categories outlined in the document.  However, this 
approach— intended to represent ethical practice—provides no account of how decisions 
are made when matters do not correspond to established guidelines.  In this dissertation, I 
propose that it is precisely the situations on the margins—those between clear categories
—which typify many ethical concerns, requiring the use of a human and cultural faculty 
that lies beyond a technical or logical framework.  Situations located at the margins of 
ethical knowledge require the use of imagination and reflection to practice ethics, as well 
as to further the ethical project itself, thus providing practitioners with the opportunity to 
engage ethics in the deepest, most vitalizing and life-affirming sense.  Without the ability 
to imagine otherwise, as Ricouer (2007) and Kearney (1998) argue, ethics becomes 
inherently non-participatory and, in effect, sterile, paralyzed, and a matter removed from 
history.  Moreover, this understanding of ethics challenges oversimplified notions of 
thinking, thus extending the definition of thought to include the workings of imagination.  
Ethics might be considered through “the productive power of language and that of 
imagination” (Kearney, 1998, p.148) which allows for consideration and generation of 
possible meanings, as well as the synthesis of dissimilar meanings.  As a result, ethical 
practice might be seen to draw upon both language and the image, enabled by the 
productive and synthesizing modes of imagination.  Such a view honors the 
phenomenological-hermeneutic model of imagination through its acknowledgement of its 
production of possible meanings, while also recognizing the Kantian model in which 
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imagination plays both a schematizing or ordering function, as well as a productive one 
(Kearney, 1998).
Kant’s stance toward the imagination is worth elaborating upon by virtue of its 
stark contrast with previous versions.  For Kant, the imagination was no longer seen 
through a Platonist frame as a “copy, or a copy of a copy,” but instead assumed “the role 
of ultimate origin” (Kearney, 1998, p.158).  Whereas Aristotle argued against Plato’s 
mimetic version of the imagination by claiming that the imagination “was the passage 
between sense experience and reason,” the two Greek philosophers agreed on the 
fundamental inferiority of imagination, concurring that “imagination is mostly 
false” (Gratton and Manoussakis, 2007).  Moreover, the imagination’s falsity and 
corruptive tendencies stemmed from its reproductive (or secondary) role in relation to 
sensation, a view that remained relatively unchanged until Kant unmoored the 
imagination from its complete servitude to sense perception.  
Importantly, Kant’s theory of knowledge heightened the significance of the 
imagination insofar as earlier accounts situated it within a mimetic model of 
representation, while Kantian and post-Kantian versions recognized its quintessentially 
productive, formative capacities, particularly its influence upon the cognitive structures 
which precede and organize experience.  His assertion of the imagination’s pivotal role in 
human understanding marked a turning point in the theoretical importance attributed to 
the imagination in other branches of philosophy as well, including aesthetics and 
ontology (Kearney, 1998, p.157).   
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Considering the influence of the imagination on ethical understanding, an ethics 
of everyday and historical relevance might be seen as active, engaged, reflective, and 
chiefly concerned with the possible influences and meanings of our actions on the actual 
lives of others.  A participatory approach to ethics, then, acknowledges that ethical 
practice is less contingent upon one’s application of formalized codes, and more 
dependent on thinking imaginatively about what is affectively, relationally, and morally at 
stake when dilemmas arise.  Such an understanding of ethics aims to prevent the 
relinquishing of ethical agency and imagination to a higher authority, an unspeakably 
tragic act which characterized the behavior of Nazi doctors, as described during the 
Nuremberg trials (Sharrock, 2009), and presumably marks, to a large degree, countless 
instances of violence and brutality (see Milgram, 1965; Zimbardo, 1965).  
Also serving as a painful reminder of the failure of ethical imagination are the 
Tuskegee experiments of the 1930s in which 400 healthy African-American men were 
used as test-subjects for syphilis.   Dozens of the men eventually died from a lack of 
treatment and countless others suffered while the U.S. Public Health Service sought to 
collect data about the effects of the disease on the human body, and knowingly withheld 
penicillin even after it was discovered as an effective cure (Chadwick, 2002).  These 
instances of inhumanity need not be limited to the realm of physical violence or 
mistreatment, as in the case of the Tuskegee experiments, but often occur in more subtle 
ways between those holding authority, power and expertise, on the one hand, and those 
being evaluated, served, or treated.    
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Avoiding unthinking deference to authority harkens back to the primary task of 
the Enlightenment, as understood by Kant and Foucault (MacIntyre, 1998, p.245).  
Importantly, we might pause to consider just what characteristics contribute to this 
fundamental task.  Preventing potential atrocities inherent within the blind application of 
codes, both Kant and Foucault considered it a necessary project to achieve “a condition in 
which human beings think for themselves rather than in accordance with the prescriptions 
of some authority” (MacIntyre,1998, p.245).  From their respective yet kindred 
viewpoints, Kant’s and Foucault’s definitions of authority might be broadly conceived to 
encompass not only powerful figures and institutions, but also formal texts and codes, 
which threaten critical thought.   As MacIntyre (1998) explains, “thinking for oneself is 
contrasted with thinking in accordance with the dictates of any authority […] 
unenlightened thinking is characterized by the indiscriminate and unintelligent use of and 
appeal to rules and formulas” (1998, p.247).  
Vital to the concerns of this study, the sort of enlightened thought which both 
Kant and Foucault had in mind is antithetical to a vision of the self-contained, 
autonomous individual characteristic of many Enlightenment philosophies.  Against the 
notion of isolated subjectivity, enlightened thinking arises among communities of 
individuals who have arrived at, and continue to reproduce, certain agreed upon 
descriptive terms which strengthen and serve their value systems.  Kant asserts that 
“thinking for oneself always does require thinking in cooperation with others,” according 
to MacIntyre (1999, p. 251).  Indeed, thinking itself is best understood as “an essentially 
social activity” (ibid).  Out of such a view of enlightened thinking, we might consider 
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how particular conversations about ethics serve as a foundation upon which the practice 
of ethics unfolds, and we might inquire into the features of those conversations, features 
which fundamentally transcend a limited understanding of public and individual reason.  
In other words, ethical understanding might be seen in a deeper and more communicative 
light, demanding of a more complex view than one that equates ethical thinking with 
reasoning per se.                 
From a human science viewpoint, the espoused “decision-making model” of the 
APA Code—intended as a “guide to understanding and applying the Ethics 
Code” (Barnett and Johnson, 2008)—demonstrates a common and misleading use of the 
term understanding.  This misuse involves a blurring of the meaning between the terms 
understanding and explanation, a distinction found in the work of Continental 
philosophers Dilthey (1900/1989) and Ricoeur (1979).  Dilthey noted this distinction in 
an effort to illuminate the primacy of interpretation in the process of understanding 
meaningful human phenomenon—such as ethics—particularly considering the 
inadequacy of explanation, which he equated to the technical and generalized language of 
the natural sciences (Burston & Frie, 2006).  If ethics can be considered “first 
philosophy,” as Levinas (see Kearney, 1994/1998) argued, then it is necessarily a realm 
of knowledge and meaning beyond the scientific method per se.  In other words, insofar 
as natural science—both methodologically and rhetorically—is a form of epistemology, it 
exists as a secondary branch of philosophy.  Consequently, ethics and ethical practice 
cannot be understood when approached through a solely technical-explanatory lens, one 
lacking a vitalizing principle; such an insight is made especially apparent in the work of 
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thinkers such as Dilthey, Levinas, and Ricoeur.  The APA Ethics Code and its 
accompanying desk reference serve as illustrations of how technical, list-like rhetoric is 
limited and insufficient with regard to ethics; the result being a rather vague, highly 
generalized document that neither addresses nor inspires moral conviction or informs 
practical ethical action.  What is more, such documents do not provide a meaningful 
account of how ethical practice is lived, endured, debated, passionately performed, and 
creatively considered.  These official documents provide little sense for the nuances of 
ethics in psychotherapy, leaving us with the question of how ethical decisions are made, 
including what the “sources”—from ontological to narrative ones—of ethical knowledge, 
discernment, and judgment might be.
Appealing to Foucault’s Archaeological Method and Ricoeur’s Notion of Imagination
A plethora of theories offer explanations regarding the sources or origins of 
ethical knowledge, including those favoring, in varying degree, religious or secular 
traditions, reason, the scientific method, human nature, extra-rational features, divine 
insight, relationship and community, and hermeneutics (Tjeltveit, 1999).  Such 
foundations can be assessed according to their status in relation to formal or informal 
knowledge systems, a distinction derived from Foucault’s archaeological method.  An 
amalgam of concepts, Foucault’s archaeology consists of the critical notions of savoir 
and connaissance.   Defined as everyday social practices which merge with and embody a 
form of knowledge unique to a cultural and historical context, savoir is a special form of 
knowledge not so much written as enacted and performed (Scheurich and McKenzie, 
2005, p.846).  Savoir can be contrasted against the sort of formalized knowledge or 
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connaissance found in academic texts, official documents, philosophical treatises, and 
religious justifications (2005).  Most importantly, savoir precedes and enables the 
construction of connaissance, allowing a given concept, principle, theory, rationale, or 
code to emerge.
One way of viewing Foucault’s method is to understand its implicit subversion of 
the idea that formal disciplines work towards the accurate representation of phenomena, 
as though, for example, psychology’s representation of the mind corresponds to how the 
mind exists “naturally” and “in essence.”  If connaissance came before savoir, one might 
believe, alongside Plato, that formal disciplines were involved in the discovery of correct 
representations of preexisting archetypal forms (or simply the discovery of reality as it 
“really” is), as opposed to the invention or construction of systems of meaning which 
provide a particular way of talking about problems, and certain frameworks for solving 
them.  While the former position implies a sort of magical belief in the power of natural 
science to uncover truths about reality—through the use of objective, dispassionate, 
distanced reason; it is the latter position that appeals to Foucault and other Continental 
thinkers because of its outright rejection of the quest for universal foundations of 
knowledge.  The latter position also seems congruent with the true spirit of the 
Enlightenment, which rejects any and all ideological or conceptual authority for the sake 
of tireless skepticism.  In this sense, we might ponder whether an imaginatively-driven 
form of skeptical thought is more important to engaging the difficult questions of ethics 
and science than the authority of reason itself.  What is more, an understanding of the 
proper sequence of savoir leading to the construction of connaissance recognizes the 
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ubiquity of pragmatic interests in the way we discuss and think about problems, which 
inherently reflects the particular interests of a specific time, people, and place; that is, of a 
locality taken in its disordered entirety.
The idea that connaissance can be removed or absolved of its connection to 
savoir—or the everydayness of historical and contextual practices—is typified in Western 
philosophy’s privileging of epistemology at the expense of ontology and ethics, 
something thinkers like Foucault and Rorty (1989) viewed as an obstacle to addressing 
the truly urgent problems of the day.  This turn towards epistemology in philosophy 
symbolizes the priorities of psychology more generally, whose overarching interests have 
been with locating or “discovering” foundations and frameworks for the sake of reaching 
consummate conclusions about the human mind.  This intersects with Foucault’s 
summary of his entire body of work as being “against the idea of universal necessities in 
human existence” (Martin and Gutman, 1988, p.11), which, as he aptly demonstrated 
through multiple works, may be countered by localized accounts that express the role of 
social practices and power inherent in the making of knowledge.
 Foucault’s archaeology includes interpreting formal changes in a discipline 
[connaissance] as traces of more fundamental shifts in everyday life [savoir] (Scheurich 
and McKenzie, 2005, p.847).  The genesis of a discipline, such as psychology in the late 
nineteenth-century, is indicative of much broader changes in “concepts, practices, 
procedures, institutions, and norms” (2005).  This approach to research undermines the 
modernist notion that the human subject, operating as a master at the generative center of 
formal knowledge systems, is intentionally and coherently directing the development of 
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respective formal disciplines, as though connaissance exists apart from the cloudy 
influence of context, contingency, and circumstance (2005, p.848).  At any rate, the point 
can be made, if we step back from methodology per se, that the entire modernist ideology
—which still influences how psychology identifies and represents itself—of formal 
knowledge emerging through the rational efforts of respective human subjects at the 
center, is actually indicative of the way modernity imagines human beings to inherently 
exist.  Specifically, such a human subject is conceived as an observer who can separate 
from phenomena for the purpose of objectifying assessment, as well as the source of an 
inwardness and privacy that is thought to occur naturally as a hallmark of individuality.     
Our tendency to look primarily at connaissance when assessing the history and 
practice of psychology—and to consider this to be psychology—is overturned when 
one’s examination and inquiry extend beyond mere formal history, and subsequently 
investigates that which might be termed “the conditions of possibility.”  Providing three 
axes or arenas for analyzing these conditions, Foucault’s method focuses on 1) the role of 
savoir in the making of formal knowledge; 2) power relations and accompanying tactics 
used to privilege certain discourses; and, 3) the development of the subject and parallel 
forms of subjugation (2005, p.849).
Perhaps more than anything, Foucault is drawing our attention to and insisting 
upon the innate incompleteness and, to a certain degree, arbitrariness of our explanatory 
and representational powers, rooted as they are in the interests of formalizing that which 
is more complicated than formalization allows.  Additionally, such an acknowledgment 
enables reason to be put in its rightful place as only a portion of the broader creative and 
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generative capacities of the imagination, which Kant envisioned as the source from which 
human understanding arises.  
   Grasping the importance of imagination in the making of connaissance involves 
significantly altering our conception of the formalized account, as well as recognizing the 
intuitive and imaginative sources that inform everyday practices composing savoir.  For 
psychology and psychotherapy, this might lead, perhaps, to a less hidden role of the 
fundamentally poetic and literary dimension of ethical codes, diagnosis, case reports, 
therapeutic intervention, and subjectivity, as opposed to insisting that psychology follow 
the model established by Western natural science which has, as Clifford (1986) explains, 
“excluded certain expressive modes from its legitimate repertoire: rhetoric (in the name 
of plain, transparent signification), fiction (in the name of fact), and subjectivity (in the 
name of objectivity)” (Clifford, 1986, p.5).  These expressive styles were banished from 
legitimate formal knowledge structures by relegating them to the category of “literature.”  
By highlighting the paramount role of the imagination in the making of savoir and, 
subsequently, connaissance, we might begin to see why labeling any approach to 
psychology (or any formal discipline) as literary is radically misleading since formal 
knowledge is itself, to a certain degree, a literary pursuit.  In other words, the distinction 
assigned to literary practices obscures the literary nature of all knowledge systems.  This 
is not to dismiss the quality of one’s psychological inquiry, research, and interpretations
—there is certainly a vital need for rigorous data collection, sophisticated description, 
diverse interpretation, skepticism, and critical scholarship in general.   Foucault 
demonstrated such qualities throughout his work, but there is also the need to displace the 
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misleading, ultimately hubristic philosophical assumptions undergirding much of what 
we perceive to exist in formalized accounts.    
 Embracing Foucault’s methodologies of savoir and connaissance, we might see 
their value as rooted in the perspective they provide on the distinction between 
“reasonable” and “legitimate” accounts, on the one hand, and those which fail to meet the 
criterion of formalization, on the other.  By illustrating the way that connaissance is 
frequently appropriated apart from savoir—and through recognition that savoir precedes 
and exceeds the range of formalization—we can begin to see that any account which 
purports to be unambiguous is hiding a fundamental truth about knowledge, 
conceptualization, and writing; namely its partial and incomplete quality due to its 
location “in, and not above, historical and linguistic processes” (Clifford, 1986, p.2).  Yet, 
it is just such a pursuit of “univocity” in ostensibly “objective” research and formalized 
codes that suggest there may be a different way of approaching how we account for and 
represent ourselves as bearers of knowledge. 
 A response to these problems of writing and signification might rely not only on 
Foucault’s methodologies, but also on an understanding of the imagination which sees it 
as much more central to discursive processes than is often acknowledged.  Frequently, we 
place the imagination into a functional category, defining it as that which creates images 
from the senses.  This is limiting, though, in its denial of the equally indispensable faculty  
of the imagination as a creator of narratives and languages which allow for the unfolding 
of new lived worlds.  Accompanying such unfolding would, of course, be the special 
knowledge or savoir that enables the emergence and reproduction of social practices.  As 
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Ricoeur (1991) insists, “imagination […] should be treated as a dimension of 
language” (p.304), by virtue of its connection to dialogue, meaning, and being.  Ricoeur’s 
view, however, does not restrict imagination to a solely linguistic domain, but allows for 
imagination to be a mode of thought that exhibits visual and linguistic features. 
 In psychology, as well as Continental philosophy generally, there is a long history 
of questioning attempts at establishing a clear and firm boundary between rational speech 
and thought, on the one hand, and other forms of thought and communication, such as 
those seen which are primarily emotional, gestural, embodied, or imagined (Gratton and 
Manoussakis, 2007; Sampson, 2008; Gergen, 2009; Martin, Gutman, and Hutton, 1988; 
Bennett, 2001; Solomon and Sherman, 2003).  Indeed, these latter features of thought and 
communication may be the very expressive avenues by which the savoir of daily life 
manifests, and it is often the “Other”—from non-Western peoples to the mentally ill to 
animals and nature—who carries the weight of this burden, linked to that which 
“civilized,” “rational” Westerners have desired distance (Corbey, 2005).  Examining the 
role of imagination in the establishment of reliable knowledge marks, then, a departure 
from attempts to distance rationality from other forms of thought and communication, 
while suggesting a definition of thinking that exceeds the borders of reason per se 
(Murray, 1987).   
For psychology, our treatment of the imagination and its role in the writing of 
psychological accounts is but one of many possible examples which typify the 
discipline’s struggles with its identity; among others is the role of savoir and its place in 
the genesis of connaissance.  While connaissance can be seen as that which psychology 
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employs to symbolize and legitimate its value to the broader culture and its institutions, 
savoir is the messy but essential knowledge of context and practices which give rise to, 
but also might undermine established, reasoned accounts of phenomena.  These dilemmas 
occur at the edges of the discipline, and highlight problems with the conventional 
classificatory frameworks through which psychology gains its identity, makes claim to 
possess legitimate knowledge about the human psyche, defends ethical practice, and 
communicates and symbolizes phenomena.  Psychology’s problems, then, might be 
redirected from focusing on obtaining universal information about the human mind to 
examining its own history and the difficulties of a value-laden psychological discourse 
vis-à-vis dilemmas of reason, alterity, social practices, and everyday knowledge 
(Sampson, 2008).  
Some in psychology may rather ignore these ambiguous aspects of our work, as 
they pose threats to the traditional order of the field, at least from the perspective of 
social and philosophical precedent established by natural science (Kendler, 2005).  
However, if psychology is to acknowledge that its work is precisely on the margins—that 
is, with what has, and with whom have, been marginalized and neglected by the natural 
sciences, the medical model, and left out of formalized accounts—it might choose to 
embrace and celebrate its position and place as a discipline which is categorically 
ambiguous.  As Foucault aptly explained with regard to his work, 
I deal with figures and processes [on the margins of society] for two reasons: the political 
and social processes by which the Western European societies were put in order are not 
very apparent, have been forgotten, or have become habitual.  They are part of our most 
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familiar landscape, and we don’t perceive them anymore.  But most of them scandalized 
people. (Foucault, 1988, p.11)
These remarks are appropriate for a psychology of the margins, one interested in 
its own history of acquiring, constructing, and formalizing knowledge; particularly 
surrounding the dilemmas and complexities of ethical practice.  What is more, we might 
speak of the margins in a two-fold sense: both as a space in which people and ideas are 
positioned outside dominant discourse, as well as a space in which certain modes of 
human understanding—such as the imagination—are placed at the edges of formalized 
knowledge systems.  
Addressing the Ethics-Practice Divide through the Cultural and Narrative Imagination
Coinciding with Foucault’s distinction between formal and informal knowledge is 
the general consensus that a research-practice gap exists in psychotherapy (Walsh, 1995; 
Fourie, 1996; Talley, et. al., 1994).  While this dualism is commonly seen as a problem 
caused by “the unscientific and vague nature of clinical theory and practice, […] the 
solution [frequently] proposed entails transforming psychotherapeutic practices into 
experimental procedures,” explains Walsh (2004).  However, an alternative understanding 
of the problem is gained through a turn toward an ancient, tripartite distinction of 
Aristotelian epistemology between varying knowledge systems (Bernstein, 1983).  For 
Aristotle, scientific knowledge (episteme), technical knowledge (techne), and practical 
knowledge (phronesis) distinguish our theoretical and practical ways of knowing.  
Furthermore, it has been suggested that psychotherapy practice necessarily and rightfully 
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occurs in the domain of moral or social action—known to Aristotle as phronesis—which 
explains the inevitability—indeed, necessity—of the notorious divide (Walsh, 2004).  
With that said, just as different modes of knowing contribute to a research-practice gap, it 
is equally possible that epistemological distinctions give rise to an ethics-practice divide, 
particularly in consideration of the APA’s ethics canon, which sheds little light on the 
phronesis or savoir of psychotherapeutic ethics.  In other words, this problem may not be 
restricted to psychotherapy research per se, primarily because the research-practice gap is 
a consequence of different modes of knowing, which produce a duality in the ethical 
domain as well.  While empirical research is often ignored by practicing psychotherapists 
(e.g., Begley, 2009), ethical codes may be similarly deferred to a peripheral position 
insofar as they fall into the domain of formalized knowledge or episteme.  This divide can 
be better understood by recognizing that ethical practice occurs within a domain of 
phronesis and savoir, as Aristotle and Foucault would respectively have it.
The notion of phronesis is an appropriate starting point for inquiries into ethical 
practice precisely because, categorically, ethics occurs in the realm of human action.  
This is markedly different from theoretical understanding in that theory “aims toward 
eternal and immutable being [whereas] practical wisdom takes the contingent and 
variable as its object” (Barash, 1998, p.33).  In effect, phronesis “applies most directly to 
the domain of human affairs” (ibid).  What is more, the practical wisdom inherent within 
moral judgment synthesizes with the core human faculty of narrative imagining.  For 
Kearney (1998), “it is the task of narrative, in its ‘poetic’ forms, to provide us with 
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specific ways of imagining how the moral aspects of human behavior may be linked with 
[particular consequences]” (p.242).
Phronesis and narrative imagination are inseparably linked in the world of human 
action, joint features of how we relate to and enact contextually-bound values.  Narrative 
itself is basically phronetic, according to Aristotle, insofar as it exhibits both cathartic 
and poetic functions.  “As catharsis,” writes Kearney (1998), “narrative fosters wisdom 
by encouraging us to sympathize with the characters of imitated and plotted action while 
simultaneously provoking a critical attitude of withdrawal […]” (p.243).  This event of 
both cathartic release and poetic understanding leads to what Nussbaum (1990) sees as 
“special kinds of ethical attention” (Kearney, 1998, p.243).  By way of humanizing and 
contextualizing abstract, theoretical ethical rules, Nussbaum (2001) views the literary 
narrative as especially crucial to the ethical project.  
Nussbaum’s assertion could be taken even further by the claim that literary 
narratives—which might include fiction contained in film and media images—are not 
only complementary, but essential in the process of nourishing and maintaining a 
vitalizing principle in ethics.  What is more, such a quality of aliveness is found waning 
in one-sidedly formalized accounts of ethics.  As Kearney (1998) explains, “narrative 
considers ethics in terms of human desire rather than exclusively in terms of norms.  It 
favors teleology over deontology and seeks to extend our understanding of ethical 
philosophy beyond formalist categories to include the ‘exemplary’ persuasiveness of 
literary and oral stories” (p.244).  Moreover, we might add to such convincing accounts 
those derived from and contained within film, particularly in an age marked by the 
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ubiquity of untraditional “texts,” namely those transmitted through a hyper-technological 
popular culture.  The kinds of narratives conveyed in these sources might be said to 
influence several aspects of moral and ethical life, from how individuals explore “the 
noncommensurability of valuable things” (Kearney, 1998, p.244) to contextually-
sensitive judgments and the complex role of emotions in our value-laden actions.
Widely viewed, ethical sources might best be thought of in terms of affective and 
imagined phenomena that arise not in static isolation but through relationships of blurred 
boundaries in which webs of significance and meaning emerge.  Such meanings are 
reflected in complex connections between communities, traditions, and the individual and 
social imaginings embedded in everyday practices.  While moral and ethical codes reflect 
the formalization of values, ethical sources exist within the informal practices of 
everyday conversations, action, and performance.  Such sources are inherently pluralistic 
and shaped by the ways particular agents make ethics their own, which requires the 
activity of the imagination to construct a meaning that has vitality with respect to the 
uniqueness of different situations.  This might be thought of as a process of owning or 
crafting the plethora of ethical sources and meanings in the broader social imaginary, a 
process rooted less in the intellect and more in imagination.  While the former attempts a 
clean break from affect and story, the latter is vitalized by emotion, narration, and 
aesthetically-rich visual imagery whose sources are elusive and multiple.  In other words, 
what enables ethics to take on a passionate dimension is not contained by codes, but 
rather how particular subjects imagine the relationship between everyday practices or 
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savoir and the ideals expressed by codes, as well as in stories representing the lives of 
heroes, anti-heroes, and other characters with whom we can empathize (Tjeltveit, p.286).
Imagination and the Challenge of Inquiry
Considering these broad concerns, a critical challenge might be posed to an 
inquiry into ethical practice: is such practice the application of formalized knowledge or, 
because the variation in ethical scenarios is virtually infinite, is it a matter not of 
following procedure, but of practice rooted in the implicit knowledge of savoir?  The 
presumption that ethics is driven by formalized knowledge problematically implies that 
unethical practices stem from a logical error in applying correct ethical knowledge.  Yet, 
ethical dilemmas endlessly recur in new forms, extending ethics into an ambiguous realm 
beyond formalized, preconceived doctrines.  One solution to this impasse would be to 
study and explore the savoir of ethics in psychotherapy, an inquiry that privileges 
practical knowledge by considering it as the ground upon which meaning and values 
arise.
In what ways does savoir require us to move into an alternate domain of inquiry?  
In engaged, lived practice, in order for someone to make a decision or acknowledge a 
dilemma, one has to imagine beyond the moment, which is fundamentally a non-technical 
act.  While this act might be partly informed by formalized knowledge, it is by no means 
defined by, restricted to, or sourced in those systems.  Rather, informal and implicit 
knowledge involves the critical act of imagining and telling it otherwise, which might 
best define the lived ethical moment.  Indeed, Ricoeur (2007) and Kearney (1998) see 
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narratives as helpful in an ethical respect because it is always possible to create an 
alternate version or account; that is, to tell another way.  This is elaborated by Foucault, 
who sees such acts not through individualized features, but as culturally and historically 
situated.  Hence, while ethical practice is in some way informed by codified knowledge, 
it is more likely to take place in lived, dialogical, interpretive, and engaged ways 
(Sampson, 2008).      
  In effect, the everyday practice of ethics involves the activity of the imagination, 
which leads the actor to a place of not-knowing, reflection, and consideration of 
possibilities.  Rather than deferring to moral rules from a quasi-administrative position 
(which is more bureaucratic than it is ethical), ethics is performed through imagining, 
wondering, and questioning.  This process draws from a cultural imagination conveyed in 
popular and personal narratives (Gergen, 2009; Kearney, 1998; MacIntyre, 1981; 
Ricoeur, 1995; Valdes, 1991), suggesting entangled linguistic and visual dimensions.  
Moreover, the cultural imagination is informed by multiple sources, and in our 
technologically-based, media-saturated culture, these sources organize around the visual 
image, a defining feature of the cultural imagination (Kearney, 1998).  We might 
consider, perhaps, a multiattentional approach—one that accounts for poetic qualities as 
much as technical and formalized ones—in understanding the mediatory forces and tools 
which assemble and shape both cultural and personal imaginings, as one media scholar 
has suggested (Boyer, 2007).
Ethical inquiry, then, begins with concern for how we go about imagining 
ourselves into particular relationships, which invariably reflect certain ethical dilemmas, 
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questions, and projects.  Furthermore, ethical practice is less about resolving or quelling 
these ethical imaginings, and more contingent upon the sustained practice of imagining. 
This critically hinges upon how ceaseless changes in context, relationship, and 
interpretation re-orient us to our ethical narratives, calling for articulation of that which is 
implicitly enacted or performed.  We are afforded the gift to name the otherwise nameless 
phenomena of the world around us, to paraphrase Rilke (2005). “Speak and make 
known,” he writes in the ninth elegy of his Duino Elegies, “more and more the things we 
could experience are lost to us, banished by our failure to imagine them” (Rilke, 2005, p.
58). 
If mass media might be interpreted as a form of dreaming or imagining, as 
Romanyshyn (1992) has proposed, the sustained practice of ethical imagining might be 
seen to occur through narratives conveyed in and through media.  This view of 
imagination leads to the cultivation of a poetic and aesthetic (values held in language as 
well as visual images and forms), rather than a technical orientation to ethics.  In 
particular, Kearney’s notion of the narrative imagination allows for a sense of ongoing 
engagement with the ethical possibilities inherent within the flux of relationship with 
both actual and imagined others.
An oftentimes vaguely held concept, imagination might be viewed as a form of 
questioning and contemplating, even as a state of reverie in which emotional and 
thoughtful consideration might be given to matters usually held at the margins of the 
intellect.  We might consider such a state as exemplary of a certain aptitude or 
imaginative sensibility that animates affective, intellectual, narrative, and aesthetic and 
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visual domains, thus allowing for greater sensitivity and empathy towards others.  
Providing the imagination a critical place in discourse on ethics allows for the return of a 
vitalizing principle to ethics, something that is sorely lacking in many overly bureaucratic 
and formalized accounts of ethics which leave few inspired.  
While philosophers have emphasized the vital role of imagination in human 
understanding—including Kant, Heidegger, Ricouer and Kearney—researchers have yet 
to apply these concerns to the specific ethical matters at play in the relationship between 
psychotherapy practice and cultural imaginings.  In the interest of focusing on the 
narrative aspects of the ethical imagination, this inquiry will concern itself with 
Continental philosophy and contemporary cognitive science, and related theories that 
provide a central place for imagination both in terms of visual and linguistic capacities. 
Thus, an adequate exploration of the ethical-cultural imagination must include an 
examination of some of the visual tropes that may provide both a script and screen for 
ethical narratives.  This calls for a structural and post-structural sensibility, allied with a 
method that negotiates the difficulties and subtleties of concrete practice, often riddled 
with the weight of clashing priorities.  The implications for seeing the imagination as 
culturally embedded requires a research methodology which extends beyond the subject 
per se, and into broader representations of ethical practice.  For instance, popular 
representations of psychotherapy shape our understanding of ethics, including what might 
constitute an ethical dilemma and response.  An example in this regard is the television 
show In Treatment, with a narrative and dramatic structure revolving around ethical 
dilemmas.  This cultural artifact highlights the ways in which film and media narratives 
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might inform and inspire ethical deliberation and action, as well as how viewers or 
“readers” of the cultural text might re-appropriate and reshape ethical understandings that 
were previously implicit.  Indeed, de Certeau (1984) has insisted that we have little 
understanding of the ways viewers use the images conveyed to them.  As he notes, “once 
the images broadcast by television and the time spent in front of the TV set have been 
analyzed, it remains to be asked what the consumer makes of these images and during 
these hours” (p.31).  De Certeau’s observations parallel a broader trend in the field of 
media psychology, in which there exists a paucity of research concerning the particular 
“meanings that media hold for audiences, rather than assuming (as with much media […] 
research) that their effects are homogeneous” (Giles, 2003, p.82). 
McLuhan also provides valuable insight with regard to the relationship between 
media and meaning, particularly through his distinction between hot and cold media 
(1964/1994).  As he explains, hot and cold media can be distinguished by the degree to 
which they respectively allow for greater or less participation from the viewer, reader, or 
user (McLuhan, 1964/1994).  McLuhan sees a hot medium like the printed word or ballet 
as definitively less participatory than a cool medium like television, which offers the 
viewer the possibility to be included because it does not require any special training or set 
of skills or expertise with which to engage its content or imagery.  The greater the degree 
of specialization or formal training required to use or engage it, the less participatory 
potential the medium contains, according to McLuhan.  “Any hot medium allows of less 
participation than a cool one,” he writes, “as a lecture makes for less participation than a 
seminar, and a book for less than dialogue” (McLuhan, 1964/1994, p.23).  
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If anything, the only training one needs to understand the content of a television 
show is to be a member of the particular culture in which the medium is intended to be 
viewed (and, lacking even that, one could argue that much of what is contained within 
television shows is at least partly understandable to nearly any given audience).  
Alternatively put, one only needs to understand the implicit knowledge or savoir  of a 
given community in order to grasp and engage with a television show.  We might, then,  
observe the workings of imagination, savoir, and the everyday practices of the non-
specialist in a cool medium such as a television.  In turn, it seems appropriate, that the 
study of practical ethics might ideally involve studying the effects of a participatory, 
inclusionary medium on the viewer, particularly when that medium involves the portrayal 
of a difficult, yet intuitively realistic, emotive, and believable scenario, one which calls 
the viewer to respond without excessive formality, abstraction, or ostentation.             
Consequently, this inquiry into the everyday practice of ethics involved 
researching the ethical imagination by showing psychotherapists a segment of the TV 
program In Treatment, and then asking them to imagine the ethical implications and 
potential options of unresolved dilemmas faced by the characters in the story.  Participant 
responses were then analyzed hermeneutically in order to articulate implicit values and 
practical ethics.  Findings were compared across participants for the purpose of 
delineating individual and cultural features of the ethical imagination.  Finally, the results 
were discussed within a broader historical and philosophical examination of ethics and 
the imagination with particular attention to integrating pragmatic clinical concerns with 
ideas stemming from philosophy and cognitive science.
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Method
 As referred to above, the methodological approach of this study is qualitative in 
general and phenomenological-hermeneutic in particular, consisting of an approach in 
which an understanding of the explanations, justifications, and meanings of individuals 
was sought in relation to the unique social, cultural, and personal worlds in which they 
live (see Packer & Addison, 1989; Murray, 2008).  This method concerned first and 
foremost the dynamics at play in the convergence between social and historical factors in 
the making of personal meanings, including concern for the ways individuals make sense 
of, interpret, and imagine these forces through the stories they tell about their experiences 
and challenges (Murray, 2008).
Specifically, my method is phenomenological insofar as it seeks to attend to 
contextually-dependent descriptions of experience, meaning, and ethics.  The starting 
point for this encounter begins with the phenomenological assertion that such matters are 
constituted through the daily and seemingly ordinary re-production of certain interests, 
purposes and activities.  In this sense, my method aimed to illuminate what is typically 
overlooked in relation to the significance of everyday practices, which marks the 
intersection of its phenomenological and hermeneutic sensibilities.  In other words, since 
hermeneutics provides an interpretive pathway to understanding an action through 
bringing “to light the world outlook of which it is a response” (Greco-Brooks, 2003); the 
methodological focus on uncovering the meanings and narratives embedded in the 
everyday workings of personal and cultural variations of the imagination signifies 
mutually phenomenological and hermeneutic interests, concerns, and priorities.         
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 Since this research project investigated the influence of both the cultural 
imagination and personal variations of imagination vis-à-vis storied responses to socially 
and historically-based meanings, it employed the broad and interdisciplinary vision 
celebrated in the human sciences; namely, an appreciation of integrative scholarship.  As 
van Manen (1990) explains, “a human science researcher is […] a sensitive observer of 
the subtleties of everyday life, and an avid reader of relevant texts in the human science 
tradition of the humanities, history, philosophy, anthropology, and the social sciences as 
they pertain to his or her domain of interest […]” (p. 29).  Such a description resembles 
both Freud’s and Jung’s respective opinions regarding the ideal training for a 
psychotherapist: as broad, global, and multi-disciplinary as possible (McWilliams, 2004).  
 With this in mind, my comprehension of imagination and its complex influence 
upon ethical practice is heavily steeped in the literature I have studied in the Continental 
tradition of philosophy (as described throughout the above sections), as well as my 
exposure to such media sources as In Treatment, which have engendered curiosity about 
the ways popular imagery and narration are impacting, inspiring, and/or complicating the 
ethical domain of psychotherapy practice.  Keeping these tendencies in mind, the method 
applied here is grounded not only in the hermeneutic-phenomenological human science 
tradition, but also—indeed, necessarily—in my personal experiences as a member of 
contemporary culture.  What is more, there has been little if any research done into the 
ways such cultural artifacts shape the life of ethics in psychotherapy, thus having 
presented the opportunity to investigate the narrative dynamics with which clinicians 
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engaged an imagined ethical dilemma, as represented by a popular media source.  In this 
sense, my approach makes an original contribution to the current literature in the field.
 Additional contributions that this research intended to make include validating the 
method to the goal of exploring the role of imagination in ethics.  Methodologically, I 
have outlined an alternate way of looking at how people solve dilemmas, a way that is 
intended to honor the practical foundation of ethics.  Clinically, this study informs how 
ethics is understood professionally in relation to formalized codes, and with regard to 
trainees and the educational aspects of ethics.  
Research Participants 
 This dissertation involved recruiting six active psychotherapists from regional 
doctoral programs in clinical psychology and master’s degree counseling programs, 
namely Duquesne University, University of West Virginia, Chatham University and 
Carlow University.  In an effort to diversify the theoretical orientations of the 
participants, I sought to gain at least one participant from each program, which provided 
sufficient theoretical pluralism, highlighted by the distinctions between the psychology 
departments of each of these universities.  Though initially challenging (mostly because 
the first two therapists to respond to recruiting were male, presenting worry that a gender 
imbalance may develop), I succeed in recruiting and interviewing an equal balance of 
male and female therapists.  Through the use of email, I informed clinicians of the study 
by contacting department chairs and requesting that they forward the research description 
and call for students of respective doctoral and master’s level programs.  
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 After the first two participants responded from Duquesne, there was a complete 
absence of response from potential participants for nearly four weeks.  Consequently, I 
met with my director, Dr. Walsh, and discussed the possibility of providing an incentive 
for participating.  We decided to give $25.00 in return for participating in the roughly 
hour-long interview.  Although not immediately resulting in a sea change of interest, 
eventually four more participants were recruited, and a seventh expressed intrigue, all 
occurring within several weeks of sending email notification of the financial incentive.  
The seventh was declined since Dr. Walsh and I had agreed to limit the participants to six, 
mostly out of an intent to keep the scope of the project reasonable, particularly since it 
involved extensive interview transcribing and close hermeneutical analysis of data.
 My interest in recruiting graduate students rested in my desire to attain rich and 
detailed narrative accounts in response to the research inquiry (a short film clip followed 
by questions and conversation about the piece).  While other populations might have 
sufficed, it seemed important that the participants had recently received ample formalized 
training so that an inquiry might be made into the influences of everyday sources on 
ethics, while also encouraging imaginative activity between formal and informal 
knowledge structures.  If the participants had been out of training for a lengthy period of 
time, it is possible that the accessibility of their formalized training may have waned.  In 
other words, I was interested in interviewing therapists who were recently exposed to 
ethics courses and clinical training materials, hoping that they may recall formalized 
codes if necessary.
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 Typically, television programs are not considered formalized sources of 
knowledge, which allowed for the juxtaposition of knowledge sources.   This called for 
encouraging participants who had received a high degree of formalized training to 
navigate informal sources of meaning.  As noted previously, this meaning was taken to be 
both visual and linguistic, which challenged participants to articulate and narrate a 
responses that appealed to a sensibility that was far from strictly intellectual, conceptual, 
or academic.  This task indirectly suggested to them the need to rely on analytic tools that 
are typically underrepresented in conversations about ethics, such as imagined and 
affective-laden responses to the characters and story, as were featured in the media clip.  
Such inquiry was made easier for participants since they were talking about fictional 
characters in a story, and thus provided insight into a task that is not unlike a projective 
psychological assessment.  
The recruitment email described the study in the following terms: 
“Psychotherapists are sought for participation in a study about the HBO television 
program In Treatment and the unique meanings it holds for practitioners.  Interviews will 
be conducted at the Duquesne University Psychology Clinic.”  There was no explicit 
mention of the short film clip or the role of imaginative thinking.  Rather, the 
involvement of these factors was only explained to the participants at the outset of the 
interview.  Specifically, participants were asked to imagine their responses in relation to a 
particular television segment which was invariably shown to all of them (in separate 
interviews).  
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The interviews were approximately 60 minutes in length and were audio recorded 
for subsequent transcription and hermeneutic analysis.  By “fixing” the narratives by way  
of audio-tape, the content became “a text-analogue [that could] be interpreted,” as Greco-
Brooks (2003) writes.  At the beginning of the interview, participants were informed of 
the purpose of the research (to explore psychotherapy values vis-à-vis a popular 
representation of a psychotherapy dilemma), the duration of their participation, their 
rights that confidentiality would be maintained, full disclosure that their involvement was 
voluntary and subject to termination at their discretion or choice, and that such a decision 
would lead to no penalty whatsoever.  Furthermore, they were given the financial 
incentive at the outset, preventing any pressure to complete the interview under any 
discomfort.  All of this was conveyed verbally as well as in a written form; participants 
were asked to sign the consent form delineating these conditions, which included 
assuring them that the study should pose no risk to their well-being in any way.  
Following the initial process involving consent and a description of the purpose of 
the study, participants were shown an episode from the television series In Treatment, 
which lasted approximately 30 minutes (Season 1, Episode 37).  They were informed that 
they would be asked to respond to the piece during a semi-structured interview following 
the piece.  Specifically, the episode was taken from the first season of the miniseries.  
Featuring a dramatic portrait of a highly confident and intellectually challenging 
Navy fighter pilot named Alex, the episode culminates with Alex terminating therapy, 
thereby putting his psychotherapist Paul in a difficult position.  In the portrayal, Alex 
copes with the weight of a haunting combat experience in which 16 Iraqi children were 
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killed after he and his comrades carried out a bombing attack on a mistaken target.  While 
the Navy acknowledged faulty intelligence and placed the blame elsewhere, Alex is 
tormented by his involvement in such a tragedy.  Moreover, he passionately resists 
displaying his vulnerability and distress, as he strives to hide the depths of his suffering 
from his therapist, Paul.  Toward the end of the session, it becomes clear that he is 
determined to return to active duty, including combat missions.  His successful return 
depends crucially on Paul’s summary of Alex’s treatment.  As the façade Alex struggles 
to maintain begins to crumble, his animosity and verbal aggression toward Paul 
intensifies, leaving Paul perplexed.  Paul must decide whether to alert the military 
authorities to Alex’s psychological instability, or whether to abide by Alex’s request to 
keep such information between them.  This particular segment was chosen because of its 
complexity and ambiguity, as well as the abrupt completion of the episode, which leaves 
the viewer quite uncertain as to what will transpire among and between characters.   
Immediately after the segment was completed, participants were given the 
following prompt: “Imagine that you are the therapist in the story.  What is his ethical 
dilemma, how would you respond, and can you imagine other possible responses?”  The 
prompt was intended to allow participants to engage in a process of thinking which 
invited the emergence of imaginative activity insofar as the film segment portrays an 
ambiguous situation, one that will be left unresolved by the character(s) in the story.  
Furthermore, because imagination is, according to Murray (1987), taken to be an 
indispensable part of thought, language, and action; imaginative moments unfolded due 
to the ambiguity of the portrayed scene.  This particular aspect of the method followed 
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Barrows’ (1999) research into the role of imaginative thinking in borderline personality.   
Since the interview was semi-structured, many of the questions during the subsequent 
conversation were those seeking clarification.
Specifically, the semi-structured interview involved the initial prompt noted 
above, followed by questions seeking clarification about participant responses to the 
situation, including what they thought was occurring between the characters in the scene, 
what risks were involved for the patient and therapist, and what sources and experiences 
they relied upon to resolve some of the particular questions the portrayal sparked for 
them.  Instead of using a written scenario to convey the ethical dilemma, an evocative 
media source was arguably more appropriate for the purposes of this study since a 
dramatic representation has the potential to evoke stronger feelings and imaginings from 
the participants.  The familiar experience of television and film provided a starting point 
from which participants were able to immerse themselves in ethical moments.  
Consequently, what I looked for was not an intellectualized response, but one closer to 
emotional and imaginative sources, which shape our initial, practical reactions to events 
both within and outside a clinical context.  In this sense, I searched for the subtle and 
idiosyncratic ways in which imagination converged with and helped ground the 
construction of a (partly) coherent and meaningful account.   
Participants were also asked to reflect on what alternate responses they considered 
in the process of narrating the particular course of action that they eventually chose, as 
well as to explain in detail how they made their decisions.  Attention was given to 
uncovering the relationship between their imagined reactions and formalized ethical 
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codes, which I anticipated they would, eventually, refer to in narrating their envisioned 
courses of action.  However, it turned out there was a significant absence of participants’ 
referencing of such relationships, necessitating the need for me to inquire into their sense 
of conflict (e.g. the sort of conflicting ideas, emotions or interpretations they 
experienced).  I also asked how they might respond communicatively and socially with 
regard to the dilemma (i.e. whom they might contact and how they might articulate their 
position).  
Interviews were determined to be complete when the complexities of narrating 
possible and chosen ethical responses had been voiced, as well as when both myself and 
respective participants felt they had adequately explored the rich material evoked by the 
film clip.  In particular, this process was assessed through three thematic categories 
within the narratives of participants: 1) reference to the sources of ethical action; 2) 
justification for decision, including how conflict was deliberated, resolved or assuaged; 
and, 3) concrete description of ethical response.  Essentially, this template sought to 
illuminate the broad, yet underrepresented, categories of deliberation, choice, and action 
in the creation of ethical coherence.  After the participant had provided content for these 
three categories, the interview was considered complete for the purposes of this study.
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Interpretation of Data
Fundamentally, my approach to interpreting the data began with a movement 
away from reaching any sort of fixed conclusion about the way individuals resolve 
ethical dilemmas, thus moving toward a greater openness in considering the more subtle 
and elusive aspects—often unrecognized and arguably rooted in imagination—involved 
when ethical complexities were negotiated.  This method aimed to cultivate appreciation 
for a vitalizing principle in ethics that is frequently eroded by heavily formalized, 
codified and conceptual approaches to ethical practice.  Interpreting the data, then, 
focused less on fixing a grand design than upon ethical action, and more on encountering 
lived ethics.  It thereby sought to strengthen a sense for the richness of everyday ethical 
practice, and preserved a quality of incompleteness valued by a phenomenological-
hermeneutic perspective.  It is the very quality of incompleteness that enables critical and 
innovative conversations about ethics to continue.  This understanding necessitates the 
use of the hermeneutic circle in making sense of and producing meaning form the data, as 
described by Packer and Addison (1989), among others.
Acknowledging the hermeneutic circle in the process of interpreting the data is to 
recognize the inherent circularity of all understanding (ibid).  As Packer and Addison 
(1989) write with regard to impact of Heidegger’s contributions to the process of 
studying new phenomenon: 
“…we are always thrown forward into it.  Unless it is totally alien we will have 
some preliminary understanding of what kind of phenomenon it is, and what 
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possible things might happen to it.  This means that we both understand it and at 
the same time misunderstand it; we inevitably shape the phenomenon to fit a 
‘fore-structure’ that has been shaped by expectations and preconceptions, and by 
our lifestyle, culture and tradition.” (Packer & Addison, 1989).
Keeping such a process in mind, as a hermeneutic researcher, my understanding of the 
phenomenon of ethics arose through my own projected horizon or framework, which did 
not misinform my interpretation approach, but rather enabled and structured a meaningful 
encounter with the data.  Concretely, this meant that I studied the transcripts and 
formulated initial interpretations of respective participant discourse, and looked for 
thematic continuity, as well discontinuity, where moments of imaginative activity may be 
heightened.  Moreover, I reviewed the transcripts after themes and interpretations 
coalesced, and intended to uncover places where my emerging understanding was 
contradicted by the data.  After an account was obtained from a participant, I 
distinguished among certain phrases to highlight thematic content.  This procedure 
converged with the previously mentioned interview categories, which involved 
highlighting words and phrases in those three domains.     
 Among the patterns I was looking for is how the imaginative moment emerged 
and unfolded in relation to the evolving ethical perspectives and positions of participants.  
This included concern for where the imagination took the narrative; did the narrative lead 
to divergence, convergence, or idiosyncratic combinations of both?  The concern was 
with investigating how the narratives of participants established (or perhaps avoided 
establishing) a foundation for moral and ethical meaning and action, and, in effect, how 
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that foundation served to resolve a crisis of meaning stemming from the desire for ethical 
coherence.  
 Such desire—stemming from the ability to imagine the world otherwise—has 
been reduced in modern analyses, but was highly prized in ancient discourse, and may be 
seen as crucial to re-enchanting and re-vitalizing our sense of ethical engagement with 
the world around us (see Garrison, 1997).  Furthermore, this analysis sought to follow the 
imagination through the fog of conflict and ambiguity, and into the clearing of situational, 
contextualized understanding and knowledge, which I hypothesized would be critical in 
allowing a response to be formulated, spoken, and enacted.  In particular, I attended to 
where ambiguity was (dis)placed as the narrative developed, including examining how 
ambiguity was dissolved, integrated or denied, and to what degree it remained present in 
the discourse of participants.  
 Ambiguity was considered to be particularly important because the practice of 
ethics occurs in a realm beyond the order and structure of formalized knowledge, thereby 
involving a necessary tension between the lack of a framework and the need for one.  We 
might understand the human tendency to seek a frame as reflective of a basic desire for 
ambiguity to be curtailed, which rests in what the Greeks envisioned in the relationship 
between eros—or the desire to do good—and practical wisdom, which involves the 
application of imagination in the service of that desire (Garrison, 1997).   
Following an investigation into and formulation of participant themes, I 
comparatively used the summaries of respective narratives for the purpose of contrasting 
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differences and similarities.  This process enabled me to identify final themes which 
explored the varying sources of imaginative activity, from narrative to ontological ones.  
What is more, this process of engaging themes across participants ultimately intersected 
with theoretical interpretations based in a historical assessment of various philosophical 
treatments of the imagination, as well as current ideas from cognitive science.  
In sum, this study explored ethical action in a clinical scenario prompted by a 
fictional portrayal of psychotherapy practice.  This involved investigating the role of 
imagination in ethical decision-making in ways that exceeded the formalized codes, 
which attempt to dictate specific ethical behaviors, procedures, and meanings.  In other 
words, rather than presuming that formal knowledge grounds particular action and 
understanding, this study attended to the actions, rationale, and supporting sources 
evident within individualized accounts, which unfolded within the broader realm of 
practical knowledge and understanding.
The method of analysis for this study began with a close reading of the interview 
transcripts followed by a process of distilling central themes, ultimately resulting in both 
situated and general structures of analysis.  Initially, central themes—distinct for each 
participant—were identified that corresponded to my research question concerning 
ethical decision making.  Such central themes then led to the emergence of additional 
groupings or clusters which reflected my initial concern for how therapists address ethical 
dilemmas in therapy.  Practically, that initial concern—namely, the research question—
was pursued through a process of highlighting interview content that was relevant to the 
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participants’ discussion of an ethical dilemma, including any material related to client 
background story, case formulation, diagnosis, ambiguity, etc. 
  The initial categories that emerged from my review of the transcripts concerned 
several thematic areas of participants’ ethical decision making: 1) identification of an 
ethical dilemma; 2) evidence or indication of ambiguity, doubt, or uncertainty; and, 3) 
justification for a course of action.  Subsequently, interview content was highlighted to 
identify any evidence of ethical decision-making that applied to one or more of these 
thematic categories. 
 In the process of thematic highlighting, a set of interpretive marginal notes was 
created and ultimately organized into clusters, providing a second set of data, one rooted 
in my interpretation of the participants’ statements.  In other words, following the first 
step of highlighting content relevant to the research question, I summarized particular 
statements into simple thematic phrases.  For instance, if a participant stated that she 
would “keep in mind the goals of treatment,” my translation would result in a category 
summarized as “goals of treatment.” The marginal summaries were then organized into 
preliminary groupings, which led to the emergence of a second set of central themes.  The 
material clustered into four groups: 1) ambiguity; 2) metaphors; 3) intended action; and, 
4) ethical dilemma.  Following the identification of these four groups, I further 
categorized the themes into additional unique groupings, with the intent to identify 
central ideals derived from my marginal summaries.  
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 Data was subsequently assessed to capture the subcategories of respective major 
ideals, in effect illuminating the frequency with which subcategories occurred for each 
participant, as well as instances of repeated thematic comparison.  These two 
dimensions-- frequency of subcategorization and instances of repeated thematic 
comparison-- were organized into tables to best illustrate when such instances occurred 
and which participant cited particular ideals (see Tables 1 and 2).   The ideals were also 
assessed in terms of frequency by which individuals discussed each ideal, listed 
parenthetically next to the ideal, thereby indicating the individual participant.  The same 
was then done for subcategories (see data section).  These tables can be found under the 
results section entitled “Comparisons Across Participants.”  
 In summary, the method for this study involved both a structural analysis and a 
content analysis, as discussed above.  For the sake of clarification, a flow chart is 
provided below to outline the two major divisions of the method, and specific aspects of 
each.  The structural analysis was preceded by a careful reading of the interviews to gain 
an overall sense for the content and concerns of participants’ responses.  It should be 
noted that each step of the analysis is documented in the Appendix.
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Structural analysis
Thematic categories identified 
within transcripts
Identification of an 
ethical dilemma
Indication of ambiguity, 
doubt, or uncertainty
Justification for a 
course of action
Interpretive Marginal Summaries
(leading to Content Analysis)
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Content Analysis
Marginal summaries
(leading to second set of themes)
Ambiguity Metaphors Intended action Ethical dilemma
Central ideals
-identification of six major ideals across each participant
(see tables 1 & 2 below for analysis of subcategorization 
and instances of repeated thematic comparison)
Results
Individual Participant Summaries 
Greg
 Participant 1, referred to by the pseudonym Greg, is a 33 year-old Caucasian male 
who was in his fourth year of doctoral training in clinical psychology at Duquesne 
University at the time the interview took place.  He had practiced psychotherapy and 
psychological assessment for nearly four years, and underwent a one-year training in 
neuropsychological assessment at a regional hospital.  Furthermore, he identified his 
clinical orientation as predominantly informed by psychodynamic theory.
 Greg approached the task thoughtfully and intensely, taking notes about the 
clinical vignette, and extending his rumination over various ethical dilemmas and 
possibilities well beyond the length of any other participant.  He returned to each of his 
major ethical concerns multiple times and, at several key moments, accepted and 
acknowledged contradictions inherent to the complexity of the clinical portrayal.  
Overall, his approach was characterized by confident pondering and careful consideration 
of the clinical encounter, notably shaped by his self-identified proclivity toward 
psychoanalytic thought and an attempt to understand unconscious and hidden motives.
 In terms of specific content, Greg’s responses seemed to run the gamut, acting as 
a veritable flagship for subsequent participants; his was the only interview that 
comprehensively spanned categories, including concern for and content from each of the 
six major themes, namely, those of clarity, patient’s past, patient’s safety, boundaries, 
therapeutic relationship, and clinical understanding.  Greg also provided numerous 
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Structural Analysis
responses derived from these major categories, expressing concern for nuance and 
subtleties within the ethical dilemmas with which he was preoccupied. 
 More than any other participant, Greg identified themes that were diverse and 
descriptive enough that subcategories needed to be noted in order to account for his 
extensive responses.  Such a trend is visible insofar as his responses, in the form of 
interpreted ideals, appear with greater frequency under the six major ideals than any other 
interviewee. In order to account for this diversity, 46 instances of subcategory responses 
were noted across the six major ideals (see Table I, Ideals from Analysis of Marginal 
Summaries section).  
 Greg’s responses also involved a numerous instances of what might be termed 
“repeated consideration,” suggesting increased rumination and heightened awareness of 
and concern for specific dilemmas and difficulties.  While not as great a disparity from 
other participants as with the aforementioned instances of subcategory differentiation, he 
expressed the greatest number of any participant, with repeated consideration of 
particular themes in 15 instances (see Table II, Ideals from Analysis of Marginal 
Summaries section).    
 In addition to high amounts of subcategory differentiation and repeated 
consideration of ideals, Greg also explicitly attested to a concern for preserving 
ambiguity, noted in bold under the general section entitled “Boundaries.”  His concern for 
ambiguity appears thematically tied to his valuing of maintaining a treatment space and 
respecting the patient’s values, on the one hand, and confronting the patient and avoiding 
collusion, on the other.  Such an observation about Greg’s thinking is reflected in the way  
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that his consideration of boundaries involved all four of those potentially conflicting 
subcategory concerns.  These themes are illustrated at various points, including the 
following rumination:
 
 “Because what is it that he [the patient] wants?  And I think I would, um make 
 that very clear.  And I think in the session I would have been a bit more, just for 
 my own sake, be a little more clear about what it is that he wants [...] you know, 
 because it seems like there is this, um, in the session where it becomes, um, the 
 boundaries are beginning to cross because the client is asking you to lie in a 
 way.”    
 
 In light of these observations, Greg demonstrated an ability to simultaneously 
hold contradictory ideals while wrestling with his values; that is, he expressed a desire to 
maintain a somewhat inactive stance that he felt would preserve ambiguity while also 
indicating the importance of direct confrontation and the avoidance of collusion.  What is 
more, at some point during a practical clinical encounter, these values would eventually 
lead to a conflict in which Greg would need to assess how much inactivity or ambiguity 
to preserve in the face of the growing pressure to confront when necessary. Furthermore, 
any confrontation inevitably conveys values, and Greg would be communicating his 
values when applying a confrontational interpretation or response-- grounded in his 
theoretical orientation-- to the patient.  Despite the vagueness with which Greg leaves 
both the interviewer and himself (in that he does not explicate which path he would 
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actually choose), it is expressive of an underlying and perhaps more vital value system 
about psychotherapy that he, in fact, holds; one that is accepting of contradiction and 
paradox in the realm of conflicting values.  This is demonstrated through statements such 
as the following:
 
 “Is [...] being in the air a safe place for him [the patient]?  When these kinds of 
 issues of identity and responsibility and guilt are set aside? Can I be certain 
 about that?  And I don’t know [...] I can see it going either way.”      
 
 Another instance in Greg’s interview where this became evident is with regard to 
his repeated concern for clarity, for example clarity of communication, language, and 
ordering of clinical material.  Such values, through his use of the clarity metaphor, may 
conflict with his concern for remaining inactive and ambiguous.  If we assume that the 
process of clarifying involves ordering and negotiating what is otherwise opaque or 
cloudy, then we can conclude that Greg is concerned with both helping the patient toward 
organized thought while also ensuring there is adequate ambiguity to leave the ultimate 
agency with patient, and cultivating possibilities; as possibilities thrive on ambiguity and 
open-ended questioning.  However, taken from a different viewpoint, we could see his 
concern for clarity as compatible with remaining inactive in that through inactivity, Greg 
would be forcing the patient to clarify the meaning of his statements and language while 
also engendering agency and responsibility.  In multiple places, Greg makes comments 
along the lines of “[intending on] being a little more clear with the client about what I’m 
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willing to say or what I’m thinking,” as well as “I think I would have been a little more 
clear, I mean, a little more direct [...] in the session.”        
 Greg’s responses indicate a noteworthy balance and tension between direct and 
practical concerns of patient safety, boundaries, and ethical pragmatism, which tend to 
cluster together, as well as a more subtle concern for the importance of depth, 
interpretation, and intuition.  At various points, he cites interest in each of these themes, 
while avoiding a dependency on or deferral to codified rules and abstract ethical codes, 
exemplified by the fact that he makes no explicit reference to particular rules, instead 
relying on his idealization of a rather unspecified “moral foundation” amid a stream of 
steady and speculative questions, which is a more lengthy and complicated task than 
justifying action based on an abstract code.  If anything, his interview suggests that 
Greg’s moral foundation is built upon values of openness, basic safety, confrontation, 
psychodynamic interpretation, and the preservation of ambiguity, even when these values 
at times conflict and contradict one another.  As will become evident, Greg’s values and 
concerns differ from other participants, some of whom demonstrated perhaps a stronger 
desire to maintain greater pragmatic coherence and avoid explicating ambiguous 
material.  These values can be summarized in one of Greg’s quotes in which he describes 
his view that difficult material calls for the use of both clinical intuition and imagination.  
With regard to making hard choices, he states:
 
 “It’s more of a feeling, you can feel it and its imaginative.  You have a certain 
 ideal of what is possible that is kind of guiding, um, what you’re saying.  But like 
52
 he [the therapist, Paul] says: ‘we have a lot of work to do.‘ He has a certain 
 image of what therapy is, what is possible, based on his experience but also on 
 what he has been taught.”
 Finally, toward the very end of his interview, Todd, beautifully summarizes his 
outlook, saying that, as a therapist,
 
 “You see certain outcomes, you see certain things, but what really guides you a 
 lot are the cases you read, the things that you hear, about what is possible, what 
 goes on in your own therapy, what you’ve experienced kind of thing, you know, 
 as a therapist.  There is this kind of thing, um, this ideal, this kind of thing that 
 guides you, an ideal, that I’m going to look at this situation and, you know, not 
 just ‘what am I obligated to do‘ but ‘what is possible for this client‘ and that’s 
 guided by experience and theory and your worldview.”  
 
Todd
 Participant 2, referred to as Todd, is a 30 year-old Caucasian male who was, 
alongside Greg, in his fourth year of doctoral training in clinical psychology at Duquesne 
University.  At the time of the interview, his training was similar, although he lacked the 
former participant’s training in neuropsychology, substituting in its place training at a 
counseling center at a small liberal arts college in Pittsburgh.  He identified his clinical 
approach as humanistic and post-structuralist.
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 Todd’s approach to the task was visibly more relaxed and, at times, even more 
playfully contrarian than that of the other participants, but by no means less sincere.  He 
seemed to relish moments when he could depart from the immediate, and perhaps, 
expected script; one that seemed to equate ethical dilemmas with problems confined to 
the therapy room.  
 Moreover, Todd was quick to bring lingering political and meta-theoretical 
questions to the fore.  Such transgression and defiance of thematic confinement was most 
pronounced when Todd questioned the whole notion of treating a client’s symptoms for 
the sake of allowing him to return to military duty as a Navy pilot, a duty in which the 
client would, presumably, be directly engaged in activities intended to kill other human 
beings.  Todd suggested that the client’s complaints and presenting symptoms might, 
perhaps, be best left untreated or, at a minimum, interpreted with a pacifist leaning, lest 
the client return to a wider unethical lifeworld of military violence and destruction.  
Additionally, Todd questioned whether it would be ethical for a clinician to clean the 
wounds of war, so to speak, knowing the client would likely return to a situation where 
he would be further wounded, possibly both emotionally and physically.  This is typified 
through the following remarks:
 “My initial sense was that I thought [...] that the question or phrasing of someone 
 being ready for war was already flawed in a sense [...] the whole ‘are you ready 
 for this or not’ doesn’t really make sense to me [...] if the guy was traumatized by 
 killing innocent people [...] Are you really going to go back and kill innocent 
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 people?  Because it’s a nonsensical question to me.  It’s like if, as for me, coming 
 from the place of a psychologist because that’s psychopathic, you know?”
   
 Ostensibly, Todd would have departed from the more conventional approach of 
the fictional therapist, instead pushing the client to (further) question the purposes and 
consequences of military work and war.  It is indeed fitting that Todd’s interview 
involved pondering questions on the borders of professional psychology’s ethical canon, 
such as the ultimate ends of a professed ethical psychotherapy that in effect causes wider 
ethical problems; exemplified through his humanistic and post-structuralist theoretical 
orientation, which conveys a set of values, concerns, and interests that extends well 
beyond the discipline of psychology per se, intersecting with sociology, philosophy, and 
linguistics, just to name a few.  At one point, during a moment of reflecting on making 
mistakes in therapy, Todd states: 
 
 “you can look at it [therapy] somewhat analytically and say, well, ‘I [messed] up 
 and that would have allowed therapy to change or that would have allowed them 
 to have some realization that they should have or whatever [...] and the opposite 
 is true as well, like, I just tend to assume that things are going really well, I take a 
 class in post-structural psychology and begin to think, well, what is really going 
 on in here?”
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 While not as broad-ranging or lengthy as Greg’s, the specific content of Todd’s 
overall interview touched upon every major category, and he ruminated on all six of the 
themes, demonstrated through repeated concern for and questioning of issues surrounding 
clarity, patient’s past, patient’s safety, boundaries, therapeutic relationship, and clinical 
understanding.  Todd also provided numerous comments which qualified for 
subcategorization, leading to consideration of several critical themes, as well as 
idiosyncratic and meta-clinical concerns.
 The diversity of Todd’s responses is demonstrated through 21 instances of 
subcategory responses across six ideals.  While below the participant average, his 
repeated and numerous subcategory responses visibly hover around the rest of the group, 
making the statistical average of 25.5 misleading, due to the disproportionate number 
provided by the first participant, Greg (see Table I, Ideals from Analysis of Marginal 
Summaries section).  
 Todd’s interview also involved multiple moments of repeated consideration, 
illustrated through 12 instances in which he returned to the same theme or dilemma three 
or more times.  This suggests ongoing concern for and valuing of particular themes and 
their complexity, implying that an unambiguous application of a rule or code will not 
suffice for making sense of the dilemmas at hand (see Table II, Ideals from Analysis of 
Marginal Summaries section).  Todd’s 12 responses of repeated thematic consideration 
are virtually precisely at the average (12.2), and occur with a frequency quite similar to 
that of the other participants, especially since there were no extreme scores in this area, 
with the highest number of instances being 15 and the low 9.
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 Alongside frequent occurrences of subcategory differentiation and repeated 
consideration of ideals, Todd also expressed concern for a number of particular 
dilemmas, reflected in the interpreted ideals highlighted in bold, and present in five of the 
six major thematic categories.  Among these, concerning clarity (Theme 1, Interpreted 
Ideals), Todd ruminated on several thematic subcategories, including “clear, precise 
language,” “clear communication,” and “order and clarity.”  Paralleling these themes, 
Todd added concern for “coherent history” under patient’s past (Theme 2, Interpreted 
Ideals), which is seemingly compatible with his valuing of organization and clear 
communication as a means to ethical practice.  However, his responses become more 
complicated and conflicting when several of his other key concerns are taken into 
consideration.  Such conflict revolves, in particular, around his valuing of ambiguity, 
inaction, and mystery, themes which he struggles with and returns to repeatedly 
throughout the interview, epitomized when he says “I leave a little bit of mystery and 
ambiguity in what the right thing to was or is.”  He also states that [the clinical situation] 
“pushes me to the limits of not-knowing what is going on.  I mean, yeah, I think it is 
important for me to say that I don’t look at this as some kind of, some riddle, some riddle 
that has a right answer.”  
 Given the convergence of these interests, it seems Todd, not unlike Greg, wants to 
respect and hold a sort of tension, so to speak, between pursuing ethical structure while 
also leaving room for the unexpected, and the ethics that exists, perhaps only as a 
potentiality, beyond convention; in other words, he is holding a tension for what might be 
learned not through continuously placing rules, structure, answers, and formalized 
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knowledge upon a given interaction or dilemma, but rather holding a tension between 
structure and ambiguity for what might be understood-- by clinician and client alike-- 
only through a loosening of cognitive restraint, which appears to be contingent upon 
letting go of the pressure to over-structure.  
Ann
 Participant 3, known in this study as Ann, is an international graduate student 
from China in her mid-twenties who was in her third year of doctoral training in the 
counseling psychology program at West Virginia University.  She had extensive training 
experience in the college counseling center on the campus of WVU.  Additionally, she 
identified her clinical approach as cognitive-behavioral and psychodynamic. 
 Ann approached the task patiently and sincerely, taking ample time before 
responding and mulling over her descriptions of ethical dilemmas.  She indicated a more 
pronounced concern for the ethical code than other participants, and was the only 
interviewee to reference a particular section of the ethics code, though (understandably) 
she did not seem confident that it was the correct section.  With regard to boundaries, Ann 
stated: 
 
 “the codes and standards...one standard, I think maybe the eighth.  Let’s see.  I 
 don’t remember which one, but [...] one is human relations [...] about boundary 
 issues.”  
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 While this marked a turn to formalized knowledge unmatched by others, Ann 
remained more similar to her counterparts than not, demonstrated in the overall pattern of 
her rumination, including multiple instances of repeated thematic reflection and 
subcategorization of ideals.
 Specifically, Ann’s responses came across as highly focused on the concrete 
aspects of ethical practice, such as safety, crisis prevention, and ethical guidelines; which 
perhaps reflected her theoretical orientation based in cognitive behavioral thought, or 
shaped by challenges associated with cultural and linguistic differences.  This latter factor 
may have inhibited more sustained speculation or thematic risk-taking, mostly since such 
activity requires more detailed, nuanced, and thick description that is representative of 
linguistic and cultural subtleties.  Nevertheless, Ann’s strong proficiency in recognizing 
and attending to the important ethical matters of the portrayed clinical encounter were not  
lacking in terms of astute recognition of safety concerns, boundaries, treatment planning, 
effective communication, and sensitivity to context.         
 Ann’s concern for these issues, and her methodical deliberation of their 
complexity, is at least partly illustrated by the frequency with which her responses 
required subcategorization.  Of all the participants, Ann provided the second highest 
amount of ideals expressed in subcategories at 29 instances (see Table I), above the 
average of 25.5.  The next closest in this regard was 22 instances.  Additionally, Ann’s 
responses spanned all six major categories, suggesting she was engaged with a variety of 
clinical concerns and thematic interests.  Her responses also included 14 moments of 
repeated thematic consideration, above the average of 12.2.
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 Among Ann’s more unique and idiosyncratic comments are those highlighted in 
bold, themes she returned to several times or more.  These included establishing clear 
communication, maintaining patient safety and preventing suicidal tendencies, respecting 
boundaries and preserving the treatment space; and, lastly, providing timely, insightful, 
and context-sensitive interpretations.  Essentially, these themes indicate a prevailing 
interest in practical values and concrete concerns related to ethics in therapy.  
 Further strengthening this conclusion are Ann’s responses that qualified as unique 
themes unmentioned by any other participant.  In this case, she provided 7 instances of 
unique, unshared thematic concern, second only to Greg (see Table III).  Of these 7 
instances, three concerned the major category of patient safety; namely, addressing the 
patient’s aggression and anger, safely transitioning the patient out of the session, and 
ensuring social support for the patient.  Three other instances concerned the therapeutic 
relationship; specifically, avoiding multiple relationships, awareness of cathartic role of 
therapy in relation to the client’s difficult emotions, and confrontation of aggression.  
Finally, the seventh unique theme concerned gaining a clear and accurate sense of 
diagnosis.  At one point she stated: 
 “it sounds like some sort of PTSD, but I’m not sure or clear enough to diagnose.  
 It is some sort of PTSD related [disorder], and I really think to have a plan to not 
 do it again [return to military combat].”  
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 Ann also expressed concern about the therapist’s competence and the question of 
diagnosis, as indicated in the following remark:
 
 “One question is the competence.  I’m not so sure about the psychologist’s 
 competence.  Of course, it is not addressed, but we’re not sure he’s competent to 
 treat a certain population.  It kind of sounds to me like the client might have 
 PTSD  problems and it is not clear to me whether the therapist is competent or 
 got training in that.”
    
 As these themes suggest, Ann’s ethical concerns translate into a treatment 
approach that values the practical and concrete.  Interestingly, unlike the former two 
participants, she did not wrestle with themes of ambiguity or inactivity, but instead 
valued a proactive approach, at one point mentioning frustration with the fictional 
therapist’s absence of direct and decisive action.  In one instance, Ann criticized the 
therapist, Paul, for being too inactive, passive and unclear, particularly toward safety 
issues.  She expressed the following concern:
 
 “[I’m not sure] how just listening is benefitting the client.  And there are some 
 exceptions of just breeching confidentiality and I think it fits into that category 
 because he does, um, have the potential to hurt other people, and he [the 
 therapist] didn’t go into that and ask [...] what would your plan and usually what 
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 would trigger that, and his potential for doing something that would hurt himself 
 or others.” 
 In summary, Ann suggested several times that she would “apply the ethical code” 
and “apply ethical knowledge.”  She remarked that the therapist “might have to breech 
confidentiality at some point, but I don’t remember where that ethical code is [...].  
Despite wanting to recall a specific code, it remained unclear how she meant to apply the 
code, if located; consequently, she left a sense of ambiguity to her responses without 
actually acknowledging the role ambiguity might play in her ethical understanding.  
Perhaps this is indicative of a valuable skill set of cognitive flexibility and an ability to 
think creatively within the moment without getting distracted by the apparent absence of 
a clearly recollected ethical framework.  Overall, Ann’s such qualities conveyed 
thoughtfulness, patient deliberation, and sincere care for the client’s wellbeing and safety. 
Kelly          
 Participant 4, referred to as Kelly, is an African American female and mother of 
three who returned to graduate school after nearly two decades in another career.  At the 
time of the interview, she was attending Carlow University and studying clinical 
psychology in its doctoral program, where she was in her second year.  She identified her 
approach as cognitive-behavioral and humanistic.
 Kelly’s approach was distinguished by an overt and repeated concern for the 
social basis of ethical knowledge and authority.  Without any prompting, she made 
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frequent reference to consulting supervisors, peers, and “imagining ‘what others would 
do in this situation,” all of which converged with her intuitive and practical concerns of 
patient safety and clear communication.  When presented with the general instruction at 
the beginning of the interview (i.e. “Imagine what you would do in this situation...”), 
Kelly mentioned turning to what others might do; that is to say, imagining the possible 
responses of others as a bedrock for her own course of action.  This is most evident in the 
following quote from her interview:
 
 “In going through the training I’m going through, they teach us our ethical 
 dilemma-decision making models.  And, I think that at the core of the ethical 
 decision-making models is the decision you make if another person were to 
 evaluate it; if it were evaluated by a peer.  Would they say that was an ethical 
 and reasonable decision or would they say this goes against every professional 
 standard and ethical model and ethical practice?  That would guide me.”   
 Such a statement illuminates an approach to ethical thinking based in imaginative 
activity and mental rehearsal that corresponds to Kelly’s understanding of a broader 
social value system, in this case professional psychology.  
 Compared against the responses of other participants, Kelly’s were the second 
most brief, lacking the thematic repetition of her counterparts.  Only the sixth participant, 
Arnold, provided a more concise set of responses.  Despite comparative brevity and 
perhaps decisiveness, Kelly still engaged the task with a significant degree of nuanced 
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description, including subcategory differentiation, instances of repeated thematic 
consideration, and several instances of unique, unshared thematic concern; all of which 
suggests the use of imaginative thinking.
 In particular, Kelly’s responses qualified for 15 instances of subcategorization 
insofar as she provided descriptions of varying complexity for each of the six major 
categories.  Such descriptive breadth across all six categories indicates a concern for 
multiple value-based frameworks at play in the clinical encounter.  While her 15 
subcategory responses were well below the group average of 25.5, Kelly managed to 
pinpoint the important and overarching concerns shared by the others, thereby fulfilling 
her intention of maintaining continuity of understanding with “what others would do,” 
even though she was never actually informed or aware of what other participants said.  In 
effect, it seems that her approach of visualizing and speculating about the likely 
responses of others contributed to her construction of a socially-astute ethical 
understanding, affirmed by subcategory responses in every major category shared by her 
peers in the study.           
 Kelly engaged in nine instances of repeated thematic consideration, which was 
below the group average of 12.2.  She demonstrated special concern for a number of 
familiar themes, including establishing clear communication, thematic order, and a sense 
of the patient’s history, while also preventing crisis, destabilization, and violation of 
boundaries.  These safety concerns are illustrated within statements such as “[I’m] also 
thinking about if this guy has PTSD [...] because what is going on?  And then I go back to 
[...] do you really think it is a good idea to put yourself in active duty?”  Additionally, 
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Kelly indicated that she valued preserving the treatment space, providing insight, and 
open communication with supervisors and peers, as previously noted.  This characteristic 
of her approach is also exemplified through the following remarks: 
 
 “Another peer- if they were looking at my decision in this scenario.  Would they 
 look at my decision and think, objectively and uninvolved, that [it] was 
 reasonable, or would they say it was unreasonable?  And, how would I then, if I 
 was questioned about it [...] from a legal standpoint or another standpoint [...] 
 could I justify the decision I made on ethical standards, model of care standards, 
 [...] really that’s what would guide me.  Because at the end of the day, your 
 professional integrity has to win out.  And I think that would be the key thing for 
 me.”   
 
 Finally, Kelly provided two instances of unique, unshared thematic concern, 
namely, the desire to establish a clear understanding of the effects of treatment, and to 
consider unresolved issues from the patient’s past.  These two instances were below the 
average of 5.1 unique responses, suggesting that Kelly was intuitively aware of the social 
consensus in that her responses stayed within a familiar, shared, and common ethical 
frame that mirrored her counterparts.  In this sense, Kelly’s interview-- more so than any 
of the others because of its overt and implicit valuing of the social-- demonstrates an 
ethical reasoning that is strongly connected to, informed by, and seen through what might 
be termed the social imaginary.        
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Lori
 Participant 5, identified as Lori, is a Caucasian female in her mid-twenties who 
was enrolled in her second year of the counseling psychology program at Chatham 
University.  Her training included various clinical experiences through practicum 
placements around the Pittsburgh area.  Her clinical approach was described as 
humanistic.
 Lori’s approach was marked by a socially active, relational contemplation of the 
task from the moment the research question was posed, distinguished by her idiosyncratic 
and reciprocal questioning in response to the initial directive.  From the onset, she 
challenged the researcher, which came across somewhat surprisingly, particularly in 
contrast to previous participants who took up the research question and went with it.  This 
feature of her approach is marked by questions such as: 
 “What has happened to him that he wasn’t allowed to fly? Or, um, was he 
 allowed?” [and] “So the bombing thing, he, was it accidental that he ended up 
 taking out all of the civilians?  [...] Was that part of his job and then, consequently 
 because of having done that he was struggling?”  
 
 Both of these questions were directed at the researcher, which differed from 
others who posed questions, but only in a rhetorical manner.  
  In effect, Lori was slower to start into her own independent inquiry, reversing the 
expected script through direct and firm requests toward the researcher to clarify a number 
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of the more ambiguous elements from the clinical vignette.  Her interaction was an 
enriching respite from the more predictable and contained reactions of the others, as she 
colorfully engaged the researcher in a conversational, dialogical approach to ethical 
practice.  To this effect, she displayed similar qualities to those of Kelly; specifically, in 
the way she relied upon and valued an overtly, socially-mediated ethical query.  Yet, in 
contrast to Kelly, Lori blurred, at least momentarily, the lines between researcher and 
participant, giving herself permission to question the researcher in return.  In light of such 
a dynamic, she demonstrated an ability to subvert the social roles to which the others had, 
perhaps unknowingly, conformed.  This signified a noteworthy departure from the way 
others navigated difficult ethical terrain.     
 In terms of the structural patterns of Lori’s interview, she displayed similar 
qualities to the other participants, roughly striking the average range for the three primary  
matrices of analysis.  Lori demonstrated 22 complex responses requiring 
subcategorization, scoring not far from the average of 25.5, again suggesting the 
production of detailed scaffolding to account for the nuances of the six major ethical 
themes.  She also arrived nearly precisely at the average for instances of repeated 
thematic consideration with twelve, and not far from the average of 5.1 for instances of 
unique, unshared thematic concern with three.  These trends illustrate that Lori was both 
engaged with similar patterns of reflective analysis as her counterparts and capable of 
creative deviation from the values and conclusions of the others.
 Among Lori’s foremost ethical concerns was a focus on questions surrounding 
clarity of communication, coherently understanding the patient’s history, assessing safety 
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concerns and preventing crisis, and maintaining stability.  In several instances, she 
utilized clarity as a metaphor, reflected in remarks such as “[...] understanding where he’s 
coming from and how he’d do things.  That would paint a clearer picture for the 
therapist.”   Regarding boundaries and the therapeutic relationship, Lori was focused on 
respecting the patient’s agency, avoiding collusion, integrating and unifying 
psychological issues, preserving the therapeutic alliance, and understanding the larger 
view.  It seems that this latter aspect involved a profound concern for cultural difference 
and diversity unmatched by other participants.  Such cultural concerns are highlighted by 
the following comments:
 
 “I would probably consult with a military psychologist because [...] I have a lot of 
 friends in the military, and their frame of mind is very much [...] they kind of have 
 a different world view of what is and is not important, and where they should be, 
 and what their responsibilities are, so, I think, given that, he would get a better 
 picture of what this guy is thinking and grappling with if he had insight into the 
 military.  So, I really think he would benefit from consulting because that would 
 have painted a more clear picture.”
 Finally, similar to Kelly, she emphasized and valued the social and supervisory 
sources of ethical direction, action, and understanding, noting that she would rely on 
consultation amid ambiguous ethical matters, as evidenced in the quote above and in 
multiple other places.  
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Arnold
 Participant 6, known as Arnold in this study, is a Caucasian male in his mid-
twenties who was attending a graduate program in counseling psychology at Chatham 
University at the time the interview took place.  He described his clinical approach as 
combination of rational-emotive, cognitive-behavioral, and humanistic.  
 Arnold approached the research question with focused intensity, and did not mull 
over questions as extensively as the others.  In terms of length, his was the shortest 
interview.  Notwithstanding, even within a limited amount of time, he demonstrated 
numerous noteworthy instances of continuity and discontinuity when contrasted against 
the responses of the other participants.
 Despite overall brevity, Arnold’s responses included 20 instances of ideals 
requiring subcategorization to account for their complexity.  This was not far from the 
group mean of 25.5 subcategories per participant, an average that was statistically 
inflated due to the first participant’s unusual number of responses.  Moreover, Arnold 
touched upon five of the six major thematic categories, his only exception being category 
II, “patient’s past.”  In other words, he did not express concern for the role of the patient’s 
history with regard to ethical issues or clinical concerns.   In terms of instances of 
repeated thematic consideration, Arnold provided 11 responses, which demonstrated a 
focused, sustained concern for resolving ambiguous subject matter.  This was relatively 
close to the group average of 12.  
 The shortness of Arnold’s interview began to impact the complexity and diversity 
of his responses when seen through the third axis of analysis, namely Table III, instances 
69
of unique, unshared thematic concern.  He did not provide any responses that were 
unshared, suggesting, in part, an astute awareness of group consensus.  To his credit, 
Arnold touched upon nearly all of the major thematic concerns expressed by the others, 
while avoiding tangential rumination.  However, he did, in fact, demonstrate less overall 
rumination, at least in terms of trends found in this study, in particular the kind which fell 
within close range of the others‘ concerns.     
 Among Arnold’s specific thematic focal points was expressed concern for clear 
communication, language, and case conceptualization, a resounding theme with his peers. 
At one point, he expressed interest in establishing clarity and shared understanding, as 
well firm boundaries, stating:
 
 “I think he [the therapist] could have been a bit more direct with him [the patient] 
 and told him, you know, I cannot be biased in [giving you a favorable] 
 assessment and it’s basically coming back on my professionalism; I need to be 
 as unbiased as possible and really [...] give an accurate assessment, so I guess 
 he could be a little more direct and com back to that [issue].”
 Further themes included patient safety, and associated concerns of preventing 
crisis [both in and outside of therapy], assessing and ensuring the patient’s ability to 
perform his military job safely, and preventing violence.  Indicative of these trends, 
Arnold stated the following:
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 “I think [...] the pilot sounds like he’s not so much in the session, but he’s 
 aggressive in a lot of situations outside the session, too.  So, I think that [...] 
 maybe the therapist didn’t want to get off on a bad foot that early in the session 
 and tell him directly that, you know, this is what I need to do and what I’m going 
 to say.  I’m going to be neutral and not going to, you know, [necessarily 
 endorse] the opinion of you going in for training and going on as a pilot.”
  Arnold also wanted to retain boundaries through an avoidance of collusion, 
maintaining the therapy space, and allowing ambiguity to play a role in the patient’s 
therapeutic work (e.g., his references to “being neutral”).  Regarding the relationship in 
treatment, Arnold displayed significant interest in responding with sensitivity to context, 
cultivating insight, and preserving the alliance.  Finally, similar to Lori, Arnold expressed 
concern for cultural sensitivity and understanding the role of subculture and race in the 
making of the client’s identity.  This latter theme seemed directly tied to Arnold’s 
repeated concern for working toward an understanding of context.  These therapeutic 
characteristics are illuminated in the following remarks, which concern working with a 
patient who has had traumatic experiences and is from another culture or subculture:
 
 “You have to [...] you cant’s just come out and say ‘what was your experience in 
 Iraq and Afghanistan?’  You have to be, you have to build a relationship with them 
 before you can get into any of the details because they’re just going to see you 
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 as a civilian.  There’s a huge thing between talking to each other and talking to a 
 civilian.”
 
 Later, Arnold added to these cultural, identity, and communication concerns by 
questioning the therapist’s readiness to understand military culture, as Arnold stated:
 
 “He [the therapist] couldn’t be detailed about anything in the military.  All the 
 acronyms and everything else.  And, um, but I think that’s good because I think 
 that  he struggles with-- the pilot struggles with-- the relationship with his dad [...] 
 And, even his wife, he had mentioned [...] I think a lot that probably has to do 
 with, um, he’s in the military life for nine months out of the year, and on a full-
time  basis.  And when he’s deployed, he’s completely wrapped in that, and it’s two 
 different worlds.”        
 Overall, Arnold demonstrated cultural sensitivity and skepticism about the 
therapist’s ability to bridge the divide between two separate cultural worlds, while also 
speculating about the possible benefits of that divide.  In effect, Arnold displayed an 
ability to simultaneously hold two possibly contradictory ideas, and thereby engage the 
ethical ambiguity at the core of the therapeutic encounter. 
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Comparisons Across Participants
 The general findings and analysis of participants as a group stems from the review 
of marginal summaries for respective participants found in the Data section, including 
Tables I and II.  The general analysis was conducted with several key concerns in mind, 
namely to identify commonalities across all participants, assess for subgroups, and 
delineate idiosyncratic themes.
 As evident in the previous data section, there are numerous participant 
commonalities deserving of attention, particularly those illustrated through participants’ 
repeated interest in and concern for specific ethical themes, values, and dilemmas.  One 
of the most clear commonalties is illustrated by a convergence of ideas when considering 
the six major categories of ethical themes.  All six participants expressed a concern for 
five of the six major categories, which include clarity, patient safety, boundaries, the 
therapeutic relationship, and clinical understanding.  Following this convergence, five out 
of six participants shared concern and expressed value for all six major categories; in 
particular, the five mentioned above along with patient history, which only the last 
interview participant omitted from his major concerns.  This suggests that the six major 
thematic categories of clarity, patient safety, boundaries, the therapeutic relationship, 
clinical understanding, and patient’s past firmly rest in the shared, collective ethical value 
system of the participants.     
 Among other strong commonalities, every participant expressed interest in a 
number of subcategories.  These included a concern for clear communication (under the 
broader category of clarity), patient safety to perform a high-risk job (under patient 
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safety), and confronting the patient about safety concerns (under the therapeutic 
relationship).  Furthermore, when assessed for commonality by considering subcategories 
endorsed by five of the six participants, several significant patterns emerged.  These 
included five of six participants expressing concern for the respective subcategories of 
assessing safety and preventing crisis, suicide, and violence (both under patient safety),  
maintaining a treatment space (under boundaries), and relying on social/supervisor 
understanding (under clinical understanding).  
 When framed by and assessed through the commonalities shared by three 
participants, a plethora of shared values and interests emerges.  These include concern for 
clear and precise language (under clarity), coherent history (under patient’s past), 
maintaining patient’s stability (under patient safety), avoiding lying to please the patient 
(under boundaries), refraining from action in therapy and preserving ambiguity through 
inaction (under boundaries), and leaving responsibility and agency with the patient (under 
boundaries). Additionally, three participants held in common an interest in the following 
subcategories from the major theme “therapeutic relationship”: help the patient to 
integrate and unify, communicate directly, provide context-sensitive response, cultivate 
awareness and insight, and preserve the alliance.  Finally, three participants valued two 
subcategories from the general category of clinical understanding, namely, understand 
context and understand what is latent or concealed.       
 Among additional common themes, every participant engaged in multiple 
instances of repeated thematic consideration, as evidenced in Table II.  The mean was 
12.1 instances.  This suggests a significant level of reflection, rumination, and implicit 
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awareness of ambiguity at work within participants‘ consideration of particular 
dilemmas.   
 The assessment of subgroups stems, primarily, from the frequency of ideals 
expressed in subcategories (Table I), of which all six participants engaged in ethical 
deliberation to the extent that a degree of subcategorization was necessary to organize 
their responses.  Participants ranged in frequency of ideals expressed in subgroups from 
15 instances to 46 instances (participants 4 and 1, respectively).  The mean for 
subcategorization was 25.5.   
 Idiosyncrasies among participants are indicated by singular subcategory 
responses, or, alternately stated, any instances in which a theme was identified by only 
one participant and did not resemble or share commonality with any others.  Specifically, 
these included  clear understanding, knowing clearly, clear and coherent motivation, clear 
thinking, clear diagnosis, ethical clarity, clear effect of treatment, and narrative clarity, all 
under the general theme of clarity.  While these instance occurred singularly, and thus as 
idiosyncrasies, they are indicative of the broader and more general common interest in 
clarity, as shared by all participants.
 A second subset of idiosyncrasies can be seen under the general category of 
patient past, and includes the unique themes of comprehensive history, treatment history, 
unresolved issues from the past, and absence of history as a viewer of the clinical 
encounter; the latter being what I have come to see as a meta-theme, or one concerning a 
reflective, perhaps critical, stance toward the actual research interview in which the 
participant questions what it means to witness only one session among a series of 
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therapeutic encounters.  There were several distinct meta-thematic moments during 
various interviews, and this represents the first among them.  All of the meta-thematic 
moments were idiosyncratic and unshared, but nevertheless noteworthy insofar as they 
mark a divergence from common ethical thinking. 
 The next subset of idiosyncratic themes is found under the category “patient 
safety,” and includes patient’s aggression and anger, transitioning the patient out of 
session, cultivating social support, and patient’s understanding of social issues.  Under 
“boundaries,” several more idiosyncrasies were cited, including leaving responsibility 
with the military, responding to the patient following the session, ending the session, and 
understanding the therapist’s role.  Subsequent idiosyncrasies under “therapeutic 
relationship” concerned ordering (clinical) material, provide meaningful interpretation, 
maintain a singular relationship, provide a catharsis, and confront the client’s 
aggressiveness in the session.  Finally, under “clinical understanding” multiple thematic 
idiosyncrasies were present, in particular to reveal underlying, understand the military’s 
intentions, understand family dynamics, understand patient’s expectations, understand 
defenses, and rely on moral foundation. 
 Amid such idiosyncrasies, it is important to note they all unfolded within the 
domain of broader, shared common themes, namely the six general categories.  This 
seems to indicate that there was a collective ethical framework at work, encapsulating the 
possibilities in which unique ethical dilemmas and values emerged.   Such an observation 
does not preclude imagination from working its way into the ethical concerns of 
participants, but instead illuminates that a significant portion of ethics may be held less in 
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the individual subjective psyche in and of itself, and more in the social or collective 
psyche of the group as a whole.  Put succinctly, the range of concerns and values was 
obviously not infinite or divergent beyond common ground, but rather imaginative within 
six generously wide yet specific shared categories.     
77
Table I, Frequency of ideals expressed in subcategories:
Interpreted 
Ideal
Participant 
1
Participant 
2
Participant 
3
Participant 
4
Participant 
5
Participant 
6
Seeking 
clarity
11 6 5 2 2 3
Patient’s past 3 2 1 1 1 0
Patient’s 
safety
3 1 7 5 6 3
Boundaries 11 4 1 1 5 4
Therapeutic
Relationship
7 5 11 5 5 7
Clinical 
understanding
11 4 5 1 3 3
Total 46 21 29 15 22 20
Mean: 25.5
Median: 21.5
Table II, Instances of repeated thematic consideration (frequency of returning to item 
at least three times during interview):
Participant 1: 15
Participant 2: 12
Participant 3: 14
Participant 4: 9
Participant 5: 12
Participant 6: 11
Mean: 12.1
Median: 12
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Discussion
 The findings from this study suggest a variety of implications pertaining to ethics 
and the significance of imagination to clinical practice, including insight into how 
therapists construct variations of intention and what alternate paths of action they tend to 
consider.  Participants’ unique and shared responses reflect imaginative thinking that 
draws upon both interior or subjective meanings, as well as socially and institutionally-
sourced ones, resulting in a blurry line between personal and cultural values and ethical 
ideals.   The purpose of this discussion section is to address the relevance of these 
findings for practical ethics, while also considering broader questions concerning the use 
of imagination in interpersonal communication, clinical understanding, and the making of 
therapeutic meaning.  
Seeking clarity
 The general ideal category of seeking clarity provides a subset of particular minor 
ideals, which are among a plethora of preoccupations described by participants spanning 
the six major ideals (beginning with the first, clarity).  Achieving clarity, gaining clarity, 
and establishing clarity are all intention-laden phrases that occurred frequently during 
interviews, and clarity as a concept may be among the prevailing metaphors used by 
psychologists and scientists, regardless of whether they identify with the respective 
human, social, or natural sciences.  
 Clarity also relies on a metaphoric turn hinging on the epistemological role of 
vision in our processes of building shared understanding (e.g., “seeing the same thing 
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politically”), as well as the privileging of empirical knowledge of the natural world as it 
may actually exist (e.g., “seeing an object accurately and as it really is”).  Both ways of 
seeing-- of the social consensus sort and the correspondence-to-nature kind-- have been 
part of what it means to see clearly for centuries in Western thought.  Clarity as an 
everyday ideal is also found in common speech, and we can basically count on hearing 
the concept in the workplace or home whenever effective communication is sought after 
and demanded.   
 Another dimension underlying the focus on seeking clarity is an intention to 
establish clear thinking about a particular dilemma, and effectively commit to a position, 
stance, narrative, or organized and directed view.  To gain clarity is to gain a sense of 
teleology (not a firm unwavering teleos per se, but at least a sense for a sought after end).  
Use of the word itself implies awareness of varying perspectives, as well as the need to 
move toward interpersonal and/or subjective position that essentially makes both 
meaning and sense based on information and insights gathered from a given 
phenomenon.  In other words, clarity is fundamentally about establishing a contextually-
rich, historically-informed perspective that can be shared and verified by another 
observer or participant narrator.  This does not necessarily require a complete 
relinquishing of uncertainty or ambiguity, but rather seeks to construct intelligible, 
reasoned reflection on what is possible.  Seeking clarity overlaps with the notion of 
savoir as a way of knowing that arises out of the contextually-embedded, situationally-
grounded struggle for clarity; in the movement toward making what is implicit explicit, a 
widening ethical understanding is constructed and developed.  The data indicates that the 
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movement of trying to become clear leads to engagement and diversification, which then 
leads to a different picture of ethics and restructures ambiguity.  
 Of the ideals expressed in subcategories, several concern gaining clarity regarding 
the patient’s history and past, demonstrating a tendency among therapists to approach 
ethical practice not only through clear, ordered, and structured understanding, but also 
through an ordering of the patient’s past.  Such tendencies appeal to underlying 
psychodynamic theory, even among therapists who do not explicitly identify with 
psychoanalysis or its kindred theories; primarily because psychodynamic thought, more 
than any other theoretical foundation, awards a privileged place to the historic, 
genealogies of self, and the search for symptomatic origin.
 Participants also expressed strong concern for gaining clarity of communication 
and language, linking linguistic precision, accuracy, and directness to ethical action.  This 
tendency overlapped with establishing narrative clarity and clear intentionality, implying 
that ethics converges with an ability to order the patient’s story, self-direction, 
expectations, and desires.  Furthermore, participants frequently noted the importance of 
establishing clarity in treatment planning, direction and effect of treatment, case 
conceptualization, and diagnosis.  These themes suggest a vision of ethical action that 
sees clarity by way of shared planning, intent, direction, and coherence of clinical 
understanding.  Through such subcategories, it becomes apparent that participants assign 
meaning and value to a process of therapeutic communication that seeks and ideally 
creates clear and unambiguous planning, direction, motivation, and treatment 
expectations.  
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 While the theme of clarity is important to understanding how therapists engage in 
ethical thinking and what content is involved, it by no means offers a comprehensive 
account of such content, particularly since later themes cited by and valued by therapists 
contradict and belie easy and clear ethical ideals that rest easily together.  For instance, 
under the general ideal of clinical understanding, participants expressed the importance of 
the “big picture,” using intuition, and understanding culture and identity differences.  
Additionally, under “boundaries” participants sought to “preserve ambiguity.” None of 
these themes is open to singular interpretation, and consequently they subvert and 
complicate therapists’ intentions to work toward clarity.
 Among the divergent and idiosyncratic responses concerning clarity, eight 
subcategories were endorsed by only one participant, indicating divergent thinking in 
contrast to group and shared trends.  These subcategories included “knowing clearly,” 
“clear understanding,” “clear and coherent motivation,” “clear thinking,” “ethical 
clarity,” “clear diagnosis,” “clear effect of treatment,” and “narrative clarity.”  Their 
importance seems to revolve around divergent thought that remained within the bounds 
of the expected range of concerns, and did not deviate in extreme ways from other 
subcategories that were shared by multiple participants.  The eight idiosyncratic themes 
speak to the participants’ desire to establish organized, structured, and unambiguous 
thinking in regard to clinical thought, ethics, narration, effects of therapy, and 
understanding the patient.  By way of such desire, they embody the search for more firm, 
certain, and solid foundations of understanding, and imply that obtaining greater certainty 
through a processes of clarifying converges with ethical practice.  
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Patient’s past
 The second major thematic category, patient’s past, includes a number of 
subcategories which stand independent from the previous themes concerning gaining 
clarity about the patient’s history, although there is some overlap.  This merger occurs 
through therapists‘ use of the descriptive terms “comprehensive” and “coherent,” which 
parallel their search for “clarity” from the first thematic category.  
 Research participants endorsed ethical action that addressed the patient’s past in 
terms of developmental history, treatment history, and “unresolved issues.”  Their focus 
on the individual’s past echoes earlier thematic emphasis on values found most explicitly 
in psychodynamic theory, suggesting that ethical action relies, to some degree, on gaining 
perspective of the patient’s early development, including “issues” or traumas, conflicts, 
and unmet desires.  These inclinations resonate with what the late psychiatrist-analyst 
Ethel Person conveyed in Feeling Strong (2002), that “no one can really know us unless 
they know where we come from, what bumps and wounds we experienced in early 
life” (quoted in Burt, 2012).  
 What is more, the emphasis on the past also suggests therapists‘ concern with the 
influence of biology and the potential organicity of patient complaints, symptoms, and 
distress.  To understand the historic basis of a symptom-- whether seen as biological or 
psychogenic-- requires an attentiveness to the value of the patient’s past as conveyed in 
their narration and sequencing of life events, including how they order difficulties in 
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terms of cause, effect, and origin.  Therapists participating in the study appear to equate 
ethical practice with an awareness of such a perspective.
 An exception to these trends occurs in the final subcategory of the patient’s past 
category, namely “absence of history as viewer of clinical encounter,” a concern of only 
one participant, but noteworthy nonetheless.  Given the context in which the participant 
expressed this, it seems he was referencing the situation of the research interview and 
limitations imposed by viewing a video portrayal of psychotherapy.  Moreover, he was 
emphasizing the importance of having a direct, first-hand experience of the patient’s 
progress through therapy, and not simply a snapshot provided by a limited and finite 
portrayal of a session.  Nevertheless, his concerns are indicative of a more general 
frustration and dilemma therapists may experience at any given time; for, what clinical 
relationship is not bound by a beginning and an end, a trajectory unfolding over a period 
of time which is relatively short in comparison to the breadth of any given patient’s 
lifespan and development?  While the limitations imposed by the video clip are to some 
degree artificial insofar as actual therapy, of course, involves a first session followed by 
subsequent sessions and, eventually, a final session; a therapist’s vantage point is always 
limited by the “snapshots” she receives of a particular patient regardless of whether the 
patient is seen for one session or fifty.  Inevitably, therapists must resolve to piece 
together a coherent and workable version of past events on limited information.  In other 
words, therapists occupy and attend to a realm of meaning that, by definition, will create 
a multitude of gaps in understanding, necessitating that clinical work occur between the 
bookends, so to speak.
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 Further complicating this concern is the issue of empathy and social proximity, an 
ethical problem raised by several prominent liberal social theorists, including two leading 
contemporary philosophers, Jeremy Rifkin and Peter Singer, whose respective writings 
have reached a mass audience over the past several decades (Asma, 2013).  Both Rifkin 
and Singer have argued for widening the ethical circle and expanding our moral 
obligations to include the welfare of all of humanity, regardless of race, ethnicity, or 
nationality.1
 In a recent article in The Stone, philosopher Stephen Asma (2013) polemicizes 
Singer’s empathy project, arguing that our ability to empathize with and understand the 
moral relevance of another’s situation, whether human or nonhuman, depends on our 
ability to experience an emotional connection to them.  He also argues that these moral 
connections are only realistically available to those whose lives we directly associate 
with, exemplified in Cicero’s outlook that “society and human fellowship will be best 
served if we confer the most kindness on those whom we are most closely 
associated” (Asma, 2013).  While certainly not as idealistic as the vast, boarder-
transgressing, and inclusionary hopes of Western liberalism, Cicero’s stance may, in 
reality, be the more accurate reflection of the way human behavior has and continues to 
operate.   
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1 1 Singer has also argued in favor of extending the ethical circle to include our closest genetic 
kin, the four nonhuman Great Ape species of the Hominidae family (made up of chimpanzees, 
bonobos, gorillas, orangutans, and homo sapiens).  Singer has made some strides toward such 
goals, particularly through his role in promoting the international Great Ape Project, which has 
illustrated that at least some human beings are capable of engaging their empathetic 
imaginations to traverse divisive ideological barriers. 
 Applying Asma’s position to the research situation, it is likely more difficult for 
participants to feel a strong affective bond with a patient who is portrayed in a filmed 
therapy scenario.  Even more importantly, If Asma is correct, it is quite possible that 
direct social contact with a patient is a critically important factor in evoking strong 
affection and, consequently, ethical care for patients.  In effect, the recent emergence of 
online psychotherapy could become a deeply problematical topic of current ethical 
relevance, particularly as philosophers like Asma alert us to the important role that social 
proximity likely plays in awakening us to “the true wellsprings of ethical care, namely 
the emotions” (Asma, 2013).   
 There were a number of idiosyncratic responses, each cited by only one 
participant under the patient’s past category.  Specifically, these include “comprehensive 
history,” “treatment history,” “unresolved issues from the past,” and “absence of history 
as viewer of clinical encounter.”  The first three subcategories clearly overlap with one 
another and share concerns with “coherent history,” a subcategory shared by three 
participants.  The last one listed is unique and original in its speaker’s attempt to discuss 
the research study itself.  It also demonstrates the generative, problem-creating potential 
of imaginative thinking, mostly as it raises a question that leads to further, essentially 
unresolvable questions.  It is a dilemma that engenders further dilemmas concerning the 
nature of an authentic encounter, the relationship between ethics and social proximity, 
and the value of first-person experience, all of which were discussed above.  Finally, 
these themes all concern ethics and were generated through the divergent thinking of only 
one participant, which demonstrates that importance of imaginative thought.  Through a 
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hypothetical dialogue among participants, it is possible that this concern could be raised 
by one and discussed by all of them, effectively deepening the ethical discourse, and 
expanding notions of what sorts of dilemmas we include within the ethical domain. 
Patient’s safety
 The third category, patient’s safety, encompasses a number of related values and 
ideals which are perhaps more defined by practicality and concreteness than those from 
other general categories.  Through a clinical vignette that was weighted with potentially 
catastrophic, tragic, and momentous implications, participants were quick to attend to the 
urgency of preventing irreparable harm to the patient or others.  Furthermore, they felt 
these clinical concerns were ethical in nature. 
 The subset of values encased within the patient safety category range from 
stabilizing the patient’s high emotionality and securing his safety (and consequently 
safety of others), on the one hand; to creating a web of supportive relationships and 
establishing an appropriate treatment frame, on the other.  While these themes were 
mentioned by all of the research participants, they are relevant insofar as the threat of 
suicide, aggression, and violence toward others is never explicitly communicated by the 
patient.  The presence of such themes is inferred through participants’ speculation 
regarding the patient’s state of mind, vis-a-vis observation of the patient’s affect, 
communication, and comportment converging with cultural images of mental instability.  
Moreover, these cultural images of mental illness appeal to broader societal portrayals of 
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madness and insanity, especially our fears and anxieties of patients, in the worst of 
scenarios, “losing it.”  
 In the fictional portrayal, the participants‘ fears turn out to be correct, though 
those who did not view future episodes would be unknowing (assuming they were not 
told by someone else who watched the series).  At any rate, therapists‘ worries of the 
patient destabilizing and inflicting harm turned out to be justified; as the client eventually  
dies while performing his job flying a military jet, and his death appears to be deliberate 
and self-inflicted.   However, in evaluating this scenario, we must consider the 
entertainment dimension of allowing these fears to materialize.  It is certainly more 
sensational to introduce the death of a character to a dramatic production than to only 
allow mortal consequences to merely hover in the backdrop, as a threat and nothing else.  
Such a script would fail to illustrate that tragedy is, indeed, a very real part of life.  
 Fortunately, most patients, including those suffering from repeated episodes of 
suicidal ideation, do not end up committing suicide.  According to the National Institutes 
of Health website, “about 10% of people who threaten or try to commit suicide will 
eventually kill themselves” (see NIH.gov, 2013).  Although it is difficult to discern and 
measure how many people experience suicidal ideation because many do so in isolation 
and beyond the reach of documentation, and many clinicians can attest to working with 
countless patients who endure suicidal ideation but never develop a plan or act on those 
thoughts.       
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 The ethical practitioner will, ideally, take suicidal thoughts and threats with the 
greatest seriousness and diligence, and the participating therapists in this study appear to 
be well aware of the necessity of keeping these safety risks-- from suicide, aggression, 
violence, and isolation without support-- always in the backdrop, ready to take center 
stage should the indicators arise.  Additionally, these indicators may rely on the ever-
present fears therapists have of losing a patient or having a patient engage in violence, as 
well as on the sensationalized images of the mentally ill in movies, the news, and popular 
culture; nevertheless, with the issue of grave risks, we are better off being hyper-vigilant 
than asleep at the helm.  It appears that the research participants invariably share such a 
conclusion.
 Among the unique and singular responses provided by participants in the third 
category, four subcategories arise as relevant and, ultimately, overlapping the shared 
concerns of participants.  That is to say, unlike the second category in which a participant 
provided a truly unique and divergent response, subcategories in the third category 
hovered closely to the primary concerns of participants as discussed above.  Given the 
highly practical nature of the category itself-- safety-- all of the responses, from shared to 
singular ones, focused on how to ensure the patient is adequately cared for, intensified by 
his variable mood and overall instability.  Participants‘ concerns for this theme were far 
from surprising and relied on crisis prevention thinking and the well-known value of 
social support for mentally unstable individuals.  
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Boundaries 
 The fourth category, boundaries, involved participants constructing a frame 
around the agency and responsibility of relevant parties involved in the patient’s life and 
care, primarily for the sake of ordering an otherwise potentially disordered social 
encounter.   Participants’ concerns tended to equate ethical practice with preserving the 
patient’s power and freedom to determine his future, make important decisions, and 
thereby take responsibility for his actions.  Such a view reflects the heart of Western 
values, namely the privileged position and weight bestowed upon the individual’s 
presumably self-contained agency.
 Among the subcategories composing the boundaries section, numerous 
participants were troubled with the possibility of becoming involved in an ethical 
quandary in which their honesty and integrity was compromised to please the patient.  
These converge with overarching themes of leaving responsibility, and the patient’s 
vocational fate, with external actors; that is to say, the patient himself and the military 
doctors in the video portrayal.  
 Participants also wrestled with the extent to which the patient should be 
confronted and pushed by the therapist, and what role, if any, the therapist should play in 
making decisions about the patient’s desire to return to work, reactivate in the military, 
and maintain values that engender anger, hatred, and further divisiveness.  At least two 
therapists felt that the patient’s values should be respected, even if they contradict the 
prevailing liberal-humanist value system characterizing our era, espoused by most 
90
contemporary institutions, and embodied in professional ethics codes in medicine and 
psychology.  Meanwhile, the other participants felt either anger or ambivalence toward 
such matters, while some refrained from voicing their uncertainty, or they refrained from 
considering its importance, illustrated through the absence of their outward consideration 
of this dilemma.  
 The unique and unshared subcategories for the boundaries section were contained 
in four themes, each noted by just one participant.  These include “leaving responsibility 
with the military,” “responding to the patient after session,” how to “end the session,” and 
“understanding the therapist’s role.”  Participants respectively mentioned these concerns 
and left them unresolved during the interview, citing them as dilemmas of notable 
difficulty and significance.  While the first and last themes (“leaving responsibility with 
the military” and “understanding the therapist’s role”) at least partly appear to be a way 
of distancing from the patient and avoiding the potentially unanswerable question of job 
preparedness; the other two (responding to the patient after session” and “ending 
session”) concern transitioning between therapy and the outside world, and ensuring 
proper care.   
 Although these four themes were idiosyncratic, they exhibit a strong commonality 
with the other themes under the boundaries category, which rests in questions of space, 
orientation, and positioning toward the patient; questions such as: How close is too close? 
What decisions must the patient face alone?  What am I, as the therapist, qualified to 
address here?  How should the patient’s lack of sensitivity to cultural diversity be 
handled?  How is a tense, tumultuous session best ended?  And, what communication, if 
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any, should occur beyond the frame of the session?  Such questions, demonstratively 
important to all those interviewed, do not have clear, easy answers, nor is there a code or 
set of guidelines which neatly corresponds, applies, and resolves.  Rather, what is 
evidenced in the participants’ responses and the questions they raise is that therapists, at 
least among those interviewed, seem to address ethical dilemmas not by referring to 
answers, but rather by attending to questions, without any haste to side-step or reduce the 
subtleties accompanying an encounter with a values-based dilemma.  
 In some sense, the question of “how do therapists resolve ethical dilemmas?” is 
not easily amenable to a formulaic explanation because the how of their responses is less 
an answer than a practice; one predicated on the healing, therapeutic value of attending 
to, being open, and holding a mental, emotional, and imaginative space in which patient 
and therapist alike, and perhaps together, can come to answers and insights about things 
carrying the greatest of meaning; and, often, consequence as well.  Such features come to 
the fore most clearly in the boundaries section, where it becomes apparent that the 
therapists are not necessarily trying to solve a problem like a mathematician would, but 
instead are playing by entirely different rules, much like walking carefully in a delicate 
emotional and psychological landscape, and being ever diligent not to damage the growth 
already occurring around them.      
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Therapeutic relationship 
 Subcategories in the fifth category, therapeutic relationship, revolved around  
themes found in several of the other six categories, but bonded through a common 
interest in how such shared material could be applied directly to the actual patient--
therapist relationship.  These themes concerned integrating, ordering, and unifying the 
patient’s story; providing effective, meaningful, and timely interpretations while 
communicating them directly; utilizing intuition, empathy, and contextual sensitivity; 
and, confronting the client while refraining from “advice giving.”  Additionally, imitating 
successful treatment approaches and maintaining a singular patient--therapist relationship 
were seen as important ethical issues.  
 Undoubtedly, these themes cover a wide spectrum of clinical values and ideals, 
beginning with the privileged place given to psychological integration and unity, as well 
as awareness of context.  While the former seem to resonate with both psychoanalytic and 
humanistic visions of psychological wholeness, the latter echoes post-structural values 
emphasizing the necessity of contextual sensibilities.  The two value-systems are not 
necessarily contradictory, but they certainly do not relate without conflict and, to some 
degree, contradictory.   
 Uniquely, the therapeutic relationship category marked the first time that 
participants explicitly mentioned the ethics code and preconceived ethical knowledge.  
Two subcategories involved participants‘ concern with how to “apply ethical knowledge” 
and “the ethical code.”  Interestingly, the participants were not able to clearly or 
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definitively identify or locate the particular aspects of the code or specific sources of their 
ethical knowledge.  At most, the only references to the code were characterized by 
vagueness (see Interview III in the Appendix).  
 Nevertheless, in the case of one of the participants, ethical knowledge, the ethics 
code, and contextual sensitivity were all mentioned as important considerations.  Given 
such concerns, contradictory themes inevitably arise, particularly as the ethics code, if 
specified, would likely and eventually (as detailed knowledge of an individual patient 
grew) conflict with certain sensitivities bound by the uniqueness of person and context.  
Consequently, the therapist would be forced into an intensifying dilemma, to be resolved 
either by allowing one to win out-- the generalized precepts of the code, on the one hand, 
or the unique phenomenon revealed within the context, on the other-- or, alternatively, 
responded to with a tolerance for uncertainty.  In other words, practitioners with an 
interest in applying both the code and honoring the context will most likely face 
situations in which the direction of the clinical relationship is guided by an attempt to 
amalgamate the two, but also challenged by moments when there is no clear or 
memorable guideline to apply, exemplified by these research participants’ absence of 
detailed recollection of the code.  Amid such moments, therapists will likely, and indeed 
hopefully, defer to the vividness and emotionality of the context, while abandoning the 
abstractness and distance of the code because the context and life-world provide a much 
richer reservoir of information that can feed the moral intuition and ethical imagination, 
and thereby lay the groundwork for flashes of empathy and compassionate wisdom.      
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Clinical understanding
 The sixth category, clinical understanding, is composed of a number of 
subcategories concerning dilemmas of clinical knowledge and particular interpersonal 
dynamics that interview participants deemed essential to therapeutic work.   Describing 
these considerations, interviewees either directly referred to their desire to obtain greater 
understanding of X, or they deferred to well-known knowledge structures, such as “rely 
on moral foundation,” “rely on diagnostic frame,” and “rely on supervisor.”   The other 
subcategories illustrated a pressing interest in focusing clinical thinking on resolving 
ambiguity in terms of context, latent motives of the patient, military and institutional 
intentions, family dynamics, patient defenses, and differences stemming from cultural 
and identity issues.  
 A tangential subcategory within the sixth category referred to participants‘ desire 
to “understand intuitively,” a topic gaining increasing attention within academic 
psychology and beyond.  In The Righteous Mind: Why Good People Are Divided by 
Politics and Religion, Haidt (2013) contends, and argues quite convincingly, that difficult 
human matters are fundamentally decided using moral intuition, as opposed to rationality 
or reason.  A recent paper in the A.P.A.’s journal (Rogerson et. al., 2011) argues much the 
same, positioning intuitive and emotional processes at the front and center of moral 
decision making, and our understanding of value-based dilemmas.  
 Yet, perhaps both Haidt and others are missing something crucial; specifically, a 
response to the question of what, thematically and phenomenologically, connects the 
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intuitive processes of moral sentiment and decision-making with the logical, rational, and 
reasoned justifications we provide for those very moral sensitivities and propensities?  In 
response, and in line with this study, the human imagination provides a bridge between 
unreflective intuition and reasoned justification.  Imagination serves this role insofar as it 
involves contemplation of various possible scenarios, many of which blend with and 
emerge from personal experience, emotion, subtle imagery, and the attempt to language 
and narrate what is otherwise vague and unthematic.  Consequently, when participants 
refer to “understanding [clinical material] intuitively,” they are referring to the 
importance of a “gut feeling” and unreflective knowing, but are also omitting, in my 
view, imagination’s role in making clinical experience meaningfully thematic and 
intelligible.
 Additional themes within the “clinical understanding” category touch upon the 
multiplicity of participants’ philosophical viewpoints, including overt psychodynamic 
themes (“understand defenses”, “understand what is latent or concealed”), family systems 
theory (“understand family dynamics”), post-structuralism (“understand context, 
“understand cultural/identity differences”), foundationalism and humanism (“rely on 
moral foundation”), and social constructionism (“rely on social and supervisory 
understandings”).  Furthermore, they also value (for lack of a better term) practical 
reasoning, demonstrated in somewhat unspecified intentions to “understand big picture,” 
“understand patient’s expectations,” and “rely on diagnostic frame.”  All of this appears 
to suggest that clinicians rely on a variety of sources to inform their imaginings of how 
they would respond to a possible clinical scenario, and in effect, most likely utilize 
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multiple sources to explain, justify, and lend meaning to their understanding of both self 
and other in therapy.  Stated alternately, clinical understanding, in the eyes of the research 
participants, depends on the integration of different sources to assemble a plausible, 
reasonable, and practical response to a complex encounter.
 Another theme that is visible in the subcategories is a quality of vagueness and 
ambiguity in the participants‘ responses, which could be immediately seen as a weakness 
in their explanations.  However, such ambiguity can instead be taken as a respect for the 
role of speculation within the clinical encounter itself, as well appreciation for the 
dimension of lived experience within the clinical relationship.  Given that participants 
were responding to a clinical portrayal, their responses, at most, qualify as simulations of 
what they intend to do.  This need not diminish the value of their reflections, but rather it 
points to the participants’ tendency to leave a lot to be determined by an actual encounter, 
indicating that over-planning and predetermining the detailed specifics might be 
detrimental to an authentic response.  It also suggests that the work of the therapist is 
unavoidably vague and ambiguous to the degree that every participant offered distinct 
perspectives as to what ethical dilemmas were present, and how they should be 
addressed.  
 While there was clear social consensus in that thematic similarities emerged and 
were organizable into relatable categories; such a task was by no means streamlined or 
perfectly continuous, visible in the thematic overlap between categories, and repetition of 
similar themes across participants and categories.  Such is the consequence of filtering 
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participants‘ completely unique choices of language and narration into generalizable, 
organized ethical dilemmas.  
 Evidently, what is at work is a process of combinatory understanding wherein 
participants loosely utilize socially-held values and ethical frameworks, and then 
combine those concepts with their respective and idiosyncratic leanings.  This integration 
of objective and subjective ethical systems is what lends each clinical encounter its 
meaningfulness, and perhaps, its efficacy.  Importantly, by objective, I refer not to 
objective morality in a universal sense, but, alternatively, seen as a correspondence to 
socially, culturally, and communally shared values, which are then treated generally, and 
used to construct formal guidelines and codes.  Subjective, then, implies idiosyncratic, 
unique, and contextually-sensitive values that are created from lived encounters, which 
demand practical applications of imaginative variations of generalized moral codes.           
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Conclusion
 Among the findings provided through this research is the recognition of the role 
that imagination might play in a viable, lived, and generative ethics, one that is critically 
revitalized amid our all-too-frequent encounters with stale and institutionally-bound  
formalized ethical codes.  Too often, formalized codes mask the ambiguity at the core of 
human relationships, glazing over complex questions with a ready-made rule and 
procedural structure, or a near magical belief in the power of a universal or timeless 
authority, one external and oblivious to the particulars of a given context.  Yet, it is 
precisely the complex, values-based ethical questions that do not yield easily to moral 
formulae, and need not be put to rest by codified rules, especially since so many 
problems of human relationships and suffering remain intractable and call for our 
continued concern. 
 The relationship between Foucault’s distinction between savoir and connaisannce 
allows us to gain a deeper and more accurate understanding of the interaction between 
formal and informal knowledge systems, particularly with regard to ethical codes and 
values in the clinical encounter.  Moreover, when combined with Ricoeur and Kearney’s 
understanding of ethics as the ability to imagine otherwise, we may begin to appreciate 
the essential vitality of alterity, contradiction, and ambiguity within many ethically-
layered situations.  The results of the data in this study illustrate the large degree to which 
these ideas-- from Foucault’s post-structuralism to Ricoeur and Kearney’s hermeneutics-- 
are present in the struggles of clinicians attempting to engage in ethical practice. 
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 With respect to the discipline of clinical psychology, the results of this study 
suggest that rethinking standard texts and decision-making models for ethics courses 
might be improved to better reflect the phenomenology of ethics if they were to include a 
discussion of the ethical imagination and experiential themes addressing how dilemmas 
are understood and dealt with in practice.
 While formalized codes and ethical standards occupy an important and necessary 
place in society and clinical practice, they need not be viewed as the source of ethical 
action and understanding; the idea that to be ethical requires only awareness of what is 
right or wrong according to rules is gravely misleading.  Indeed, Kitcher (2011) maintains 
that ethics appropriately be seen as an ever-evolving human project, one that is forever 
incomplete, but nonetheless deserving of our utmost attention.  
 Converse to the notion of ethics-as-the-rational- application-of-corresponding-
codes, the imaginative thinking that takes place amidst ethical dilemmas is a better 
representation of the foundation (or anti-foundation) of ethics; for, it is through the 
generative capacities of our thought that new and unexpected ethical horizons arise, 
which in turn, allow for empathy and understanding of another’s suffering, and the ability 
to envision, simulate, and model alternative courses of action.  Furthermore, it is through 
imaginative consideration of alterity that variations of language and description emerge, 
bringing forth varying interpretations of meaning, affecting greater ethical nuance, and 
engendering a deeper appreciation for ambiguity in moral dilemmas.  To respect 
ambiguity is to remain open, both emotionally and cognitively, which might be the single 
greatest aspect of developing a meaningful understanding of another person.  What is 
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more, meaningful understanding alone is an effective psychotherapeutic approach, and 
perhaps the vitalizing quality that ethics needs in our society’s quickly retreating 
conversation concerning ethical frontiers.
 To appeal for a moment to the creative wisdom of the arts, the American painter 
Chuck Close (Popova, 2013) contends that our society is entirely too focused on 
problem-solving, which may be seen to include a broad oversimplification of ethics and 
moral understanding in favor of coming to quick, pragmatic, and results-driven solutions.  
The proper response, for the artist and creative thinker, urges Close, is to focus on 
approaching one's craft- whether painting or otherwise--  with a keen sense for problem-
creation.  Such an embrace of problem-generativeness requires an aptitude for holding 
contradictory and opposing value systems in mind simultaneously, and being open to the 
uncertainty these systems produce when juxtaposed.  
 Much like humanity itself, the origins of ethics are elusive, fluid, and not easily 
amenable to our desire to establish firm lines between right and wrong, virtue and vice.  
While some dilemmas may ultimately be resolved with clear and firm judgement, many 
more are not.  They remain ambiguous and fraught with porous boundaries between what 
is ethical and, in the clinical context effective, on the one hand, and what is damaging and 
harmful, on the other.  
 Based on the data collected in this study, and in light of ambiguity in ethics, we 
might consider a number of features of imaginative thinking used by research participants 
and evidenced in their responses.  Although there may be others, a number of important 
qualities of the ethical imagination come to mind, including flexibility of thought, active 
101
interpretation of possibilities, envisioning multiple intentional and emotional scenarios 
affecting self and other, consideration of alterity; and, the use of various metaphors to 
describe moral dilemmas and potential solutions.
 The authors of a recent article in the American Psychologist (Rogerson et. al. 
2011) would seem to agree with the importance of these qualities.  Rogerson et. al. (2011) 
contend that ethical decision-making depends much less on rationality than on 
“nonrational factors,” namely, “automatic intuitive and affective processes” (Rogerson, 
2011, p.621).  They call for going “beyond existing rational models” to “utilize 
deliberation, intuition, and emotion most effectively.”  Furthermore, they prescribe a 
three-fold approach to resolving ethical dilemmas that closely parallels the characteristics 
evidenced by the research participants in this study.  When faced with an ethical 
dilemma, Rogerson et. al. recommend seeking additional information, patient 
consideration of alternatives, and re-examining initial assumptions.  The third step is 
aimed at limiting the damage of preconscious and intuitive reactions from dictating one’s 
ethical understanding and position.  Nonetheless, Rogerson et. al. do not seek abandoning 
or obscuring the potential contributions of nonrational aspects of decision-making, 
especially concerning generativity and the emergence of creative solutions to initial 
assumptions about what a rule or ethical code means practically; that is, they think 
ethics-in-practice too often involves the application of a black and white choice between 
abiding by or breaking a rule (2011, p.621).  More often, there exist alternatives that 
perhaps avoid an either/or dichotomy and can appeal to nuances without the blind and 
rote application of rules in practice.  
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 Interestingly, Rogerson et. al. fail to acknowledge the vitalizing role that 
imagination might provide in such a discussion.  Despite their commendable efforts to 
redress the imbalance favoring rational deliberation as a model for decision making; 
Rogerson et. al. ultimately align with the very philosophical tradition, and its 
accompanying assumptions, which they ostensibly have set out to critique.  Insofar as the 
authors omit a place for imagination, both conceptually and practically, they avoid 
attending to a critical distinction between Analytic and Continental traditions regarding 
how reason should be defined.  As Gutting (2012) writes, Continental philosophers since 
the 1960s, including Foucault, Derrida, and Deleuze, “regard the essential activity of 
reason not as the logical regimentation of thought but as the creative exercise of 
intellectual imagination” (Gutting, 2012, p.3).  
 Gutting describes two contrasting priorities accorded philosophy within the 
Continental tradition, one being focused on philosophies of experience and the other on 
philosophies of imagination.  Both variations are apt to the discussion here, but the 
second is particularly relevant to highlighting the problem with the aforementioned 
research of Rogerson et al.  Gutting explains: 
 “Continental philosophies of experience try to probe beneath the concepts of 
 everyday experience to discover the meanings that underlie them, to think the 
 conditions for the possibility of our concepts.  By contrast, continental 
 philosophies of imagination try to think beyond those concepts, to, in some 
 sense, think what is impossible.” (Gutting, 2012, p.3).
103
 By omitting the imagination as a concept, Rogerson et. al. limit the chances of 
reaching a better phenomenological understanding of ethics, and align psychology and 
decision-making models with an Enlightenment era language and frame, which 
diminishes what Continental versions of the imagination, and its potential for liberation, 
may offer.  In thinking beyond current ethical structures, we are liberated into using 
imagination not only for the sake of creatively problem-solving ethical dilemmas, but 
also for perceiving ethical concerns that have yet to be thought.  The latter forces us to 
confront the strange typecasting that ethics gets in our professional culture, and begs the 
question: why do we so frequently think of ethics as rules and what is proper, as opposed 
to an incomplete project toward envisioning what is possible?   
 It is not only Continental thinkers who find imagination valuable to thought 
generally and ethics in particular.  Among the latest developments in cognitive science is 
an emerging discussion about the central role of imaginative capacities in making us 
uniquely human, as well as forming the basis for humane ethics, in both theory and 
practice.   As cognitive scientist Benjamin Bergen (2012) illustrates in Louder Than 
Words: The New Science of How the Mind Makes Meaning, all human communication 
leaves gaps of meaning and understanding; mental representations enhanced by narrative 
are always, to varying degrees, incomplete.  However, this incompleteness provides the 
opportunity for imagination to craft links in the narrative gaps, breaks, and ambiguous 
patches.  As Bergen writes, “human language, in contrast to all other animal 
communication systems, is open-ended” (Bergen, 2012, p.4), which leaves room for 
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linguistic pliability wherein imaginative activity becomes essential for interpreting and 
inferring meaning.
 Bergen extends the conversation about language and imagination further, 
describing the emergence of the embodied simulation hypothesis within cognitive 
scientific circles in the mid-1990s (Bergen, 2012).  Basically, the idea stipulates: 
 
 “Maybe we understand language by simulating in our minds what it would be like 
 to experience the things that the language describes.” (Bergen, 2012, p.13).
Bergen contends that the mental imagery of “simulation creates echoes in our brains of 
previous experiences,” allowing us to “simulate percepts and actions without actually 
perceiving or acting” (Bergen, 2012, p.15).  Such simulations, though, are not limited to 
structures corresponding to previous experiences, but can transcend them through acts of 
imaginative, mental rehearsal to create new patterns of visualized, imagined movement, 
thought, and linguistic variation.  Mental rehearsal, according to Bergen, is useful for 
visualizing and improving motor skills, such as with choreographed dance or shooting 
free throws, which has been known by performance artists and athletes for years (e.g., I 
can still, quite vividly, recall my Uncle Mike, who played college football at Marquette 
University in the 1950s, reminiscing to me that he used to visualize performing specific 
defensive tackles as a middle linebacker, and reaped great successes on game day from 
strenuous mental rehearsal off the field).  What is more, simulation also enables us to 
make sense of and story from the ultimately arbitrary symbols of a given language 
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system.  As Bergen writes, “meaning, according to the embodied simulation hypothesis, 
isn’t just abstract mental symbols; it’s a creative process, in which people construct 
virtual experiences -- embodied simulations-- in their mind’s eye” (Bergen, 2012, p. 16).
 Even evolutionary evidence seems to point to the primacy of our capacities to 
imagine, and thus mental simulations to form a foundation upon which language may 
have emerged.  Simon Garfield (2013), author of On the Map: A Mind-Expanding 
Exploration of the Way the World Looks, has explained that early mapping, and the 
visualization and subsequent pictorial representation of landscapes, may have preceded 
the development of complex language, an idea advanced by the evolutionary biologist 
Richard Dawkins (Garfield, 2013).  Early cave paintings, sketches of imagined 
landscapes, and attempts at representative mapping may have enabled the evolution of an 
interior landscapes that, in turn, allowed for extraordinary variation in mental rehearsal.  
In effect, the vital need arose to apply verbal description to a rapidly expanding world of 
mental imagery, leading to an eternal and inextricable bond between the visual 
imagination and the linguistic imagination.                
 All of these important theoretical digressions relate to the phenomena observed in 
this study.  When participants were asked to “imagine how they would respond to the 
ethical dilemmas portrayed...”, they responded not by applying rules or ethical codes, 
which have their place; but instead by speculating about questions of narrative meaning.  
And, they achieved this by mentally simulating countless scenarios in an attempt to fill in 
the spaces within the patient’s history, context, and interiority, the latter including 
speculation about intentionality, affect, and desire.
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 Interestingly, these ideas from cognitive science intersect with those espoused by 
Steve Almond, an American writer and essayist.  He laments the “erosion of narrative 
authority in our civil discourse,” as well as in the arts (Almond, 2012).  Almond describes 
the irreplaceable virtues of the traditional and modern narrator, and sees the narrator as 
being systematically fragmented in an increasingly technological and visual media-
saturated culture in which “the audience’s role [has become] increasingly passive-- to 
absorb and react, not to imagine” (Almond, 2012).  Amid these trends, many of the very 
concerns of the psychologically-minded clinician have come under duress, namely those 
shared by Almond in particular, and the writer generally, who are interested in telling a 
coherent and unified story.  These include, the ability to “establish setting, supply vital 
background and push the plot ahead,” as well as describe “subjective modes so the reader 
can experience the interior lives of characters”  (Almond, 2012).  These qualities closely 
mirror those illuminated by the research participant-therapists, whose focus was on 
imagining what descriptions might best apply to the setting and context, history and past, 
and interior life of the patient.  In this sense, the ethical decision-making processes of 
therapists more closely resembles the attentiveness of the writer than virtually anyone 
else.  
 It is puzzling, then, why the A.P.A. model for ethics is based on the rational and 
logical model of the natural scientist when, in practice, therapists rely on much different 
sources of understanding, including those stemming from imaginative capacities 
assessed, utilized, and praised by creative writers.  Clearly, the A.P.A.‘s ethical canon is 
neither concerned with attending to how clinicians experience thinking about ethical 
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dilemmas, nor with how they use vital qualities inherent to imaginative thought to resolve 
dilemmas; instead the A.P.A.’s canon coveys the institutional hope to design and further a 
set of guidelines that pleases the dominant cultural values of our time, one favoring clear 
and distinct ethical codes, and corresponding guidelines to be applied rationally.       
 The linguist and cognitive philosopher Mark Johnson raises similar concerns with 
regard to ethics, literature, and the sources of our moral sentiments.  Johnson asserts that 
widespread views of morality, particularly those within mainstream religious, legal and 
institutional circles, are characterized by the notion “that living morally is principally a 
matter of moral insight into the ultimate moral rules, combined with strength of will to do 
the right thing that is required by those views.”  This moral absolutism fails to account 
for the crucial and “fundamental role of imagination in our moral reasoning” (Johnson, 
1993, p. iv).  Johnson calls us to recognize morality as a process of discerning “what is 
morally relevant in situations” and understanding “empathically how others experience 
things, and to envision the full range of possibilities open to us in a particular 
case”  (Johnson, 1993, p.x)  Such a process, as demonstrated by the data described in this 
study, requires the use of imaginative thinking.  As a result, we are faced with the 
challenging task to avoid strict adherence to abstract, standardized moral codes, as well 
as the equally important need to avert total disregard for the grounding which moral 
principles can provide; indeed, we may find a middle path between the two extremes 
through the recognition that “it may be harmful to think that there is one right thing to 
do” (Johnson, 1993, p.xi).  Johnson’s advice is that, in order to engender moral 
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sensitivity, “we are going to have to take as our principle task, not the formulation of 
moral laws, but the cultivation of moral imagination” (Johnson, 1993, p. xii).  
 Johnson sees a vitalizing relationship between ethics, imagination, and narrative, 
explaining that literature and story foster emotional and imaginative depth.  He writes 
that “it is never enough to have moral principles, unless you have a sense of the tragic in 
life, the fragility of human well-being, and the importance of moral imagination in 
everything you do”  (Johnson, 1993, p. xiii).  Furthermore, the sources of these capacities 
are accessed, says Johnson, through a deepening engagement with literature and 
narrative.  
 One conclusion we might make from Johnson’s work, then, is that ethical practice 
requires the ongoing enrichment of the imagination through immersion in works of 
literature, art, theatre, film, and any performance which conveys narrative.  Instructing 
clinicians how to practice ethics by informing them of codes and guidelines has its place, 
but is not nearly as important as promoting a larger and wider engagement with 
developing one’s mind through exposure to the more difficult, essential, and meaningful 
ethical matters portrayed within stories, an idea promoted by the psychiatrist-writer 
Robert Coles in The Call of Stories: Teaching and the Moral Imagination (Coles, 1990).  
 Ethical training needs to include a component of narrative enrichment stemming 
from interdisciplinary sources and multiple mediums-- textual, visual, tactile, 
performative, auditory, etc,-- in order to teach and strengthen the ability to think deeply 
and imaginatively about ethics, out of which unforeseen ethical queries may arise.  The 
study of creativity and creative individuals across walks of life and throughout history, 
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has demonstrated that “creativity is combinatorial,” as writer and blogger Maria Popova 
explains in Brainpickings, a website which is, as she calls it, “a human-powered 
discovery engine for interestingness”  (Popova, 2013).  Popova, a self-described 
“interestingness hunter-gatherer and curious mind at large,” embodies the sort of 
imaginativeness that can lead to new insights, including ethical ones.  Her project has 
revolutionized what a website and e-newsletter for book lovers might look like.  
 Discussing innovative thinking, Popova notes that “the most profound and 
valuable insights appeal to the cross pollination of disciplines” (Popova, 2013).  Her 
ideas resonate with the ideas of both Freud and Jung, who thought that the best 
preparation for becoming a psychoanalyst was to immerse oneself in a broad and 
sustained study of anthropology, literature, history, mythology, philosophy, the arts, and 
the like.  Without such intellectual depth, the imagination is starved, and any 
psychological language or ethical codes one might entertain will amount to being little 
more than a facade, and perhaps a dangerous and harmful one insofar as the recitation 
and unthinking application of psychological facts, ideas, codes, and rules lacks humanity.  
 The project of the ethical imagination is rooted in the idea that ethics is, indeed, 
an ongoing project, one that is never complete, yet vitalized by the ambiguity at the core 
of human relationships.  Without outward recognition of this fact, human beings have a  
tendency to forget that codes and rules are human created, and can be dangerously used 
to irresponsibly hide behind, obscure identities, limit experience, hinder empathy and 
understanding, and further injustice.  Notwithstanding that, rote memory of an ethical 
rule or code is valuable, but only to the degree that its application to an actual event is 
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wrestled with, and that thinking, pondering, and reflecting on the various dimensions at 
play does not wither amid the temptation for a quick resolution to a given problem, which 
moral rules may seem to promise (at least from the perspective of the frequently 
impatient human mind).  
 Another proponent of the role of imagination in ethics, psychiatrist and 
philosopher Arnold Modell, draws a critical distinction between the construction of 
meaning and the cognitive acquisition of information, explaining that making meaning 
“is not the same as the processing of information; meaning cannot be ‘represented‘ by a 
formal symbolic symbolic code” (Modell, 2006, p. xii).  Modell argues that “the 
construction of meaning requires the use of emotions and feelings as markers of value,” 
and that what makes us most uniquely human and separates us from the rest of the animal 
kingdom is “not only our possession of language, but also our capacity for generative 
imagination, which in turn relies on the use of metaphor as a cognitive tool” (Modell, 
2006, p. xiii).  Furthermore, metaphor enables affect to be “imaginatively interpreted, 
displaced, and transformed,” which, in effect, allows human beings to sublimate instincts 
and reflectively choose alternatives to otherwise unconscious proclivities and desires 
(Modell, 2006).    
 The philosopher Hilary Putnam affirms kindred views, espousing that meaning is 
not created through the translation of a cryptographer’s code but rather through social 
interaction, and dependent on “what is in our heads [...] and in our environment,” writes 
Modell (ibid).  Consequently, meaning is best seen as embodied, social, and imaginative, 
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making the sources of ethical and moral values ecologically rooted in the human 
community, so to speak (Modell, 2006, p.4).  
 Yet, despite a cacophony of voices praising the vitality of imagination in both 
making meaning and morality -- ranging from contemporary ones like Johnson, Modell, 
and Bergen to much older ones like John Dewey, Frederich Nietzsche, and the 17th 
century Italian philosopher Giambattista Vico-- there has been an even larger movement 
in the sciences away from such a view.   As Modell laments, “the flight away from a 
meaningful mind is widespread,” possibly representing “an aspect of American culture 
that is relatively intolerant of conflict and the disorder that is part of one’s inner world, 
and that welcomes the orderliness of ‘objective‘ and presumably scientific explanations 
of how the mind works” (Modell, 2006, p.5).  
 From this we might infer that our culture, in both popular and scientific sentiment, 
has difficulty accepting and working creatively with the ambiguity at the heart of the 
human mind, and the related ethical thought, meaning, and language that such a mind 
generates.  We seem to individually and collectively resist the effort, humility, patience, 
and uncertainty which accompanies the admission that much of what we know, in terms 
of meaning and ethics, is quite pliable and can be seen alternatively.  It is significantly 
easier to see the mind through mechanistic and computational metaphors than through the 
murkiness of human relationships, culture, language, history, and subjective imaginings.  
Indeed, we seem to specialize in the accumulation of information and ‘facts‘ at the 
expense of developing an understanding not only of how imagination works, but also 
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how it can be cultivated and experienced.  Such tendencies severely restrict ethical 
understanding and empathetic sentiment.
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Postscript              
 Phenomenologically, the workings of the imagination can be, at times, defined by 
an essential quality of slowness.  Much like the slow drip of a sugar maple in January, the 
pace of imaginative thought unfolds along the long span of geologic time over the short 
one of industry, bureaucracy, and the contemporary institution; the latter being especially 
vulnerable to the ideological, ethical, and conceptual short-sightedness imposed by a 
particular cultural-historical context.  
 If we are to ponder the relationship of imagination to ethics, we might consider 
Martin Luther King, Jr.’s affirmation that “the arc of the moral universe is long, but it 
bends toward justice” (Howe, 2009) to be a sagacious contention that the pace of ethics, 
humanity, fairness, and human wellness develops over centuries, even millennia, and 
crucially depends on the ardent evolution of our sympathies, understandings, and 
imaginings of one another’s circumstances.  
 As equally as imagination is marked by slowness, it can, after long periods of 
incubation, strike at lightening speeds when the conditions are right, sparking epiphanies 
that may impress us as somehow being eternal truths, and so electrically clear that they 
inspire unwavering conviction (much like Plato felt that all true knowledge was always in 
us, but forgotten until uncovered through self-examination and dialogue).  In this sense, 
imaginative activity is paradoxically dependent on slow, patient, resolute thoughtfulness, 
while correspondingly characterized by swift, seemingly-spontaneous insight. 
 Needless to say, human imagination is not unconditionally, necessarily, or 
definitively employed for the sake of ethics or justice.  Plenty of examples to the contrary 
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abound in literature, philosophy, and the daily headlines.  The most evil and maligned 
among us have often been the most brilliantly imaginative, in some cases offering a 
veritable starburst of inhuman imaginings, with subsequent murderous, destructive acts 
springing forth.  
 In their introduction to Imagination and Its Pathologies, editors James Phillips 
and James Morley make an abundantly clear case for imagination’s insane, mad leanings.  
Through their own research and a selection of insightful essays from various 
psychiatrists, clinical psychologists, and philosophers, Morley and Phillips express both 
affection for and alarm at the workings of imagination, illustrating how imagination came 
to be associated with the irrational, particularly through the application of Enlightenment 
philosophy and values to medicine and psychiatry.  
 The darkness of imagination is also disturbingly portrayed in Franz Kafka’s short 
story In the Penal Colony (2007), in which the main character devises the penultimate 
torture machine, one so ingenious that the reader is left wondering what is more evil: the 
man/technician operating the machine or the one who imagined and then created it in the 
first place.  In short, the machine works by manipulating the anticipatory cognition and 
rumination of its victim insofar as it slowly, and intermittently, provokes the victim and 
drives him mad while killing him.  What is more, Kafka’s upsetting tale leaves the reader 
perplexed, for, the very imagination that can contemplate why such a particularly evil 
machine is so effective is the same imagination that can unlock and contemplate the 
victim’s suffering.      
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 Despite the potential for evil rooted in imagination, we are left with no choice but 
to face its complicated and frequently contradictory nature, mostly since the same force 
and capacity in us for developing, planning, and conceiving acts and methods of harm 
and atrocity is inextricably linked to our ability to understand precisely why such acts are 
wrong; that is, because they are harmful to individuals whose interior life and 
circumstances we can both imagine and, in effect, empathize with and comprehend.  
 In light of this dual and paradoxical nature, the interest of this research project has 
been to examine the creative, generative, and ethical workings of imagination in the 
interest of gaining a deeper understanding of how people respond to ethical dilemmas.  In 
other words, questions of how imagination is employed for the use of destructive, 
harmful, and immoral action and ideation has been, at least for the moment, put on hold 
for the sake of engaging in a research endeavor that is reasonable in scale.  Furthermore, 
since the project set its gaze specifically on the work in which psychotherapists engage, 
and the difficult clinical problems they encounter, it has limited the exploratory terrain 
and inquiry to instances in which the agent of imagination-- the psychotherapist-- intends 
to direct the imagination at interventions and interactions that will assist, guide, and, 
ideally, help heal the other.  In doing so, it is hoped that our understanding of ethics 
continues to be both deepened and expanded in ways unexpected and unforeseen.  
 Finally, in consideration of the sort of reflective struggles with which participants 
engaged the research question, I would like to take the liberty to honor such contributions 
and conclude with words that are not my own, but those of Wendell Berry, who is among 
the greatest writers and poets of our time, and whose imagination, wisdom, and 
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descriptive gifts far exceed my own.  The excerpt below is from his essay It All Turns on 
Affection (2012), and, while written with a specific focus on our ever-pressing 
environmental crisis, which is really also a crisis of economic philosophy; its applications 
are essentially limitless, and converge nearly perfectly with the ideas discussed 
heretofore.  It also applies to the idea of place, and creating a space for affection to 
flourish, something that will likely concern any clinician interested in creating an 
environment of hospitality, warmth, and care in the therapy room.   Berry offers a 
beautiful, revitalizing vision of imagination, a passage worth ending on, and a message 
ethicists would benefit to heed:
 “The term ‘imagination’ in what I take to be its truest sense refers to a mental 
 faculty that some people have used and thought about with the utmost 
 seriousness.  The sense of the verb ‘to imagine’ contains the full richness of the 
 verb ‘to see.‘  To imagine is to see most clearly, familiarly, and understandingly 
 with the eyes, but also inwardly, with the ‘mind’s eye.‘  It is to see, not passively, 
 but with a force of vision and even visionary force.  To take it seriously, we must 
 give up at once any notion that imagination is disconnected from reality or truth 
 or knowledge.  It has nothing to do with clever imitation of appearances or 
 ‘dreaming up.‘   
 For humans to have a responsible relationship to the world, they must imagine 
 their places in it.  To have a place, to live and belong in a place, to live from a 
 place without destroying it, we must imagine it.  By imagination, we see it 
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 illuminated by its own unique character and by our love for it.  By imagination, 
we  recognize with sympathy the fellow members, human and nonhuman, with whom 
 we share our place.  By that local experience, we see the need to grant a sort of 
 preemptive sympathy to all the fellow members, the neighbors, with whom we 
 share the world.  As imagination enables sympathy, sympathy enables affection.  
 And in affection we find the possibility of a neighborly, kind, and conserving 
 economy.”  (Berry, 2012, p.3)
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Appendix
Analysis of Marginal Summaries, Interviews 1-6 (Int.1-Int.6)
Categorical Key  
IA: Intended action
AM: Ambiguity
ED: Ethical dilemma
ME: Metaphor
General Key
Tx: Treatment/therapy
PT: Patient/Client
MH: Mental Health
Hx: History
Rx: Prescription/medication
SI: Suicidal ideation/intention
HI: Homicidal ideation/intention
Category       
AM- what are the ethical challenges?
AM- back story, past, PT’s Hx.
ED- PT’s safety to function in professional role.
AM- regarding PT’s background and past work in Tx.
AM- regarding back story, PT’s Hx.
AM-regarding who PT blames for primary tragedy in his
personal and professional life.
AM- regarding presenting problem.
AM- presenting problem, PT safety, responsibility, 
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PT’s agency, and PT’s guilt.
ME: chaos, disorder regarding PT’s narrative. 
“Intertwined and entangled”
AM: presenting problem.
AM: PT’s identity and relationships, as well as meaning.
AM: PT’s motives.
ED: is PT fit to fly and safe to perform professional role?
AM: PT’s motives and concern for what military’s intentions are.
ED: whether to collude with PT when he asks clinician to lie about MH.
AM: PT’s intentions and what PT is seeking or expecting from Tx.
IA: need for clinician to be more clear and direct with PT.
AM: how should clinician respond or what action should be taken? 
ED: how to best communicate with PT?
IA: be clear about expectations and communication with PT and
      other professionals.
AM: PT’s symptoms in life context.
AM: PT’s Tx Hx.
ED: best communication, PT safety to perform job.
IA: request, pursue more information.  Engage PT in deeper inquiry.
IA: interpret that PT is projecting.  Inform PT of his defensive 
      patterns.
AM: PT’s relationship with family, namely those only know through 
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        PT’s second-hand accounts.
IA: communicate to PT that he has more work to do in Tx.
IA: acknowledge that PT cannot be forced to work on a particular issue; 
      preserve PT’s agency and responsibility.
IA: confront PT about potential impact of his actions on family members.
AM: PT’s safety in professional role.
IA: confront PT about his sense of urgency to return to work and 
  impatience with Tx process.
ED: should clinician endorse PT’s return to dangerous, 
high-risk work?
 AM: safety of PT in professional role.
ED: basic safety of PT and others around him.  Risk of SI/HI.
ME: mapping, marking, and ordering an otherwise chaotic landscape.
“fencing in the territory.”
IA: avoid addressing material or assessment questions beyond one’s 
clinical expertise.
IA: allow military doctors to decide PT’s return to work and completion 
of Tx.
IA: refrain from crossing the boundary of favoring Tx over PT’s career.
AM: PT’s military status and appropriate time for return 
to high-risk role.
ED: how far should PT be pushed to stay in Tx?
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ED: whether or not clinician should take the decision out 
of PT’s hands.
IA: preserve PT’s autonomy and responsibility.
AM: what do PTs actually want from therapy?
IA: assess PT’s mental status out of concern for basic safety.
ED: avoid collusion with the PT; important to avoid 
negating responsibility and choice.
ED: PT’s safety.  How to address problematic symptoms and 
erratic behavior?
AM: lack of background information to assess for safety.
IA: be more direct with PT.
IA: be clear with PT.
AM: how to interpret PT’s situation?
IA: avoid forcing PT to stay in Tx.
IA: “hold on,” maintain boundaries, maintain a “Tx space.”
ED: how to interpret emotional dynamics in Tx room?
ED: how far to take Tx and interpretations?
AM: regarding ethical action.
AM: regarding PT Hx.
AM: what kind of chance to take with interpretation and
confrontation.
 AM: decision making; go with intuition.
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AM: regarding inaction as response.
ED: should more direct interpretation of PT’s situation occur 
in session or to outside psychologist?
IA: go with my intuition (“go with my gut”)
IA: consult supervisor.
ME: must get clear, gain clarity.
AM: response after session.
ED: how to restore and preserve PT’s agency?
ED: how to address PT’s desire to have clinician decide?
AM: PT’s motives.
ED: how to leave the session?  How to end it?
AM: PT’s Hx.
AM: directness, confrontation, assertiveness and interpretation. 
what role do they play?
ED: not sure how far to push PT.
AM: regarding relationship dynamics and transference in Tx.
ED: how to handle transference?  
how to address repetition compulsion? 
AM: regarding fictional therapist’s decisions.
IA: follow instinct and hope luck and chance are on 
side of enacted intervention.
IA: take a chance with considered interventions.
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IA: follow instinct.
AM: best course of ethical action?
AM: ethical action.
IA: remain largely inactive and maintain boundaries.
ED: how to handle one’s own anger toward PT.
AM: regarding inaction or “sitting back.”
AM: regarding multiplicity of Tx paths.
ED: what are my responsibilities an obligations?
IA: follow intuition.
AM: regarding if Tx works or is effective only 
in the way we perceive an outcome.
IA: determined by safety, but cannot be assured 
PT will be safe.
ED: will be solved by basic guideposts.
ME: “basic guideposts”
AM: what kind of Tx and ethical action is possible?
AM: how to erase what fictional therapist did 
and what to do with PT’s behaviors?
IA: agree with fictional therapist’s confrontation; 
mimic it.
AM/ED: questioning whether someone is qualified or capable 
of killing others in war—should an ethical stand be taken?
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IA: pressure and question regarding PT’s perceptions of 
Self-Other.  Gain PT’s perspective.
AM: regarding PT’s motives and what he is actually 
communicating in Tx.
AM: fictional therapist’s statements in session.
IA: mimic some of therapist’s behaviors and intervention.
IA: avoid depth of most difficult ethical issues and remain 
clear in responses to PT.
IA: answer “yes” or “no” to PT’s questions.  Be as clear as
possible.
IA: make black and white statements. 
IA:  access other ethical dilemmas vis-à-vis issue of PT’s 
assessment request; conflict over assessment 
can crystallize clinical issues.
ED: how to deal with another psychologist, namely
military psychologist, and how to respond.
AM: what to do with one’s own anxiety about PT’s
 request?
IA: spend more time on assessment, PT’s request, and 
PT’s expectations.
IA: spend more time on PT’s request itself.
AM: regarding how to best respond about keeping
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 PT in Tx.
AM: unsure of situation as a whole; never been in one
 quite like this.
AM: what actions to take in/during session?
AM: regarding directness of communication.  Should
 PT take particular actions to resolve problem?
ED: contextualize problem and locate answer or 
action within context.
ED: how to treat the last session, particularly since 
PT announced he was leaving unexpectedly.
AM: regarding PT’s abrupt announcement of last session;
 what does such a statement mean?
AM: Which of the ethical dilemmas is more important 
or urgent?
IA: do not leave PT with false impression of what can be 
done with psychological assessment. 
AM: regarding how fictional therapist left things with PT 
and what therapist’s intentions were.
IA: rely on intuition in session and luck.
ME: the situation of the assessment request is a 
“roll of the dice.”
IA: leave decisions for PT to make—preserve ambiguity
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 of therapist’s own position and opinion.
 IA: leave situation at termination ambiguous as to whether
 it is best for client to leave.  Extend invitation to return.
AM: regarding if fictional therapist’s actions were correct.
IA: “go along for the ride” with PT. 
ME: “going along for the ride” enables a real decision and 
intervention to arise.
AM: need for more information about PT’s situation to make 
 therapeutic and Tx decision.
IA: resolve dilemma out of experience in session.
AM: what is difference between being a viewer of session
 and living or experiencing session?
IA: therapist cannot speak it, but implies thought.
ME: a certain “barrier” exists.
AM: because there is no Hx with that portrayed PT, 
situation is unclear.
ME: all the work here is done “under the gun” because
 PT states he’s leaving and the “clock is ticking.”
ED: no single correct response is possible.  There is no riddle, so 
 how to leave some degree of mystery and ambiguity?
IA: through consultation with others, value of different approaches
 emerges.
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AM: regarding boundaries with PT.
ED: how to maintain professional boundaries.
IA: begin with presenting problem and identify whether
 PT is ready to return to active military duty.
AM: regarding multiple relationships with PT.
AM: regarding PT’s readiness to return to work/duty.
AM: what is presenting problem?
AM: regarding what fictional therapist is actually endorsing.
 What is his action?
AM: regarding PT’s readiness.
IA: assess whether PT is ready for duty.
ED: what to do about PT’s aggressiveness, anger.
IA: need to address PT’s safety and SI/HI.
IA: clarify why PT feels aggressive.
IA/ME: find an “outlet” for PT’s emotions.
IA: confront PT regarding aggressiveness.
IA: validate PT’s anger.
IA: validate challenges PT is facing.
IA: encourage outlets for PT’s anger.
ED: Will PT hurt others?
IA: determine PT’s diagnosis.
IA: do not give PT cell phone number as fictional therapist does;
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 give him crisis hotline number instead.
AM: what is PT’s diagnosis?
ED: Is clinician competent to Tx PT’s diagnosis?
ED: how to address PT’s aggressiveness?
IA: do more than listen, as fictional therapist does.
IA- clarify PT’s intentions with PT.
AM: is PT intent on hurting others?
ED: how to handle homicidal potential?
AM: unsure if simply listening to PT is an adequate intervention.
IA: carry out standards as outlined in ethical code, section on
 human relations.
ED: boundaries between PT’s needs and clinician’s abilities.
IA: justify intervention based on ethical code.
AM: exact meaning of ethical code.
AM: how should code be applied?
AM: is clinician competent?
AM: what is code?  How should it influence decision?
IA: need for clear, unambiguous statement about PT’s 
preparedness for work.
ED: how to overcome lack of directness by fictional clinician?
IA: assess PT for SI.
ED: what action should be taken if PT cannot work?
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ED: how might PT respond to upsetting news?
AM: unsure about PT’s situation and actual circumstances.
AM: what is context PT is dealing with?  What disparity exists
 between PT’s presentation and reality?
AM: actions rest on contingency, namely what PT’s actions are.
IA: better assessment during session regarding SI and S potential.
ED: how to address SI?
AM: diagnosis?
IA: gain more detail about SI.
IA: take more action than fictional therapist.
IA: make SI/HI concerns clear and concrete.
IA: recommend higher level of care.
AM: how serious is SI?
AM: regarding questions that are not addressed in video clip.
IA: use CBT techniques to help PT deal with trauma and guilt.
IA: do more than listen.
IA explore anger issues more deeply.
AM: how to handle PT’s trauma?
IA: ease PT’s anger.
IA: create more awareness.
AM: PT’s motives.  How to address PT’s conflicting motives?
AM: not sure of presenting problem.
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IA: refer PT to someone else.
IA: clarify continuity of care.
ED: how to leave PT in safe position?  How to handle transition?
AM: how to extend Tx?
IA: develop better communication among family members.
IA: encourage development of social supports and crisis plan.
ED: PT’s preparedness to deal with intense emotion.
AM: regarding high stress military position.  
ED: how ready is PT to return to duty?
ED: how to handle PT’s request to return to duty?
AM: regarding unresolved issues from past that could 
 effect PT’s safety.
ED: PT’s stability and what to do about it?
ED: client’s lack of self-insight and awareness.
IA: clarify with PT beyond clinician’s intervention.
IA: be more direct with PT regarding his 
complicated request.
ED: choices regarding risks to therapeutic relationship and
 what PT is requesting.
AM: how should the ED be handled?
AM: how to respond to PT’s request?
IA: base action on decision making models.
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IA: base action on imagining how others in profession
 would evaluate and respond to PT.
IA: base action on model of care and ethical standards.
IA: imagine a peer in this situation and enact/mimic how
 that peer would respond.
AM: how would others respond?
IA: address PT’s request more directly.
ED: how to address PT’s difficult request for assessment
 and return to work?
IA: be more confrontational than clinician.
IA: therapist should have pressed PT more than clinician.
AM: how will therapist actually respond to this request?
AM: could PT have handled more insight from clinician?
IA: attempt to add greater depth to therapeutic encounter.
AM: could more psychological processing be done?
AM: does clinician have empathy?
AM: was there an opportunity for processing?
AM: is PT fit for active duty? 
IA: discuss safety issues surrounding military role more actively.
AM: how to provide confirmation that PT is stable.
IA: confront PT about over confidence in being ready for duty.
IA: seek supervision.
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IA: maintain boundaries and frame relationship.
IA: refer to others and rely on other professionals.
IA: use honesty and directness.
ED: dilemma of continuing care and Tx.
IA: use more direct confrontation regarding PT’s request.
IA: request that PT return for one more session.
ED: PT’s fitness for active duty?
AM: influence of all this intervention on PT?
AM: not sure of intervention. 
AM: what is PT’s Hx?
AM: what is PT’s situation?
ED: asking therapist to lie.
IA: Consult professional peers about request to lie.
IA: inform PT that assessment might disappoint him.
AM: did therapist agree to make statement assessment or
 are they meeting again?
IA: Give an honest evaluation and avoid lying to please PT.
IA: clarify with PT that assessment will be honest, not necessarily
 pleasing to him.
ED: how to do least harm to therapeutic relationship.
IA: consult because overall situation is unclear.
AM: not sure what I’m missing about this case.
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IA: clarify for PT.
AM: what is therapist’s role here?
ED: lying about PT’s status to please PT.
ED: PT’s power and control issues and how to address them?
ED: HI and safety of others around PT.
ED: PT and his abuse and violence toward others.
ED: let him fly?  Safety concerns, PT’s impaired judgment.
 IA: advise PT to remain in Tx.
IA: refrain from advice giving.
AM: does PT think about safety issues?
ED: therapist should have stayed with PT longer?
ED: role of cell phone in session?
ED: contact with PT outside of Tx?
 ED: boundaries with PT and how to address?
IA: consult with military psychologist.
ED: dilemma of cultural differences between therapist
 and PT; civilian and soldier.
AM: PT’s identity and influence of military culture.
AM: understanding the PT’s identity.
IA: confront PT about responsibilities to his family.
AM: not sure therapist was engaging with cultural and identity
 issues enough.
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AM: how to respond to overall situation.
ED: should decisions be made about PT’s fate in military?
ED: how to handle PT’s identity as a military man?
AM: how to handle PT’s military identity.
ED: identity dynamics of PT and how to address.
AM: many missing aspects of story that remain unclear.
ED: how to best handle delicate issues of PT of him flying and his 
 military career.
IA: process PT’s reaction to the upsetting news that assessment might
 lead to him not flying again.
ED: request for assessment that will allow him to fly.
ED: boundary issues surrounding session (use of cash, giving PT cell
 phone number).
IA: do not allow phone calls to therapist so readily.
ED: asking therapist to lie and PT’s request for a direct answer.
AM: follow up to PT’s request for a response.
IA: respond like therapist did in terms of trying to get PT
 to expand his thoughts about issues.
ED: unresolved issues.  Therapist left things unresolved.  Is that okay?
AM: not sure of overall context, situation of session.
AM: does PT have PTSD?
IA: would act as fictional therapist did.
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AM: not sure if exact path of fictional therapist would be repeated.
IA: would be more direct in assessment.
ED: how to handle request for assessment?
IA: agree with fictional therapist’s indirectness, and mimic.
AM: violence, safety, HI issues.
ED: how to handle PT’s potential aggression?
IA: build relationship before addressing difficult material.
ED: dilemma of cultural issues and PT’s identity.
ED: how to address cultural differences?
AM: case formulation.
ED: how to handle HI?
IA: address personal issues that therapist left out.
AM: unsure about what action would be best.
ED: how to confront family dynamics.
IA: confront PT’s avoidance of core issues, namely those with family.
IA: avoid indirectness.
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Ideals from Analysis of Marginal Summaries, Interviews 1-6.
-Respective participants’ interviews (e.g. 1, 3, 4) are listed parenthetically.
-Items highlighted in bold indicate an ideal that was repeatedly cited by multiple 
participants (a minimum of three times by each participant listed in bold for that 
particular item).  Additional items in bold are highlighted to indicate that more than three 
participants expressed concern for or valued that item, theme, or dilemma.
I.Clarity (1-6)
A. Clarity of patient history (1, 2)
B. Clear understanding (1)
C. Knowing clearly (1)
D. Clear intent (1, 3)
E. Clear, precise language (1, 2, 6)
F. Clear communication (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
G. Clear treatment plan (1, 3)
H. Order and clarity (1, 2)
I. Clear and coherent motivation (1)
J. Clear thinking (1)
K. Clear intentionality (1, 2)
L. Ethical clarity (2)
M.Clear diagnosis (3)
N.  Clear case conceptualization (3, 6)
O. Clear effect of treatment (4)
P. Narrative clarity (5)
II.Patient’s past (1, 2, 3, 4, 5) 
A. Comprehensive history (1) 
B. Coherent history (1, 2, 5)
C. Treatment history (1)
D. Unresolved issues from past (4)
E. Absence of history as viewer of clinical encounter (2)
III.Patient’s safety (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
A. Safety to perform job (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
B. Assessing safety (1, 3, 4, 5, 6)
C. Preventing crisis, suicide, violence (1, 3, 4, 5, 6)
D. Patient’s aggression and anger (3)
E. Maintaining patient’s stability (3, 4, 5) 
F. Transitioning patient out of session (3)
G. Cultivating social support (3)
H. Keeping patient in treatment (4, 5)
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I. Patient’s understanding of safety issues (5)   
IV.Boundaries (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
A. Avoiding collusion with patient (1, 5)
B. Avoiding lying to please patient (1, 5, 6)
C. Leave responsibility, agency with patient (1, 2, 5)
D. Leave responsibility with military (1)  
E. Respect patient’s values (1, 2)
F. Maintain treatment space (1, 3, 4, 5, 6)  
G. Refrain from action in therapy; be inactive/preserve ambiguity (1, 2, 6)
H. Responding to patient after session (1)
I. Ending session (1) 
J. Pushing, confronting client (1, 6)
K. Containing anger toward patient (1, 2)
L. Understanding therapist’s role (5)
V. Therapeutic relationship (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
A. Help integrate and unify (1, 2, 5)
B. Confront patient about safety (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
C. Order material (1)
D. Provide effective, timely interpretations (1, 3)
E. Communicate directly (1, 3, 6)
F. Use intuition (1, 4)
G. Apply ethical knowledge (1, 3)
H. Apply ethical code (3, 4)
I. Attain empathy (2, 4)
J. Mimic previously successful treatment approaches (2, 6)
K. Provide meaningful interpretation (2)
L. Maintain singular relationship (3) 
M.Catharsis (3)
N. Confront aggressiveness in session (3)   
O. Provide context sensitive response (3, 5, 6)
P. Cultivate awareness, insight (3, 4, 6)  
Q. Preserve alliance (3, 5, 6)
R. Refrain from giving advice (5, 6)
VI.Clinical understanding (1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6)
A. Understand context (2, 3, 6)
B. Reveal underlying motives (1)
C. Understand presenting problem (1, 3)
D. Understand military’s intentions (1) 
E. Understand big picture (1, 5)
F. Understand family dynamics (1)  
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G. Understand what is latent or concealed (1, 2, 3) 
H. Understand patient’s expectations (1)
I. Understand defenses (1) 
J. Rely on social/supervisory understanding (1, 2, 3, 4, 5)
K. Understand intuitively (1, 2)
L. Rely on moral foundation (1) 
M.Rely on diagnostic frame (3, 6)
N. Understand cultural/identity differences (5, 6) 
Table I, Frequency of ideals expressed in subcategories:
Participant 1: 46 
Participant 2: 21
Participant 3: 29
Participant 4: 15
Participant 5: 22
Participant 6: 20
Mean: 25.5
Median: 21.5 
Table II, Instances of repeated thematic consideration (frequency of returning to item at 
least three times during interview):
Participant 1: 15
Participant 2: 12
Participant 3: 14
Participant 4: 9
Participant 5: 12
Participant 6: 11
Mean: 12.1
Median: 12
149
Interview Transcripts
Dissertation Interview 1
JJ: Imagine that you are the therapist in the situation.  What ethical challenges or 
problems do you see and how do you think you would respond?
G: Well, um, the ethical challenges.  I don’t know.  Maybe I’ll just talk freely for a second 
and gather my thoughts.  
JJ:  Ah hmm (agreeing).
G: He comes into the session and is dressed to the nines.  He projects a powerful image.  
He’s very forceful.  Then he goes through this long description of this party where you 
see all these different dynamics between him and his father, and his identity; and I’m 
sitting there watching not knowing the back story thinking that you know, so, the Navy is 
kind of a means to a kind of um, way to solve these identity issues that he has.  So, when 
I watch I’m thinking: what is he in therapy for.  If he’s in therapy to make sure he’s safe 
and able to go fly, then I think you have one set of it.  That’s one guidepost.
JJ: Hmm.
G: If he’s in therapy to try to come to terms with, um, his relationships with his family, 
and to have a more meaningful life with his wife and his son.  Umm.  I did watch the very 
first episode with him in there, so I do remember that he has a heart attack when he’s 
running with another guy, so that’s kind of outside of this episode. 
JJ:  Ah hmm. Yes, that’s a good memory.  That is what happens.  
G:  And he has a hard on.  I remember the guy runs a big marathon and he ran, um, and 
he had a hard on, um, but I don’t remember.
JJ: You’re accurate with that.  It is involved.  He has an erection when he has a heart 
attack and his gay friend performs CPR.  His friend is a doctor.
G: A psychiatrist?
JJ:  Um, a general practitioner, I think.
G: Yeah.  Okay, so there’s that bombing in Madrassa where he killed those people.  And I 
remember it being about, um, they told him what to do and he did not have to make any 
decisions and it’s their fault. And he’s trying to figure out blame and this kind of thing.  
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So, um, knowing some of that, too, I’m thinking, you know, is he fit to fly, is it about 
creating meaningful relationships, is that what his presenting problem is?  And then you 
have this third thing, this desire to place responsibility on others, place responsibility on 
the, um, military, so he becomes, ah, alleviated of, um, any kind of guilt or responsibility.  
But yet he’s not able to because he has all of these problems.
JJ:  Hmm mmm.
G:  So, the question, I guess, is, um, figuring out, um, the more central issue of, like, 
figuring out, kind of, who he is and how he relates to people.  This more kind of 
meaningful, meaningful life question.  Um, it does kind of become intertwined with is he 
fit to fly kind of question because, um, um, because this propensity to kind of place, to try  
to avoid any kind of responsibility, yet still he gets caught up in it, later, so I think it 
becomes really entangled.  Um, so with that kind of said I would think, okay, you know, 
what, what is this military doctor calling me for, asking me about?  You know what I 
mean?
JJ:  Hmm mmm.
G:  Because what is it that he wants?  And I think I would, um, make that very clear.  And 
I think in the session I would have been a little bit more, just for my own sake, be a little 
more clear about what it is that he wants.  Like, you know, because it seems like there is 
this, um, in the session where it becomes, um, the boundaries are beginning to cross 
because the client is asking you to lie, in a way.  Or just say, you know, tell them what I 
really want to hear.  Um, and there was no discussion about what do they want to hear.  
And I think I would have been a little more clear, I mean, um, a little more direct about 
that in the session.  And I would have, um, then been able to have tried to been a little 
more clear with him because the one thing the therapist does not do is he does not tell 
him what he’s going to say, he leaves it open, but I think for a t.v. show that is a great cliff 
hanger but I would be probably either make that call on the spot of think about this one 
and call you back and then I’d probably talk to a supervisor and a colleague or 
something.  And have a little bit of a dialogue if I couldn’t make sense of it in the session.
JJ: Hmm, uh-huh.  Say more about that part- how it makes for a good cliff hanger but 
there is something more…
G:  Well, I think when you, when it comes to, when a client is asking you for something 
especially when it comes to anything outside of the session.
JJ: Hmm-mm.
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G: When it comes to “I’m going to be talking to this other practitioner” about something 
about you or something about their parents, kind of thing to, to really be, you know 
they’re your client, they’re the most important person and that’s who…it’s your job to 
take, well, not take care, but your job to, um, be concerned with them.     
JJ: Hmm-mm.
G: Um, and not let this other person.  So, it’s like I would want, in the session, to know 
the best I can what is being asked of me and then be real clear about what I’d be willing 
to do.  And so if the doctor, if that other doctor is calling and saying is this guy having 
these symptoms, is he experiencing this kind of anxiety, and does he have  kinds of 
things, I mean, I think it would be a simple thing, I’d be like “no.”  Right?
JJ:  Hmm-mm.
G:  Now is there a chance that might happen? Um, I guess I’d want to know a little bit 
more.  Now he’s saying that that up in the air… [trails off]
JJ: Um, you would want to more about the client?
G: Want to know more about the client.  I don’t know what symptoms he has or anything 
like that.  Like what, um, what, what would get in the way of him doing his job up there?
JJ: Hmm-mm.
G: You know, he’s saying that when he’s in the air he’s in complete control, and…, um,…
JJ: You are suspicious?
G: I’m suspicious, but I don’t know because I don’t know the rest of the history.  And I’m 
also, I mean just from that one session, it might be true because it is something where he 
is alleviated of responsibility and, if I can remember from before, the problems come 
afterwards.
JJ: Hmm-mm.
G: Ah-um, so I guess that’s stuff I’d want more information about.  Um, if it was that…
um… [trails off].
JJ: You’re implying, then, that you would have done something differently?
G: Well, um, I was saying that, I mean I am saying that with figuring out what the Army 
psychiatrist wants.  Um, and, being a little more clear with the client about what I’m 
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willing to say or what I am thinking.  Um, that being said I was also kind of moving on to 
another thing where I’m thinking “okay what if the, um, you know, um, is it true that 
being in the air is a safe place for him?”  Where these kinds of issues of identity and 
responsibility and guilt are set aside?  Can I be certain about that?  And I don’t know.  
Like I said, I’d like to be able to have a little more information about the client I’m 
working with and make that kind of decision.  Um, I can see it going either way….
JJ: Based on what you do know, from the one session you saw, even if you can only recall 
so much.  Um, you made reference to issues of identity and relationships, what do you 
see there? 
G: About his family?
JJ: Well, yeah, what did you pick up on there?
G: Okay, well, so I um, I mean I would agree with the interpretation that the therapist 
makes that when he is describing the party it is pretty much projection.  So, he’s 
projecting his feelings onto his son in a lot of ways.  Um, wishing that he, you know, that 
his father would be out of the picture that his father would let him do what he wants.  
That part of the reason he feels he gets to get into the military is a kind of flight away 
from his father, and, um, you know, when he’s talking at the end about the kind of 
vulnerability that his son feels, that’s mainly projective.  You know that he feels 
vulnerable by these forces he cannot control.  Um, and, if he follows that path and 
continues to run away from those things, then he could jeopardize further his relationship 
with his son.  And it seems with his wife also.  Um, so, um…that’s mainly what I was 
seeing and, you know, I think the therapist is right in here saying that he has a lot more 
work to do.  And I think I would, I would probably, I think it was good to say “you’ve 
done a lot of good work, and I think you need to do more work.”  But the question is 
what is the presenting problem, I mean, you know you cannot forces somebody to work 
on something that they did not come in for.  Um, and maybe, maybe, you know, maybe 
even going to the point of being like, you know, if you really want, if this is the last 
moment, you know this kind of a gamble, but you might want to lay it out there.  And say 
“look, if you really think this is the last moment,” this is kind of a gamble, but you might 
want to just lay it out there.  
JJ: Yeah.
G:  And say, “look, this is why you’re going into the military and you’re going to 
jeopardize your relationship with your son.” That’s my opinion.  “Now maybe you’ll be 
safe up there.  I don’t know that.  That’s for them to judge.”  They’re better at judging 
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that than me.  But, by participating in this pattern, you’re jeopardizing your life with your 
son and your wife.  And it’s my opinion that you could work those things out here and go 
back to the military with a clearer mind.  You would be able to choose to go back into the 
military rather than feeling forced into it by forces you cannot control.  That would be, 
that would be maybe an interpretation that I would make.
JJ:  So, yeah, that’s, um, an alternative to what Paul, the therapist, did?
G: Yes, um…
JJ: If you really pushed yourself in that position, how would you choose between that 
alternative and the one represented in the segment?
G: I think it would be a pragmatic decision because, ultimately, I agree with the therapist 
and think he should stay in therapy.  There is no reason to rush into going back up there, 
um, except for these kinds of dynamics.
JJ:  Hm-mm.
G: Now those dynamics, I guess, what I am saying, aren’t really [pause] as important to 
the practical question: can he fly? 
JJ: Hm-mm.
G: If, as I’m imagining the question to be.  Um, I mean… [pause].
JJ: And, um, how would you respond if the [military] psychiatrist asked that?
G:  I think I would hedge and say that it is out of my expertise.  You know, um, what 
what is it that you are looking for?  Is he a danger to himself or others, you know?  I 
mean I think I would fall back on those ethical guidelines that we have first to fence in 
the territory.  You know, these are, um, my boundaries, or my fence posts that are going 
to kind of mark off the conversation, and inside of which I can maybe speak a little more 
freely, but if he’s not a threat to others or himself, he’s not erratic, he’s not having 
debilitating anxiety, or any kind of symptoms, um, you know, then I think they are better 
off to assess that through whatever simulations, cognitive testing; I don’t think that’s in 
the realm of therapy, you know.
JJ: Right.  Do you feel, then, if you took that approach, and would you be letting down 
the client because he was asking you to not let him down and in sense, his ability.  Do 
you think that would be part of your decision or not at all?
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G: I mean, look, I don’t think I would want to.  I would not want to, you know, jeopardize 
his career at the expense of my own desire him to continue in treatment.  That would be 
an ethical boundary that I wouldn’t cross.
JJ: Part of it, then, is your inward concern, too?
G: I could see this client being very, or me having a strong desire for him to continue to 
do the work, I mean all of the work up to this point.  But I would not want that to, um, to 
be what guides me into saying something like “he’s got a lot more work to do.”  You 
know, I think that would be letting the client down.
JJ: Hmm-mm.
G: Because I feel his desire to fly is not a true desire to fly, it has more to do with these 
personal things, and I think that would be letting the client down  and I think that would 
be unethical because it would be coming out of my own desire to see him in therapy 
rather than being concerned about him.   I mean, look, if he wants to go to fly and avoid 
these issues, it is his life.
JJ: Hmm-mm.
G: I mean it would be counter-therapeutic to take that responsibility away from him since 
that is what he wants in the first place.  Right?
JJ:  Hmm.
G: I mean that’s his whole M.O.  so then I’d be colluding with him.  And that’s even more 
problematic. [long pause]  No, I don’t think it would be letting him down to be honest 
and direct about whatever the people are wanting from me, and what I can imagine them 
wanting from me is: does he have problematic symptomology and behavioral concerns 
and that kind of thing.
JJ: So, real concrete stuff?
G: I think so, I think so.
JJ: And you don’t feel you could make that call?
G: What the concrete stuff?
JJ:  Yeah.
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G: No, I think you do.  But let’s assume that this is a six month therapy or something.  
You know, is he a threat to himself or others?  Is he, um, you know, does he have 
problematic symptomology, does he have erratic behavior, these kind of things.
JJ: So, you feel you have enough information for that?
G: I would assume so, yeah, I mean, if this was the second session then, no.  It sounds 
like they’re settling up, they did a lot of work together, you know.
JJ: Although it does sound like it is kind of abrupt, you know, they’re settling up so 
quickly.
G: And that would be my caveat, too.  You know, I mean, I’d say “hey, look, I’ve seen 
this guy for seven sessions over several months, and these are the kinds of things I see.”  
But that is something I would have been direct with the client.
JJ: Yeah.
G: The whole thing about letting him down, I think I’d be direct with him right there and 
say, “this is what I’d be willing to say, based on what you’re telling me they are going to 
want.”   And then I might move into that more dynamic interpretation for him.  I think 
from a more pragmatic point of view, that is more likely to keep him in therapy because 
I’m not going to use my desire to keep him, I’m not going to be blind to it and let it guide 
my decisions, and completely control his life.  But maybe I’m wrong.  Maybe my 
interpretation is completely wrong.
JJ: So, that being held in mind, how would you settle upon […] the therapist had to do 
something, so […].
G: Yeah, I would go with my gut I guess.  I don’t, um, know what the other sessions look 
like, but I’m sitting here watching this one, and, I’m like, I’d just be holding onto my 
seat.  He’s getting up and standing and it’s very cordial.  The therapist does a really good 
job of maintaining boundaries.  But when they get to that moment when it kind of settles 
down into a more emotional level, I think there’s a moment there where you have to 
make a choice, you know, it, um, it. Do I take this chance and make this kind of 
interpretation, which could jeopardize the therapy and which I’m imagining is way too 
much for this client, and that he may just chuck it away.  Um, or do I let it go and then 
face this kind of, just, um, just as problematic of a position as it would be talking to the 
psychiatrist.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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G: And having this responsibility. Because I think both of those thing s threaten to 
jeopardize the therapy.  Um, no matter what.  So, I mean I would probably go with my 
gut, so I could imagine if I was in this situation it would be on my mind.  Especially if he 
didn’t settle down.  I think if the whole session had gone like it did in the beginning I 
would be a little flustered because he was pushing so much and there’s a lot of other stuff 
going on in the room.  I might have just sat there and been like “what the hell just 
happened.”
JJ: Hmm-hm.
G: And it would come down to maybe talking to a colleague, talking to a supervisor if I 
had a supervisor, and I don’t see what would be wrong with calling the client back, you 
know. And saying “I’ve been thinking and whatnot and wanted to be a little more clear.”
JJ: So, a follow-up?
G: Yeah.
JJ: So, that might be the most appealing path?
G: Hmm, yeah.  But if you do a follow up, you’re just being very clear about what you’re 
willing to do and still not taking care of it.  It almost seems like the client wants to send 
him, send dad to the principle and see if he can get back in school or on the football team, 
and it’s behind closed doors, it’s between the men, and I just don’t think that’s good for 
him, I mean he’s the man.  So, talk to him first.  [Long pause].  It is a real sticky situation
—that’s for sure.
JJ: Yeah, yeah. [long pause].
G: Because I don’t, I don’t know.  I don’t know what the history is with this client.  I 
mean why would he leave it like that?
JJ: If you had to know just what you know from this session, could you speculate then?
G: I mean maybe he’s thinking that he doesn’t need to be that, um, forceful.  I don’t know 
if it’s really forceful, but um, making a big interpretation and bringing all these things 
together if that’s really necessary.  Maybe there’s enough there.  Maybe they’ve done 
enough work that what they’ve done and what he’s been able to come to is enough to 
make that decision on his own.  Like I said, I don’t know. [long pause] And the guy, I 
mean, he’s definitely very, he fights the therapist in a lot of ways, on all the interpretive 
levels.  Maybe another interpretation again would have just, um, been reminiscent of his 
dad, you know?
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JJ: Yeah, he has to walk the line, doesn’t he?
G: Yeah, I mean, because that is um, and I could see myself falling into that trap.
JJ: And repeating the father’s…
G: Yeah, I don’t know if it’s exactly that or not because the father is berating him for 
being a pussy, and I guess, in a way, you would be too, I don’t know, if I said that .  If you 
said that it would like, okay, like, “you’re running away from your life and being a 
pussy.” [laughs]
JJ: Yeah, so your touching on the counter-transference?  So, that is a concern for you?
G: Yeah, that would be a concern also.  And as I’m thinking this through, over again, I’m 
thinking, you know, maybe this is the best thing, maybe the way he left it is maybe a 
clear understanding about what the Army would want.
JJ: Right.  So, maybe you’re moving back to thinking maybe his path wasn’t so bad.
G: No, 
JJ: I mean maybe it wasn’t less than ideal?
G: Yeah, it is one of those situations where maybe not [whispering to himself inaudibly], 
I’m thinking I would just have to go with my gut and take my chance.  I mean, shit, I 
think chances are in this situation that it is not looking good for continuing therapy, right?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
G: Um, I think you just have to follow your instinct and, um, especially if your thinking 
for the client and trying to be very sensitive your own counter transference, and just take 
a chance, I mean what else are you going to do?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
G: I mean for one thing, I would be very angry at this client for pushing me around, and I 
think that would be a difficult thing, I think I would have to, I mean I don’t know what 
the relationship has been like with this therapist, but for me I guess if I get pushed around 
a lot the safest path is to sit back and be more direct about you’d be willing to say and 
then just let it go.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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G: But if I felt very comfortable in myself with him, then I might be more apt to make a 
move like he did.
JJ: Go even more out on a limb?
G: Yeah. 
JJ: Well, that’s pretty good.  In terms of going on, there seems to be some open-endedness 
to the way you’re leaving it or...
G: Well, there are a lot of different ways you can take it, I guess.
JJ: It seems like you keep referring in this situation, reflecting on it, there is definitely a 
divide between this and what you think you’d do.  What you’d think you’d do seems to 
be in the moment, thinking these things, and then saying something would happen 
through intuition.  Like, you would weigh these things, is that what you’re saying.
G: Yeah, um, I don’t know what I would be thinking because I don’t think, well, I do 
think in session, but I’m not just sitting there reflecting on it as much because I am in the 
session.  When it comes down to a cognitive thought process, I would be thinking about 
the things I’ve been referring to, like: what do they want, what am I willing to say, and 
then kind of have a conversation with him.  That’s one thing I’m kind of looking at: 
what’s my responsibility, what are my obligations, right?
JJ: So you would be attentive to your role?
G: My role, right.  And my role at being very straight forward.  But when it comes to my 
desire and what I think is ultimately at stake for this human being, not this fighter pilot, 
but this human being, right?  So, it would come down to that: what do I think is at-stake 
here?  Um, that’s guided more by an intuitive process meaning that I am not, I’m not 
consciously mapping all the transference-counter transference, or all these things, and 
then assessing this big schematic and making a decision.  It’s more of like those things 
through my mind and then, maybe, having them register, but then kind of sitting there 
and making a move based on how it feels.  Um, which is something that you can’t really 
see, but, um, you had that session and when you’re watching it, you can see when the 
session settled down.  When he’s talking about his son, when he’s talking about how you 
don’t get it, you don’t get it, when I’m up there getting…you can see the vulnerability, 
you can see him settling down.  And you know, in that moment, what is therapeutically 
possible.  Um, you know, that’s always an ideal.  Because therapy fails.  You know?  
When this guys life is over, you can look back and say maybe all the therapy in the world 
would not help him in his relationship with his son and his wife.  I don’t know.  You just 
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don’t know.  Maybe he would have a better life just being a fighter pilot.  And evading 
his responsibility, if that is even the case.  You don’t know.  But I think there is a certain 
ideal that we as therapists have, you know—what is possible?  And, I think, you hold on 
to that, you know?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
G: And that helps to guide your intuition a little bit, you know?  And that’s much different 
than assessing, you know like you put it, your role.  And that’s a good way to put it, but it 
comes down to when we look at the ethics, it comes down to these things like: would you 
harm yourself or others?  You know, these guideposts which I think are there.
JJ: So, you’re talking about a relationship between those things and then an ideal that’s 
intuitive?  That has qualities of being visual and emotional, if I heard you clearly?  You 
described being able to see it in the context, see it on the video, but also there’s an 
emotional thing that you’re talking about that sounds like a combination of these feature?
G: Um, it’s more of a feeling, you can feel it and its imaginative.  You have a certain ideal 
of what is possible that is kind of guiding, um, what you’re saying.  But like he says: “we 
have a lot of work to do.”  He has certain image of what therapy is, what is possible, 
based on his experience but also on what he has been taught. Right?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
G: Because this guy, I mean, he is an actor, but you know, but he’s supposed to be this 
really great therapist.   And he’s probably had lots of cases, lots of clients, lots of different 
outcomes.
JJ: Yeah.
G: Um, and, um, so he’s at a different end, but even more me, for us, you know, doing 
therapy for three or four years, you see certain outcomes, you see certain things, but what 
really guides you a lot is the cases you read, the things that you hear, about what is 
possible, what goes on in your own therapy, what you’ve experienced kind of thing, you 
know, as a therapist.   Um, there is this kind of thing of, um, this ideal, this kind, of thing 
that guides you an ideal, that I’m going to look at this situation and, you know, not just as 
“what am I obligated to do” but “what what is possible for this client” and that’s really 
guided by experience and theory and you’re world view [long pause].
JJ: Okay, good, well, let’s stop there.    
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Dissertation Interview II
JJ: Imagine you’re the therapist in the situation.  What ethical challenges or problems do 
you so and how do you think you would respond?
T: Um, it’s kind of a hard question to answer because I’m  really […] I started taking, um, 
real detailed notes of every move back and forth, and so I’m really caught up in what he 
did.  I don’t… In other words I don’t know where to, um, where the dilemma, where to 
erase what he did and where to start.  I mean I guess I could start from the beginning 
where he asks: um, for him to give an assessment of a report to another guy.  And, I think 
in that way I don’t know off the top of my head what I would say I would do because I 
think he worked, and I would work step-by-step, calm response in a dialogue, you know?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: So, um, I, um, I mean the first thing that grabbed me is that this is potentially the last 
session he has with this guy, and, um, this guy is going to go back to war and be in the air 
and whatnot, and so he just jumps in and just “are you really ready for this?”  And, I think 
that would be the right way to go.  I know my initial sense was that I thought, I thought 
that the question or phrasing of someone being ready for war was already flawed in a 
sense.  But…
JJ: The way the therapist phrased it?
T: Yeah, now I’m rethinking it because it’s his language, it’s his—he’s working with him 
and the guy’s own world,  but I don’t know, you know, the whole “are you ready for this 
or not” doesn’t really make sense to me.
JJ: How so?
T: Well, I mean, if the guy was traumatized by killing innocent people.  Are you really 
ready to go back and possibly kill innocent people?  Because it’s a nonsensical question 
to me.  It’s like if, as for me, coming from the place of a psychologist because that’s 
psychopathic, you know?  It’s like saying: “are you properly psychopathic enough to go 
back to that situation” and, um, that was my initial reaction, but I now see that that was 
good to work with, which was to challenge his initial assumption that he is quote “ready 
to go back” and needs this therapist’s help.  So, um, so then that started a lot of stuff.  You 
have a number of questions?
JJ: Well, you can keep going.
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T: You know, the next, I think just to heat it up a little more, he challenged him on the 
level of feeling.  Like, um, you know and put out words like fear and guilt and asked him 
directly how do you really feel about this.  And then for whatever reason the guy talked 
about his wife and father not wanting him to fly.  So, similarly I would explore their 
reasons because it takes relief off you of being the antagonist and it you just get to let him 
in a way speak to their hesitations.  But I must have confused that because I got the 
impression that his wife did not want him to fly but his father did.  But it doesn’t matter 
because it’s the same principle: you just work with their perceptions because those are the 
perceptions he’s working with.  And, um, and I like the move he makes when he says, 
um, “look, we don’t have time for me to talk about my father right now” and he uses that 
in a nice way because he says that he does think it’s important for them to talk about that 
and then he slides in, “especially if you’re trying to push me for an assessment” which, 
um, in a way is a very indirect way of saying, “I may not give you an assessment.”  
JJ: Yeah, hmm-hm.
T: And also, in a way, I feel like there is an indirect comment on the guy’s manipulation.  
He’s saying: “I’m not clear if this is what you’re trying to do.”  And I think that there are 
these little seeds because of course the question is going to come back and it comes back 
at the end of the session. So, um, and then the guy comments on his father being good 
with his son.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: And that their connected.   The therapist asks: “did your son ever ask you why you left 
home or moved out” and he’s real vague about it, as though his son doesn’t know the 
difference whether he’s in Iraq or across town, and that ‘s when he gets into the heart of 
the therapy where he says to him, “it’s probably a relief to him that I’m not there.” And 
he says the party was loose to him when he wasn’t there, the father was there and people 
were enjoying themselves and the child was able to spread his wings.  And, um, and, um, 
this is I think the first time the therapist makes the move of saying, was, was he enjoying 
himself because he was happy to see you, which, um, who know what the truth to that 
possibility is, but I think this is the first effort of the therapist of just brining home, like, a 
real central thing that a son needs his father.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: In one way or another. So, um, and then not long after that he really challenges him 
and says “you’re so clear that the Navy needs you, but you don’t speak in any conviction 
like that about your sons.” And, um, and he just kind of sticks with is position how his 
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son doesn’t need him, doesn’t want him, and then the therapist says “are you sure you’re 
not projecting that” um, that, um, meaning , “you don’t need your father, fuck your 
father;  you’re assuming your son means the same about you.”  And he just goes on to 
just push against that.  
JJ: Yeah.
T: The idea that his son needs him or enjoys him and he gives that example of the chess 
game.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: So, um, and there’s two things there, one is his father harshly judges him.  One is that, 
if I am to put it as short as possible, his father calls him a pussy. Um, “you know you 
can’t, if any little thing goes wrong, you’re kind of soft,” which starts to, um, bring into 
view that, um, some of the psychodynamics of him underneath, wanting to go back into 
the military.  But there is more to that, um, at the end.  Um, in terms of the interaction of 
what’s going on, um, yes, the therapist asks him, a part of that is when the son goes 
upstairs and he sees him and it breaks his heart, still playing on the idea that he is packing 
a lot on to his son, the therapist asks him what about his son was it that broke his heart.  
Because that’s, like, opening a huge window into what he feels about himself but what he 
cannot say directly.  And so he talks about being under expectations and pressure and 
whatnot and again he hammers home these things about because he leaves the party and 
the therapist says “do you really think your son was better off without you there on his 
birthday.”  And, um, the guy goes to a bar, apparently a gay bar, I don’t know?
JJ: Yes, he goes to a gay bar.
T: And, um, kind of consciously aware of his desire to hurt those guys, um, the therapist 
challenges him and says maybe that is not why he went there—he went there because it’s 
a space in which no expectations are made of him.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: Um, which as he himself said, “look, they all stayed away from me and could see 
where I was and they looked at that and accepted that.” So, um, the only thing, a couple 
things left that I picked up is, um, when he brings back the question of whether the 
therapist will provide the assessment, and I don’t know if I would have done this, but I 
don’t think I would have been sharp enough to, um, do this, but, um, I would have been 
compelled to answer yes or no.  If not yes or no, answer more directly, like, even if I was 
going to write it, I would still need to think about this.  I would have stayed on the 
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surface of the question.  Because it seemed to be building on other examples, like, you 
want me to share responsibility for really big decisions, such as continuing to separate 
from your wife, and going to war and whatnot.
JJ: And you thought that that was sharp, is that what you mean?
T:  Yeah, I thought that was really, really keen because, um, you know obviously the guy 
is macho and probably thinks of himself as totally autonomous, and makes his own 
decisions, and is a military man and is accountable for what he does.  And so to play that 
and say “this assessment seems to be you trying to be a pussy, you know.”  Kind of, um, 
not making a decision on your own.
JJ: So, let me just clarify a moment, you’re saying that you probably would not have, you 
would have been more direct?
T: Ah, no, I think I would have been really caught in my anxiety about getting a call from 
a psychologist.  And not knowing what to say there.
JJ: Hm-hmm.
T: And so, maybe in a way, that is what you were asking there.  Again that seems to be, 
that to me is an overall dilemma, but then given that, what do you do in the session?
JJ: Hm-hmm.
T: So, I think, um, I think  I would worked it more psychodynamically in the way he did 
in the session, but, um, I still think more than he did I would have spent time on his 
request itself.  Yeah.
JJ: How would have you done that?
T: I’m just kind of trying to be honest about this because I’ve never been in that kind of 
situation, you know?  How I think I would have responded rather than my best, kind of 
right-thinking, on what I would do.  [takes deep breath and exhales audibly.]  I don’t 
know.  I wonder what the risk would be in just outright saying, you know, you should 
have consulted with me first before giving my name as a recommendation because, um, 
yeah.  I think I would have, in the same way he says at the end “you should have stayed 
in therapy,” I think I would have said “look, we” and in the same way he acknowledged 
that the guy’s done good work, I would have said, “you’ve done good work and I feel I 
know you pretty well, I don’t know honestly say I know whether this is the right decision 
for you or whether you’re so-called ready for it.”  And, um, “Im not in the position to 
stand behind your decision.”  I might still stand  behind the…you know where the guy 
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says, “so you’re not going to tell me whether or not to fly again,”  I might still stay in that 
position.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: I don’t see any purpose in telling he cannot fly again.  I might say something like I 
can’t stand behind it but I don’t propose to know what is best for you, if you should do 
this or not.  What is coming to my mind now is that I don’t get the impression that you 
know what is best for you.  And so, um, and that would have been the kind of edge, that 
might have led me into something that he [the therapist] did in pushing him on some of 
this stuff and, you know, asking him to look harder at some of his motivations.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  It sounds like what you’re saying is that you’re picking up on this dilemma 
of pretty much writing or responding to his request.  So, this is kind of the central one 
you’ve identified.
T:  Yeah, well, second to that I really was, um, more than that I was with the session, I 
was in the session.  Because it is also, yeah, I mean with any client that comes in and 
says, apparently this was somewhat out of the blue, “this is our last session, I’m out of 
here,” um, I’m really, I don’t know, I think there is a huge dilemma, even an ethical 
dilemma, as to how do you use that session, depending on the client.  And for the most 
part that is the central dilemma. 
JJ: And when you say depending on the client, are you…
T: That some people, you know, have gotten what they could out of therapy and are done, 
and they can access that for themselves and there are cases in which I’d agree even if it 
was a surprise.  There are certain situations in which it would not be a bad thing.
JJ: How about this situation?
T: Yeah, the dilemmas are really both equally important, they’re one in a way, you know.  
Um, so I don’t know, I could go back to the first dilemma, which is to whether to give an 
assessment.  I think for one, you don’t want the guy to leave with a false impression 
where he leaves thinking you’re going to give him a positive assessment and then you 
turn around and say some stuff he would be surprised to hear you saying, especially to, 
um, another professional.
JJ: So, you’re saying you don’t want to be misleading or make promises that you can’t 
fulfill?
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T: Yes, and what’s unclear to me is he leaves it…it’s ambiguous, you know?  I don’t 
know what he’s going to tell the…well, it’s a t.v. show, it makes you curious about that, 
but, um, so that’s not clear.
JJ: No, it is not.  They leave that hanging, eh?
T: Yeah, so…was it clarified when the doctor would be calling?  
JJ: No, it wasn’t.
T: See, that would be my issue.  I would want to know when, exactly, should I expect this 
phone call?  I would want to make this decision with the client.
JJ: In the session?
T: Yeah, so if he was going to call me that week, then I would have wanted to let the guy 
know when he leaves that I will not be supporting his decision potentially.  And maybe 
he’s done that as a hook, you know, if you can somehow give some more time.
JJ: How would that be better?
T: Yeah, well, in a way I’m doubting that now even as I say it because, okay, let’s say the 
guy is able to say somehow, look we got another month and this doctor is going to be 
calling you, um, um, this is an interesting roll of the dice because you could definitely get 
to some pretty serious issues in a month, especially where this session was left.  On the 
other hand, when you frame it as, at the end of it, we’ll make a decision, and obviously 
he’s thinking it’s in favor to go to war, then you frame the therapy in a superficial way.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: So, there’s a contradiction that’s going through there something the therapist has to 
hope to get at some real depth and applying this or get this bill approved.  So, in that 
sense maybe it is better in what he did, which is for him to leave unclear and to have been 
challenged whether this was the best decision for him in the first place, you know?  And 
also with the very open invitation- call me anytime about anything.  I don’t know it’s 
kind of, those are kind of my thoughts on that.  
JJ: Hmm… yeah. 
T: Again, it is really hard to say, you know, what would I do…
JJ: It sound like you’re having trouble identifying…
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T: Well, he’s not my client and in this case, I mean, you know, I’ve seen probably two or 
three sessions with this guy so I have a little more context, but still there’s not enough to, 
um, really identify with the therapist in this case and know.
JJ: So, in a way, you viewing this today, caused a bit of a de-identification or distance 
with the therapist?
T: Right, because I haven’t gone along for the ride.  It’s hard for me to place myself…it 
would be easy for me to conceive of this guy as my client if I had been watching the 
whole season,  I might have more opinions on what to do.  But, then, maybe not.  What 
I’m trying to highlight is that, um, that I mean, I think it’s just different when you work 
week in and week out with somebody and they bring you or put you with a serious 
dilemma.  I think a lot of the responses are intuitive and…
JJ: What do you mean by intuitive here?
T: Well, they build on a whole history of references and conversation, so I think in a 
moment like this, especially when somebody’s going to end therapy there’s already for 
me at least to recollect a lot of what has happened in therapy, more so than on a week-to-
week basis.  Um, and so, um, I think it’s like you have this whole history with this person 
and to try to make a decision.  But my sense of this case is that the therapist wants him to 
be in therapy and not jump back into war.  That is his assessment.  Oddly enough that 
cannot be spoken, but it is pretty clear.
JJ: Can you go back to what you said moments ago when you talked about how you make 
decisions.  So, you said that when a client presents you with a difficult matter, you said 
intuitive, but then I asked you, well, it sounded like you had more to say.
T: Yeah, it’s interesting that you work with a person, you have a relationship  and history 
and a dialogue, so you’re going to work from that standpoint with them, it’s not, um, 
well, it’s hard for me to say.  I think it’s just related to what we were saying.  So, you’re 
saying what would I do with this guy’s plan?
JJ: Yeah, well being in his position.
T: Well, part of it, the reflection is limited.  There is a certain barrier.  What helps me 
think about it is, like it did, just to go through what he did.
JJ: But the barrier is not there otherwise for you, when you get at that?
T: I just think there is a gap.  When you ask me about how, well, somehow I could 
conjure up a parallel dilemma and how I worked with that.  I think that, my explanation, 
167
would draw so much more on my history with that person and the details of that person’s 
like and the details of our experience in therapy.  So,
JJ: And so,
T: Well, at the end of the day it would only result in something that looked kind of like 
this, which is pretty sophisticated psychodynamic work under the gun because the clock’s 
ticking.
JJ: Yeah, there’s a lot of pressure.
T: So…
JJ: It sound like what you’re doing is saying that you considered alternates, but find 
yourself agreeing, not completely, but largely with his technique?  In a sense, his 
response to a dilemma.  Because he’s presented with a dilemma that you’ve identified at 
the beginning of the session.
T:   Well, whether it is supervisions or whatnot there are plenty of time where I disagree 
with, well, maybe I don’t think it’s wrong, but I would do it differently.  Whereas I think 
this, as you said it is drawn from a real case and real therapy with a seasoned therapist 
and it fits to me more or less.  I think it’s, you know, it leaves me with the realization with 
what I don’t know about the therapist, the client and the therapy.  I think it’s that that was 
calling to the other question.  It just pushes me to my limits of not-knowing what is going 
on.  I mean, yeah, I think it is important for me to say is that I don’t look at this as some 
kind of, some riddle, some riddle that has a right answer.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: You know, taking into account: this factor, this factor, this factor, this should be done.  
You know what I mean?  Some real strategically, some kind of approach like, well, I 
don’t buy it.  That’s what I’m saying: the limit of me being able to think through how I 
would do this differently.  I’m not in other people’s shoes or in other people’s therapy, so 
as much as I can think things through at some point I reach a point of a mystery there that 
I want to honor and leave my own statements with some degree of ambiguity in the same 
way as.
JJ: And is that true of your own work?  In this situation, you’re looking at another, but 
does this occur inwardly for you, too?
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T: I mean, yeah, in the same way, I’ll joke around and say, well, in retrospect I fucked up, 
or, um, but, it’s often when I say that to others that they open up the possibility that I 
didn’t fuck up that maybe something else was…
JJ: An alternate?
T: An alternate or that the gravity of what I thought was really not that big or, like you 
said, an alternate and, yeah, so, but there’s an, um, like in this case, it is the client that 
leads, so then on you don’t know what their life is like and maybe it’s fantastic.  And 
maybe from their perspective they see therapy as having a positive impact, so these are 
all thing you don’t know.  And yet you can look at it somewhat analytically and say, well, 
I fucked up and that would have allowed therapy to change or that would have allowed 
them to have some realization that they should have or whatever.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
T: And the opposite is true as well, like, I just tend to assume that things are going really 
well, I take a class in poststructural psychology and begin to think, well, what is really 
going on in here?  So, um, yes, so I leave a little of mystery and ambiguity in what the 
right thing to do was or is.  Um, yeah.  Sorry, really long winded.
JJ: No, I like it.  I’ve been trying to just kind of give you the space to, um, so it’s good.  I 
think it is really good material.  We can finish there.
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Dissertation Interview III
JJ: Okay, imagine you are in the situation of the therapist.  What ethical challenges or 
problems do you see and how do you think you would respond?
A: The obvious one, um, is the boundary issue.  Um, it’s like I noticed that the client 
tapped the therapists leg, and it makes me think, hmm, their boundary seems pretty vague 
to begin with.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And the last, the therapist gave him his cell phone number and told him call me 
anytime you want to talk.  And, um, it just sounds to me more like a close friend instead 
of a psychologist.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: So, that’s what I’m primarily concerned about—the potential, um, multiple 
relationships that I can see, like, is he a friend, a psychologist, or a helper.  And also the 
client asking the psychologist to kind of endorse his readiness to go back to the Navy.  
That’s something I’m not quite sure about.  Some of the things, some of them might be 
like understanding or what I missed because of the language barrier.  Like my first 
question would be what, exactly, is he seeing the psychologist for?  And I think that 
would greatly influence how the psychologist can endorse him in terms of readiness of 
not.  And it is not very clear for me from the psychologist’s responses.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A:  Like, what are the actual reasons—he thought the client was not ready yet.  He has to 
deal with his issues on the ground not in the air, and stuff like that.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.  So, you see the whole issue of boundaries as especially concerning here.
A: Yeah, like he, the psychologist, seemed to be having a real strong reaction, like “don’t 
go, I don’t think you’re ready yet!”  But, um, I mean it’s just a push.  It’s not exactly clear 
to me what he’s dealing with and why he’s not ready.  And, um, why he might be ready.
JJ: From what you were able to see, were you able to gather anything to answer that 
question?
A:  Yeah, some part of it is that he wanted to beat people up, and I’m a bit surprised the 
psychologist did not deal with it in the session.
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JJ: Yeah.  Hmm-hm.
A: He just let it go and listened, and that’s one of the things I see as necessary to address
—that he won’t hurt people.  I’m not exactly clear why he went to that bar and the pieces 
I got from what the client said, it seemed very clear that he wanted to beat people up for 
some reason.  I don’t know if I got that wrong, though.  Did I get it, see it correctly or…?
JJ:  Um, he did say that he was, that he felt like beating people up, but that he did not.
A: Because nobody was there?
JJ: Well, because no one confronted him.
A: It seems that he, um, needs an outlet for his emotions instead of feeling like he needs 
to beat people up.  Yeah, like, if no one confronted him he was just lucky that day, and I 
see no reason why not to address that.  If I were the therapist, first of all, I would validate 
his feelings, like, where he might be coming from and what he has experienced and why 
he is having that emotion.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A:  And what is his motivation.  And if it is possible, I would strongly suggest for him to 
find other outlets, and, um, for him to talk about it in therapy.  Other outlets and develop 
a safety plan primarily for him but also for others.  And it sounds like he is a potential 
bump if he just wants to beat people up.  
JJ: Potential what?  
A:  Um, bump.  Like, he’s well trained and in the Navy and it sounds like, if I get it right, 
it sounds like he got some psychological issues.  Is that why he’s not flying anymore?  
Did I hear that right?
JJ: Well, um, he came on his own to therapy after he was, um, upset by a bombing he was 
involved in where he killed civilians.
A: Oh, um, yeah, um, I see.  So, 
JJ: Although he claims he is not upset by it.
A: Yeah, it sound like some sort of PTSD, but I’m not sure or clear enough to diagnose.  
It is some sort of PTSD related, and I really think to have a plan to not do it again.  I 
thought about and if he puts himself in a situation he might do it, but the therapist can ask 
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the client if he’s thinking about it again he can use an emergency hotline or whatever, but 
just not a cell phone.  I think it is like, well, he needs something 24 hours.
JJ: What ethical challenges or problems do you see?
A: Hmm.  Ethical challenges or problems.  Let’s see.  One question is the competence.  
I’m not so sure about the psychologist’s competence.  Of course it is not addressed, but 
we’re not sure he’s competent to treat a certain population.   It kind of sounds to me like 
the client might have PTSD problems and it is not clear to me whether the therapist is 
competent or got training in that.
JJ: Hmm.
A: He didn’t deal with the primary issue.  He just seemed to let it go.
JJ: The primary issue being…aggression?
A: Yeah, physical aggression and possibly hurting others.  And, um, let me see.  And also 
the fact that he didn’t deal with the issue I heard, it is primarily his issue.  The marriage 
and family part it sounds to me like most people have some concerns and conflict, but 
what is pressing me is that he could hurt somebody at any time.   It’s kind of hard—the 
principle of malfeasance.  Because if he hurts someone it’s going to hurt him as well.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Like, how, just listening is benefitting the client.  And there are some exceptions of 
just breeching confidentiality and I think it fits into that category because he does, um, 
have the potential to hurt other people, and he didn’t go into that and ask, like, well, what 
would your plan and usually what would trigger that, and his potential of doing 
something that would hurt himself or others.
JJ: Yeah.
A: And I just didn’t hear him doing that.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Umm, the code and standards…one standard, I think maybe the eight.  Let’s see.  I 
don’t remember exactly which one, but it should be…which one.  One is human 
relations.
JJ: And you said codes and standards? 
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A: Yes…
JJ: Which are you referring to?
A: About boundary issues.  
JJ: That was the first one?
A: Yes, and I said competence should be the second.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Um, I mean, it’s just my assumption, though.  If he asks whether he has a plan or if 
things trigger him, um, if it’s immanent.  I didn’t hear that.  He just talked about 
something in the past and I didn’t access that, so, and I don’t really know.  But if he asks 
that then he might have to breech confidentiality at some point, but I don’t remember 
where that ethical code is at.  Recognizing confidentiality or therapy…A? or 4? I don’t 
remember exactly where it is.  I almost feel like I’m having another comprehensive exam. 
[laughter].
JJ: [Laughs].       
A: Yeah, that’s what I’m thinking.  In the beginning I don’t know if I heard him right.  In 
the beginning he said something about next session?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: What did he say?
JJ: The patient?
A: Hm-hmm.
JJ: He said, “I won’t be coming back for next session.”  That he would be terminating 
after this.
A: Did he say why?
JJ: He said that he would go fly again.
A: Hmm.  He’s going to fly again.
JJ: He’s going back to the military.
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A: Hmm.  Yet, at the same time he asks the psychologist to endorse him! And it sounds 
like without his endorsement he will be unable to go back.  I think it is fair for him to ask 
the psychologist to tell him how he progressed, how he worked, and if he has consent for 
some third party, for him to give him input about his situation.  But I think the 
psychologist, if he is really not ready for flying again, it is important for him to tell him 
“you’re not ready.” 
JJ: Hmm-hm. Yeah.
A: Like, okay, say what are the reasons.
JJ: Yeah.
A: And if the client does not come back the next session, it seems to me he would have to 
assess suicidality.  Um, that’s what I would think of.  Because if he’s not coming back, 
what will he do?  That’s kind of strange.
JJ: You don’t feel he addressed that?
A: No, if he addressed that concern, the client might say “I just think I’m done in 
therapy” or…or the client might say “I’ll find another job or move away or whatever.”
JJ: Yeah.
A: At least he has to ask about it because clients won’t come and give him a reason that 
might not even be possible.  I know it’s kind of complicated.  It just, um, I don’t know if I 
understand the client’s situation correctly.  Even, um, even if he self referred to the 
psychologist, the reason he’s asking for an endorsement might kind of indicate that he 
cannot fly unless the psychologist endorses him.  
JJ: Right.  So, he’s looking for his… he wants things very concrete from the 
psychologist?  He wants him to write him a letter.
A: Yeah, so it just sounds like he is not allowed to fly.  But he has to ask for something.   
Like an endorsement of the psychologist saying he is ready to go, he has dealt with all of 
his issues, can deal with his anger, and he’s fine.  So, if he’s…that situation, then that 
excuse he gave is not valid—“Okay, I’m not coming back next session because I’m 
flying again”—and, um, yeah.  But, anyways, I feel like what’s wrong with the delivery 
part.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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A: And of course, if it is that he’s suicidal, then something, he’s not coming back, he 
might commit suicide, 
JJ: Yep.
A: If he’s in imminent danger then, then he might have to do something.  There are so 
many things.
JJ: Yeah.
A: Like, for suicidality.  It’s unknown.  He didn’t assess, like.  He didn’t assess at all.  He 
didn’t assess previous thoughts.  Nor current thought.  And, um, like frequency of 
thoughts.  Or whether he attempted or not.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Because, for PTSD, I think suicidality and irritability are primary.  But, anyways, I 
have to go back—I don’t have enough information to diagnose him.
JJ: Yeah.
A: I’m just saying, if he’s suspicious of him having that diagnosis, then that’s what I 
would go for.  And, um, means, like, and plans, like, and how much detail, like, when he 
was going to do that and what way and where.  And how, exactly he was going to do it, 
and whether he was capable of doing it or not.
JJ: Hm-hmm.
A: And, then, protective factors, um, yeah, and all those good things about suicidality.  
And also…
JJ: And what else?
A: Like, how fatal it could be.  
JJ: Um, so considering those responses, your thinking that this therapist did not meet 
these requirements, which you see as essential?
A: Yeah.  I would say he wanted to listen more.
JJ: Yeah.
A: That is a part I don’t always do [laughs].  I think our styles are different as well.
JJ: Could you say more about that?
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A: Style difference?
JJ: Or just you don’t always do that and it’s a style difference.
A: Well, what I mean is, um, I kind of hear something he tried to say.  He kind of linked 
the client’s responses about his son’s birthday party to his father.  So, I don’t know what 
theoretical approach he’s using, but, so it sounds kind of like a more active, I mean not 
so-active-one, so he will listen more, rephrase, and try to link it to his family history.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A:  And what the client might be.  And also, I kind of feel, unless I had a very long 
relationship, I would not jump and tell the client what it is without asking for permission, 
and asking for, like, how right he was, like about father, and family history, and his 
reaction to his son.
JJ: Yeah.
A: And he just says “you’re projecting.”  And that’s something I don’t agree with.
JJ: Hm-hmm.   Can you say a bit more about how you don’t agree with it?
A: Um, um, it’s just like, again it is short clip.
JJ: Yeah.
A: So, if he does know the client, he probably has enough information to say that.  From 
my standpoint, okay, if that’s how much I know the client myself, I don’t see myself 
being able to say that, unless I got some information, and usually if I do have to say that 
and say “yes, it’s about you projecting” and “you think you want to do the same thing” 
and whatever he said.  At least I would explain what information I got from previous 
therapy.
JJ: Okay.
A: Um, yeah, that’s part of it.  And I said it would be about style differences—it’s not like 
I don’t listen to the client, but it’s more about letting it go.  I wouldn’t just let him go and 
talk about.  My impression about the therapist is that he does very little, and he can do 
very little if those pressing issues were not there—if he were not hurting people, if his 
possibility of being, um, suicidal were not there, um, the boundary issues he did not 
address. If all those issues were not there, then I think he listens just fine.
JJ: Hmm- yeah.
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A: He’s just trying to listen to the client and let him talk about whatever he wants to, then 
I kind of feel he failed to stop the client when there is something he needs to ask the 
client more questions about.  Or actively help the client to develop a plan.  And I’m more 
CBT, so I talk a lot more and kind of like frame the questions a lot more and try to lead 
the client a certain way if I see there’s something they need to explore.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And if there’s something, they need to do something, like potential harm of self or 
others.  That’s something I would make very concrete.  
JJ: Hm-hmm.
A: And to make it a plan and with his agreement if it’s necessary I would even consider, 
like, suggesting for involuntary hospitalization if, like, his suicidal risk is high, and 
homicidal risk is also high.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: But, um, I didn’t hear homicidal, but he might accidentally kill somebody, though.  
That’s my fear about this particular client.  Because, I mean, my impression about Navy, 
Army, whatever, and Air Force people is that they got their physical training, and, um, a 
lay person might not be able to protect themselves if they want to hurt somebody.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And their at that range, like, if there’s a very traumatic accident.
JJ: Yeah.
A: And I didn’t hear him explore the accident exactly, but I assume there was some kind 
of incident.
JJ: The incident when in the military?
A: Yeah.
JJ: Yeah, he was, um, a pilot and bombed a village and the coordinates were given to him 
of which village to bomb, but those bombed were not enemies, but school children.  So, 
um, it was children, 11 children.  It ended up killing civilians, but was supposed to kill 
soldiers.
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A: Okay, and I heard about guilt in the therapy, but maybe his guilt is about the incident.  
But I didn’t get very clear.
JJ: Hm-hm.
A: Yeah, that’s difficult about watching the clip is that I cannot ask the client, “okay 
what’s going on, tell me more, tell me more!” [laughs].
JJ: Right.  So, everything for you is contingent upon what he asks.
A: Yeah, and I think for that incident he needs more than listening.  He needs something 
like systematic desensitization. 
JJ: Okay.
A: Yeah, and also for the guilt, you know what I mean?  He needs schema reforming or 
whatever.
JJ: How would you do that?
A: How would I do that?  Hmm.
JJ: Yeah, how would you do those two things?
A: Um, I would start with…systematic desensitization, like, um, let me think.  Um, seems 
like he’s, also I don’t know if his anger problems started from that or before.  That’s one 
thing, but how I would do it.  Well, um, I think.  Let me think.  Because he doesn’t really 
have the anxiety about it, and he didn’t mention flashback, so I’m not totally certain how 
I should get it done.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Um, let me think if there’s any emotional character, like that anger.  I would probably 
ask what could trigger him, and identify more than one thing that could trigger his anger.  
From the very mild thing to the very bottom thing and what triggers him could be very 
big.
JJ: Yeah.
A: Um, like he got angry from the conversation with his father.  Did I get it right?
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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A: Um, well, actually just that incident can be informed by the systematic desensitization 
part.  It’s like helping to, um, go through the procedural memory of what happened first 
and second.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And, what exactly is the thing that triggers his anger, and then, what he does 
afterwards.  And, then, to reduce the trigger of anger, I would probably ask him to kind of 
identify similar situations with his father, and, like, also rate it, and then starting to ask 
him to imagine that.  Kind of imagine it.  And before he starts imagining it, I would teach 
him some of the relaxation techniques, like muscle scanning or breathing.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Um, like using his good memories to interrupt what triggers his anger.
JJ: Hmm.
A: And just go through it and once the steps are identified and start imagining it, but also 
his breathing to imagine it until he reaches a certain level, like for ten seconds, and when 
he gets there tell him to stop imagining it, and then use more relaxation techniques until 
he calms down, and then repeat it.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Repeat again and again until his level of anger can be reduced to a certain level, and 
then move on to the next one which will trigger a higher level of anger.  Basically, it’s 
just like that.  It’s steps, and try to go through and then, yeah.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: I think that might be helpful to him, for him to kind of ease his anger or even like, um, 
ask him—the cognitive reframing part—is ask him what, um, if he could what would he 
do different; if he could imagine he could go back.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And I really don’t think he can do a lot, and, I mean, usually in that process of 
exploring whether he can do anything different, and he’s in the Navy—he has to follow 
orders.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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A: And, what he can do differently—then I would re-label it that he’s following orders 
and it’s difficult in a war, as far as my understanding is, a lot of the time, people are not 
segregated enough, so they end up killing civilians.  It is something he may be able to 
identify.  If he goes into enough detail, step-by-step, from when he was given orders to 
when he dropped the bomb, and figured out some civilians were killed.
JJ: Yep.
A:  And, um, whether he can do anything differently.  Maybe there were some things he 
could do differently.  
JJ: Yeah.
A: But maybe not.  And when he figures out there were not things he could do differently, 
then just help him figure out that it’s a war and is different.  If he’s walking and is not 
supposed to kill a child.  And when, also, when I’m thinking about this, he’s 
contradictory.  He says he feels guilt, but it seems like there is some angry associated 
with that incident.  And if he didn’t want to kill those children, why would he go to a bar 
and kill nice people.  And, that doesn’t seem to be consistent.  I would probably confront 
him and say “how do you see yourself doing that? How can they go together?”
JJ: Yeah, um, do you see other ethical challenges?
A: Um, let me think.  Let me try to think because I don’t understand the whole thing, 
honestly speaking.  Um, that’s so far I can see. If there are some little things, then I 
cannot remember.   Yeah, I touched upon the major ones.  And I would approach it to 
make sure everyone is safe.  And it sounds like the client has pressing issues he has not 
resolved yet.
JJ: Hmm. Hm-hm.
A: And, I would probably do something different than giving him a card.  I would 
probably give him a referral for someone for him to see.  Probably in the Navy.  Or, um, I 
know for Navy people it is kind of tough if they have any kind of record of severe mental 
disorder.
JJ: Yeah.
A: Like, we can see if he can see someone in the Navy.  Or whether he wants to see 
another person if he’s not coming back or have him come in, come back to make sure he 
does not hurt himself.  It’s just a failure I see.
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JJ: The failure to follow up?
A: Yeah, I don’t think the client is done yet.  And he just goes and says, well, go and call 
me anytime.  That’s not responsible.
JJ: Okay. Yeah.
A: Other things are more about content and how I would deal with it.  From my limited 
understanding of his family situation and children, and his wife, I don’t know what else 
to say in terms of an ethical thread.
JJ: Thread?
A: Yeah, thread.  I didn’t hear a lot.  He just says he’s upset.  It seems he’s got a lot going 
in his family life and maybe that’s why he wants to leave.  And, um, I am surprised why 
he didn’t approach him to develop ways to either better communicate with his family or, 
it can be something simple, like, tell them he is really hurt when they act like they can’t 
see him.  And, are you going to understand why his family treats him like that, and to be 
able to work it out in terms of his family’s relationships.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: To look into what is going on with his father.  That’s something that was not 
encouraged much.  And to develop other social support, like who he would talk to.  Who 
he can talk to if he is really upset.  I didn’t hear anything about that, and that’s not quite 
how I would deal with it.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: It is kind of an interest to me. 
JJ: Can you say more about how you would do that?
A: How I would do that…hmm…let me see.
JJ: And you said leave the bump?
A: [laughs] Leave the bump there.  Yeah, well, what I mean is, leave the client that way.  
I kind of put the client... well, the client is in a position where he might hurt himself or 
others, which he would certainly regret.  And, um, if the psychologist didn’t treat him 
properly then it might happen, and I’d feel bad for that.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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A: Did I answer your questions?
JJ: Yes, yes, you did.            
         
Dissertation Interview IV
JJ: Okay, imagine that you are the therapist in the situation.  What ethical challenges or 
problems do you see and how do you think you would respond?
K: Well, it appears, based on the segment, that this gentleman has been in therapy with 
the therapist for a time.  And, um, they obviously touched upon some pretty deep-seeded 
and, um, complicated issues.  There’s all that going on.  And I think the biggest dilemma 
for the therapist is that, obviously, he has some pretty complex issues that would make 
one question whether or not he should be put in a very active and high stress military 
role.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: And, he’s asking the therapist to essentially vouch for his mental and emotional 
stability to be put in that kind of situation, and, um, he’s asking the therapist to essentially 
give him a favorable sign off.  Obviously, he’s not too concerned about confidentiality 
issues because he said several times, you know, I’ve already told several people about our 
work.  And, I’m surmising that he would have signed off on anything to allow this 
therapist to talk to the military shrink, as he put it.  And, um, he… he’s really asking the 
therapist to violate some key ethical things, so that he can go back into active military 
duty.  And, so right away that jumps out at me.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: Um, also, I mean, and thinking about the issues again.  To potentially have him, he’s 
obviously dealing with some identity issues, marital discord, unresolved things with his 
dad, and there’s a lot of unresolved issues that make one question whether he would be 
okay.  Not to mention to ask someone to pre-determine an assessment and ask for what 
would need to be heard.  It’s all very troubling.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: And he was obviously not troubled very much at all by it—the patient.  And he’s 
willing to say, you know, can you do this.  And he had no insight into what he was 
asking.  There’s just a lot of issues with him.
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JJ: Hmm-hm.  So, you kind of identified this primary ethical issue.  How do you think 
you would respond?
K: Well, I really think, and the therapist in this case did not explore this with Alex, the 
client.  And it appeared that he’s not planning on coming back, so I don’t know, um, if 
Alex would have the opportunity to talk with him again about this or not.  But I really 
think, um, Alex needs a conversation with the therapist to delve into, um, what he’s 
asking, and to maybe help him gain some understanding and insight into this implications 
of what he’s asking.  I mean, I’ve never seen this, so maybe that happens in another 
segment or something, but I, um, I think that that needs to happen.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: And, I also think that then the therapist is going to have to make some choices.  Um, 
ultimately, about it.  He wants to continue to work with Alex; he says that.  Yet, 
depending on what choice he makes, he may severe that therapeutic relationship.  But I 
really think he’s going to have to go through ethical processing—the therapist—as to 
what’s being asked of him.  I thought about: what could he do?  Well, he could do 
nothing, he could say to Alex that I just cannot do that, and then face those implications 
in his work with him.  He could get the consent from him and then tell him that he’ll 
share his assessment with him, but the assessment will be my professional assessment—
you’re not going to tell me what, well, direct, how the assessment will go.
JJ: Yeah.
K: Or, well, he could go along with what this guy’s asking.  And, um, provide sign off, if 
you will.  And, I started going through in my mind several things that you could do.  Um, 
it’s pretty intriguing because I wondered what he did do [laughs].
JJ:  Yeah?
K: Yeah [laughs] it got my interest.  Now I know why people say they like this show.
JJ: [laughs] Hmm-hm.
K: So, those are a few things off the top that I thought about.
JJ: So, you’re saying you see several options in terms of what you’ve identified as the  
core ethical dilemma.  Um, how might you choose between those options?
K: Well, um, you know, of course, in going through the training I’m going through, they 
teach us our ethical dilemma- decision making models.  And, I think that at the core of 
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the ethical decision making models is the decision you make if another person were to 
evaluate it.  If it were evaluated by a peer.  Would they say that was an ethical and 
reasonable decision or would they say this goes against every professional standard and 
ethical model and ethical practice.  That would guide me.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K:  I mean, you know, I mean.
JJ: That thought about another practitioner or peer?
K: Another peer—if they were looking at my decision in this scenario.  Would they look 
at my decision and think, objectively and uninvolved, that that was reasonable, or would 
they say that that was unreasonable.  And, how would I then, if I was questioned about it, 
um, from a legal standpoint or another standpoint, could I justify the decision I made on 
ethical standards, model of care standards, um, really that’s what would guide me. 
Because at the end of the day, your professional integrity really has to win out.  And I 
think that would be the key thing for me.  
JJ: Now, kind of taking that and applying it to what you’ve seen in the situation, um, if 
you had to make decision in that session, it sounds like you had some qualms with how 
the therapist went about this?
K: I don’t necessarily disagree with how he handled it because he took it back to the 
treatment issues at hand, the clinical issues this guy obviously has.  But what I don’t think 
he did was delve into the request.  He did, well, I guess there were so many issues this 
guy had that he took it down the track and, you know, those family conflicts, those 
internal conflicts, and other things.  But I don’t think they really got to talk about, back 
to, the implications of this request.  And, um…
JJ: They got away from that?
K: Yes, they got away from that, and I think that discussion needed to be held.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: Alex seemed to believe that this…that question is out in there, but he does not know 
how the therapist is going to handle it.  I need you to not f-this up for me, and just do it, 
and then I’m on my way.  And you don’t know, um, what the therapist will ultimately do 
with it.  But I just felt like it would be helpful to stick with it a little bit and process that.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
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K: But, again, in the context of the situation, the therapist might have thought you’re 
supposed to handle it this way and not try to process it with him at all.  I mean, obviously, 
he obviously based on what seems to be his life, he should be capable of insight.  So, 
from what I was surmising and just looking at that clip, it seems that it might be a 
reasonable, it might be reasonable for the therapist to process some of the issues around 
that request, but I don’t know.  So, I felt like some it around those issues was left 
unfinished.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  Can you say a bit more about the insight issues you picked up on?
K: Well, what I mean by that is that he, again, it seems that he, the client is professional, 
high functioning, obviously has had a career and done some things, he talks about being 
the best and all of that.  So, he doesn’t strike me as being the kind of client who, um, 
would not maybe, is maybe not as high functioning and would not be able to do process 
oriented, insight treatment.  This man seems like he probably could, but, um, he, well, 
seems somewhat narcissistic and somewhat into what he wants.  
JJ: Yeah.
K: And I just felt the therapist could have pressed him a bit more, somewhat around that.  
And, um, I thought it was very presumptuous and somewhat narcissistic, you know, that 
you just need to that work for me.  So, I guess what I’m getting at is I think there was an 
opportunity.  Maybe the guy could do some of that processing, who knows.   Maybe he 
just doesn’t want to because he doesn’t have that much caring and emotion and empathy.  
You don’t know, though.  Just seeing that one clip, you don’t know.
JJ: Yeah.
K: I don’t know.  It just seemed like it might have been an opportunity.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: Did that answer?
JJ: Yeah, um, so kind of going back a little to what you’ve been saying, um.  You’ve kind 
of identified what you see as the center piece.  Do you see any other, what you would say 
is a dilemma from the, um, session?
K: Yeah, I do because, um, the therapist touches upon on it when he says to him you’ve 
been dealing with these complicated issues, and it might be better for you not to be 
dealing with the kind of high stress situation that you’ll be dealing with in active military, 
combat role, I guess.  Um, with all of those unresolved issues kind of emotionally 
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impacting you, sure, because one would have to question this guy’s fitness for duty or 
fitness for active military role.
JJ: Yeah.
K: Um, clearly I see that as an ethical piece for the therapist to discuss, potentially he’s 
going to be out in a combat role where he could hurt people.  I think he makes some 
reference to some past thing that has happened to this guy.  I didn’t, um, it sounded like a 
possible combat issue that occurred.  He said that what’s brought you into me.  
JJ: Yeah, what brought him in was that during his first session he spoke of being the, um, 
Madrassa Killer or Madrassa Murderer because there was a town in Iraq that he was 
given coordinates to bomb.  And I guess he bombed it, but it was actually school children
—12 school children.  That’s why he came to therapy, although he denied that it bothered 
him.
K: Something had occurred.  So, the ethical dilemma it would put the therapist in to know 
all that, and he’s also asking him to—to know all that history now—he’s asking him to 
talk to the military psychiatrist or military psychologist, and, um, provide confirmation 
that he’s stable.  That’s concerning.
JJ: Yeah.  
K: Okay, so those are some key things.  I’m asking this therapist to basically whatever his 
assessment is to put it in his favor.  And, also thinking about if this guy has PTSD, I wrote 
down, because what’s going on?  And then to go back to…do you really think it’s a good 
idea to put yourself in active duty?  So, it’d be a really big burden, I think, for the 
therapist to have to deal with and sort all this out.  
JJ:  And, if you were in that position, what would you do with what you’re perceiving 
he’s asking?
K: Well, one thing I would do is maybe seek some consultation help because I would, I 
think, to just get some other objective perspectives.  He’s basically, from what I saw, a 
private practitioner in his home space.  But, um, I think that would be one where 
whatever way he could consult colleagues and a lot of times private practitioners make 
arrangements to talk with peers.   I think this would be a good situation where one might 
want to do that, and that would be done before talking to anyone.  Whether Alex wanted 
me to talk to this person, and I wouldn’t talk to anybody, and if it were me, I would have 
to get guidance and consultation.  And, going back to what I told you in the first place, 
ultimately, would I feel comfortable if this decision, if some others had to look at my 
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practice, would they say what is she doing, or would they say, given those set of 
circumstances, that makes sense.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: So, I think I would need a consult and would need to objectively think about what the 
best course of action is.  The therapist leaves him with: I want to keep working with you, 
um, so that’s also a dilemma because you want to keep working with the guy but you 
know that some action that you might take could sever that possibility.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  It sounds like you would engage in some sort of, um, thought process in 
which you think about—besides consultation directly—what would other people do in 
this situation?
K: Hmm-hm.  Absolutely, that why I go back to almost, that I think the therapist needs to 
be able to talk to Alex again and in an honest and direct way about what he’s asking.  I 
think Alex has a right to know and understand.  Understand that on his own, let’s talk 
about what you’re asking me to do and what that means and what that’s all about.  And in 
the context of the therapeutic relationship, I, um, think  that’s needed.  So, I think that’s 
needed, consultation is needed, and I think just logically thinking what would be the best 
course, those are some pieces that are missing.
JJ: So, one of your responses is that you would want to talk with Alex again.  What would 
you do there?  If that’s an alternate response, what would you do?
K: I would say to Alex, I’ve thought about that request that you’ve made of me and I feel 
like we need to talk about the implications of that and why you believe that hat request is 
okay, and, you know, how the therapist and how me the therapist is responding to that.  
You know, and obviously, it has appeared to me with all of this—his issues, he and the 
therapist seem to have a good rapport and they’ve done a lot of work.  So, they’re 
probably in a place where they could talk through some of that.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: And I think he owes Alex, and I would feel I would owe Alex, the conversation about, 
you know, at the end of the day, I will have to do what I believe is best from an ethical 
practice standpoint.  And you would not necessarily have to say to him this is what I’m 
going to do, but at the same time he would have to understand that that’s going to happen. 
Um, and um take it from there.  And then I would still follow up with the other things I 
talked about.  And I would want Alex to come back and talk about those issues 
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particularly.  Well, he has all the other issues going on, but this is the most salient—he 
wants to go back and wants this favorable assessment given.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: And that is a very important issue right now.  All the others are very important also, 
but I would say that this is the most pressing—that this request has been made and that’s 
what needs to be addressed.  It’s what I would want to do.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  Um, how about any other ethical dilemmas that pop up, that, um you feel 
would need to be considered as well.  It sounds like the issue of the letter is your big 
concern.
K: It is the most pressing concern—and his fitness for active military duty.  Um, I guess 
there is a concern that Alex is obviously been telling, he’s violated his own 
confidentiality many times.  He says oh, you know, this one that one, if I were the 
therapist I would want to know what that’s going to mean.  His wife, his dad, the military
—he’s told a pretty, it sounds like pretty casually about this.  I don’t know what impact 
that will have.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
K: Are those people going to start calling him, calling me?  He’s opened boxes and doors 
because he’s violated his own confidentiality.  It sounds like he told his wife and then she 
told others.  And to me, that can cause other possible problems.  I just hope I would never 
have to be in that kind of scenario.  [laughs].
JJ: [laughs]. Yeah, it sounds like you feel it’s all pretty complicated.  
K: Yeah, I do.  Absolutely.
JJ: Yet, you did and summarized very clearly and pragmatically the steps you would take.  
It’s pretty clear.
K: I don’t know if they’re all the right steps, but just right first impressions I think that’s 
what I’d probably do.
Dissertation Interview V
L:  What has happened to him that he wasn’t allowed to fly?  Or, um, was he allowed?
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JJ: He, um, he had been in a very controversial situation, which, um, he bombed a village 
in which there were a lot of school children present.  And, um, he ended up killing a 
bunch of civilians in the mission he was ordered to carry out.  
L: So, um, what did the heart attack have to do with it?
JJ: The heart attack, um, happened, um, I want to say a couple months before he entered 
therapy.  And, um, and he had been running, um, just kind of wearing himself down to 
complete exhaustion, from that part of the story.  
L: So, the bombing thing, he, was it accidental that he ended up taking out all of the 
civilians?  Like, was that part of his job and then, consequently, because of having done 
that he was struggling?
JJ: It was considered collateral damage, yeah.  But he denied that he was struggling; he 
denied coming in for those reasons.  He said he was actually coming in for other reasons.
L: Yeah, yeah.  I just didn’t know…
JJ: What initiated it?
L: Yeah.
JJ: Yeah, even when he came in for the first session he denied that he was coming in for 
the collateral damage issue.  That he had no problem with what he did.  He looked at it as 
just a consequence of military involvement.
L: Alright.
JJ: So, let’s just begin with kind of, um, just to reiterate—imagine that you are the 
therapist in the situation, and what ethical challenges or problems do you see and how do 
you think you’d respond?
L: Um, the situation with the tank, what was that?  Some of this I didn’t get because it 
was so quickly.
JJ: Yeah.
L: Did he…it was like a training thing where he was training other…?
JJ: Yeah, um, hmm.  Other pilots.
L: Was he hurting them?  Because I know he has, like, a big control thing.
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JJ: Um…
L: Like, the harm to others thing came up, but I was not clear on the situation or what not.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  Um, I don’t think he was hurting them.  He brought that issue up or that 
aspect of himself up to prove—or kind of demonstrate—that he’s still on top of his game.  
And that he’s capable of doing this really difficult exercise where you go into this tank 
and…
L:  Okay, so he wasn’t hurting…
JJ: Well, it may sound painful; it’s simulated drowning, it’s about kind of if you were in a 
plane that crashed can you maintain a level of composure; he was bringing it up in that 
moment to display to the therapist that, well, nothing gets to him.
L: Okay.  Um, um, asking the therapist to lie and tell them all good things—that is not 
good.  Um, like, don’t take my world away, wanting the therapist to lie, um, about his 
ability or his, um, status.  That’s an ethical dilemma.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Um, I, I first would consult.  I don’t know if he has supervision.  I don’t know if that’s 
the case.  Um, I wouldn’t lie.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Um, but, …
JJ: You wouldn’t lie for…?
L: I wouldn’t lie for him.  No, I wouldn’t lie for him.  
JJ: So, you might risk giving him an assessment that he would not like?
L: Hmm-hm.  And I would tell him beforehand.  Um, what else would you say?
JJ: So, in that sense…
L: Just from what I saw, I would tell him that I would not lie beforehand.
JJ: So, do you think that was an error on the part of the therapist?  Something that he 
missed?
L: What do you mean?
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JJ: He didn’t say that.  He didn’t go into that.
L: I don’t think he decided what he was going to do.  Um, I don’t know if he’s going to 
see him again.  Is he making a statement or…?
JJ: He would, yeah, I think the patient thinks he is going to be making a statement.
L: Well, yeah, before that I would tell him.  At least, I am not going to lie for you and I 
intend to give my honest evaluation.
JJ: Yeah.
L: But I would tell him, that I’m going to give my honest evaluation, but I would tell him 
before I did it, but, again, at least, at the very least I would consult with somebody else 
and make sure that I was on point.  
JJ: What would you take to that other person, your supervisor?
L: I would present the situation and ask for feedback and how to approach it best because 
there’s a risk of obviously damaging the relationship between the therapist and client, um, 
so the least harm you can do to the client would be paramount, too.  At least in terms of 
their relationship and his trust with him.  He’s got some issues with his dad, so he would 
have to be careful about how he deals with it to ensure the least harm.  But I’m probably 
missing a lot, so consulting would be good.   And does he have anything in his informed 
consent about what he will and will not do for clients?
JJ: Does he?  His therapist?
L: Yeah, his therapist.  I’m completely over thinking this.
JJ: No, no, that’s good.
L: If he were like doing any forensic evals or military evals.  You know, like, I would do 
this or maintain this.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: So, I’m just wondering.
JJ: That’s something you’d be concerned with.
L: I’m wondering—if his role is to do these kinds of things and to do evaluations, I would 
put in that I will not or will do these certain things.  So, he could…I would use that as a… 
as something to protect myself.  
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JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Hmm… I don’t know.
JJ: So, it sounds like, first, first off, immediately there’s some resonance for you with this 
whole lying thing.
L: The lying, yeah.  Yeah, hmm-hm.  I think that’s the biggest thing.  Um, yeah.  And 
what else.
JJ:   Well, you covered the first one good.
L: Do you want more?
JJ: About the lying?
L: Yeah.  
JJ: Well, if you feel there’s more, then yeah.
L: Um.  That’s just it.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: He paid in cash and didn’t give him a receipt [laughs].
JJ: Yeah.
L: And I had in my head that you always have to have some kind of record or 
documentation.
JJ: Some sort of documentation, yeah.
L: [laughs]. Um,  I was worried with him, and just what’s going on with him, and his 
power and control issues, and he said he wanted to go to the bar and beat the hell out of 
someone.  And he may or may not be doing that, but kind of… I don’t know, I wrote it 
down because it must have been meaningful at the time. 
JJ: Hmm-hm.
 L: But, and then the situation in the tank.  There’s these little themes of him maybe 
abusing power or having thoughts of harming others, but not necessarily acting on them.  
I just…it was something that popped up a couple of times.
JJ: Yeah.
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L: Um, just keeping an eye on that.  I don’t know what his rule is…in the Air Force … 
Air Force or Navy?
JJ: Navy.
L: If he was in a position where he has control over others and he can abuse that power.  I 
don’t know if it’s impulse control or being aggressive.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: So, I would at least keep that in mind if not pointing that out whenever he has to give a 
statement.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: And, then, I wrote down flying, which is a pretty, can be, a dangerous and very 
important responsibility.  So, just how his decision making might impact that.
JJ: Hmm.  Hm-hmm.
L: I’m just thinking of things he may say whenever he is giving his assessment.  Whoever 
he has to report to.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Um, and giving advice.  Because he asked him for advice.  And the only advice he 
gave was for him to stay in therapy, which I think is okay.  But I was waiting for him to 
tell him yes or no you should not fly, so I’m okay with that.
JJ: You’re okay with him leaving it open-ended?  Or would you take a different 
approach?
L: I would leave it open ended.  About that decision…
JJ: So, you would have followed what the therapist…
L: I would have gone with the therapist on that decision, yeah.  I would not have given 
him advice about whether he should or should not fly.  Um, I’m very anti-advice giving.  
Just in my orientation, so I would not have.  I may have explored that more, like, maybe, 
does he think it’s okay or not to fly.  Maybe have him explore his thoughts more.  Um, I 
don’t know.
JJ: So, you think, perhaps, that that issue…he should have challenged him more on that?
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L: Or just, spend more time with it because he brought it up and it was something that 
was important to him.  So, I think that’s something.  It should be something he would use 
for…when called to give a statement…he should have sat for that for a moment.
JJ: So, you feel he moved on pretty quick from there?
L: He didn’t take advantage of talking about that, especially when the client was the one 
who brought it up.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: And the cell phone.  That was ridiculous.  Telling him call him anytime, day or night.  
I thought that was a very grey area.  I know some people give cell phone numbers. I hope 
that was not a personal cell phone.  And I don’t think there’s any lethality to this client, so 
I don’t understand what would necessitate him having access to a cell phone.  That’s a 
boundary issue.
JJ: Yeah, so you don’t think there’s any reason to have him… give him an emergency 
number?
L: Anytime day or night, about anything.  It’s not saying if there’s a crisis or if you want 
to communicate and you cannot, but it doesn’t sound like he communicates well with 
anyone.  Having that opportunity, maybe, but not calling him.
JJ: What do you think is implied by giving the cell phone number?
L: Um, more of a friendship even.  We’re kind of getting into that grey boundary area.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
HA: I’m waiting for you to give me feedback [laughs].  Like, yeah, you’re right on! 
[laughs].
JJ: [laughs].
L: Yeah, I know some people do it, but I think it’s very, very specific about the use of cell 
phones, if you do use them.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Those are the biggest things… [inaudible, reviewing items to self].  I would also… 
Was this a psychiatrist or psychologist?
JJ: Seems to be a psychologist.
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L: Military psychologist?
JJ: Private practice.
L: I would probably consult with a military psychologist because, um, I have a lot of 
close friends in the military, and their frame of mind is very much…um, they kind of 
have a different world view of what is and is not important, and where they should be, 
and what their responsibilities are, so, I think, given that, he would get a better picture of 
what this guy is thinking and grappling with if he had insight into the military.  So, I 
really think he would benefit from consulting because that would have painted a more 
clear picture.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  Are you saying in some way the therapist doesn’t have the knowledge 
that…
L: He might not. I don’t know.  But, I mean…
JJ: But for you in that position as therapist, it is something you would…
L: It is something I would do.  Because it’s a cultural piece and that’s his lifestyle and it’s 
obviously very important to him, so to be able to kind of get into his, I want to say his 
head, but into his identity.  It is obviously very much a part to get into that and I would 
want to know about his identity.
JJ: Can you say a bit more about what you meant by the cultural piece or identity piece?
L: Well, just from my experience of people who have had time in the military.  There’s a 
lot of things that are clear to them about what their responsibilities are.  Where their 
loyalty is and how that shapes them personally.  Um, and you could see a lot of that 
coming out just in terms of order and discipline and he had a certain responsibility to 
what he was doing.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: And that was carrying over into a lot of things and just to understand where he’s 
coming from and how’d he do things.  That would paint a clearer picture for the therapist.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  And so, the cultural piece is something that would be very key in your 
mind and crucial for you?
L: Hmm-hm.  You couldn’t challenge him.  I mean that’s what he knows.  But that’s what 
he’s invested in.  And you don’t have to agree with him, but at least you could understand 
where he’s coming from and why he’s thinking what he was.
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JJ: From what you’re saying, is there any indication that he therapist was treating him 
with an awareness of the cultural dynamic here?
L: I don’t know.  I wasn’t paying attention to it.  I did think of it afterward, and I think he 
might have.  I don’t know.  Generally, the issue with his son, but he did more on the 
relationship with his dad and not as much on his son.  Though he was more in tune to 
being in the Navy than being a father.
JJ: He was?
L: Was he?  I don’t know [laughs].  Yeah, so that’s more of a piece worth, um, expanding.
JJ: How would you respond to that part, um, just specifically that part? You seem to be 
aware of it.  You’re taking note of it.
L: I don’t know, um, maybe I’d ask him or tell him that’s what I mean.  I’d tell him I hear 
you talking more or talking more passionately about your military experience than your 
family and I’m just wondering why or more about your responsibilities to your family, 
and see if he’s aware of it.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: I don’t know.  I don’t know.  It’s hard to make decisions based on twenty five minutes.  
Hmm.  Not doing military psych that’s for sure [laughs].
JJ: [laughs].  Yeah.
L: There’s some decisions there you don’t want to have to make! Because that’s life 
shattering for him if he can’t fly.
JJ: Hmm-hm. Hmm-hm.  So, yeah, I think what you’re getting at when said life 
shattering a moment ago is that you’re, for you, you’re starting to observe and hone in on 
that identity thing.
L: Yeah, that was more important or seemed to be more important to him that the other 
things in his life, including son, or his marriage, or his relationship to his dad. To the 
point that he’d ask someone to lie so that he could get back in.
JJ: So, what other possible responses can you imagine?
L: About anything in particular?
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JJ: Well, whether or with regard to honing in on the identity issues that seems to be 
emerging…that’s kind of a big one for you.
L: Um, maybe why that’s so important to him.  Why that’s become so paramount, why 
he’s so invested in it, um, wait.  I don’t know.  I’m kind of biased because I had a close 
friend in the military and he re-enlisted because his friends re-enlisted.  Um, and 
everyone was drafted and he was out, and he would go back in just to do it.  And he left 
his family and his fiancée and he just left and he just did it.  And so, it was in his head 
that he would do this before anything else.  So, it was just, it is interesting to hear 
someone say, like, I’ll ditch everyone and everything just to serve.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: And so that’s, like, in the back of my head.  And the identity piece is really sticking.
JJ: And you said you had a bias, and that bias is sort of magnifying this?
L: I think the identity piece is where I’m leaning so much.  It’s obvious without even 
considering that I know that, but I keep hearing that knowing the discussion in the back 
of my mind, like, so I can kind of understand a lot of this, but…
JJ: Hmm-hm.
L: Am I missing something [laughs]?
JJ: Um, no.  I mean, I don’t know [laughs].
L: I’m, like, what else?  It’s right there! [laughs].  Yeah, I just think it’s going to be very 
difficult for him if the therapist should choose to say, no he should not be flying.  Um, it’s 
really going to be painful for this guy.  So, he’s going to be careful about the best way not 
to damage the relationship, and is he going to want to go back to therapy?  Is he going to 
want to go back if he has a bad experience or is going to want to communicate or talk to 
people?  Is he going to want to come back in?  He was mandated?  Or was he?
JJ: No, he brought himself in.
L: I don’t know.  He’s just going to have to really be careful not to…
JJ: Do you think he was careful in the session?
L: I think he was, yeah, I think he told him he was courageous at the end.  I think 
relatively careful, or at least he was…he told him he was courageous, if I can recall his 
exact words.  So, he might of even been setting up knowing he was going to throw him 
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under the bus whenever he went to give the recommendation.  I would still tell him, 
though.   I would process it with him.  
JJ: So, you would do that differently.
Dissertation Interview Transcript VI
JJ: Imagine you are the therapist in the situation.  What ethical challenges or problems do 
you see and how do you think you would respond?
A: Is that a general question?
JJ: Yeah.
A: Okay.
JJ: Yeah, a starting point.
A: Well, the biggest ethical dilemma to begin with was him was the Navy pilot asking the 
therapist to, um, do whatever he could regarding that assessment.  And a lot of thing that, 
even if he does have problems he just wants him to say okay so he can keep flying and 
doing flight school.  Um, and that ethical decision was when he asked him his opinion if 
he should fly or not.  And I think that is pretty tough to do because as a therapist you 
don’t want to sway the person.  You want to allow them to have their own direction and 
see it for themselves.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And then the little things I saw were, like, paying for the session in cash, um, allowing 
them to talk on their cell phones during a session, and, one that was kind of moderately, I 
didn’t think was good as a therapist was giving him his cell phone number and saying, 
contact me day or night. There has to be some boundaries.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  So, for that one you would have not gone along with that?
A: No, I mean work hours keep in mind that the person could come to depend on them 
and call them constantly.
JJ: So, um, that seems to be kind of on the side.  It doesn’t seem to be a major dilemma 
for you.  If you were to focus on the major dilemma you identified, are you able to 
narrow that down to one or two dilemmas?
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A: Yeah, I would the number one dilemma was asking him to, um, lie in the courts and 
allow him to go through the process with the shrink and his assessments so he can 
continue as a pilot in training.  And the number two one would be, um, the pilot asking 
him his opinion, and I think he handled that really well. He didn’t give him a direct 
answer.  He kind of let him make his own decision.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  How about the first one, the major one?  How do you think he handled 
that?
A: Um, I thought it was handled correctly.  I don’t know how he followed up with it.  It 
didn’t show what he did in the future, but he didn’t go allow with it, he didn’t tell him 
he’d falsify his reports, and he, um, didn’t change his opinion or anything like that, and 
there was no indication he would.
JJ: Yeah.  If you were to base kind of what you see just on this session, would you 
imagine a different response that you’d engage in?
A: For myself?
JJ: Hmm-hm.  For your self.
A: No, I don’t think I’d respond differently.  I think he, he… handled it directly.  The 
pilot asked him not to screw up the assessment when it came along, and he kind of 
brushed aside the issues that he did have, and I thought that the therapist responded 
appropriately in telling him that, you know, he got more and dug into the issues more 
rather than, um, just straight up saying this is what I’m going to say, this is what my 
opinion is.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: He kind of got to the core and redirected him back to what the therapy sessions were 
all about.
JJ: Can you say more about that?  How he did that, and how you kind of…apparently, 
you’re kind of saying that you, you agree with his technique?
A: Hmm-hm.
JJ: Yeah, what about it do you see as, more specifically, do you see as what he was doing 
well?
A: I think he did question if the pilot was really ready, and I think that in a therapeutic 
relationship you can have the feelings as a therapist that maybe the client is not through 
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the whole process.  It, um, you know, it’s difficult to do that especially when it’s cut off in 
circumstances like this.  You know, they’re not going to be in the same area; they can’t 
continue the same relationship; now it’s going to be by phone, if at all, instead of concrete 
sessions.  It seems like the therapist wasn’t really able to come to a resolution with what 
he was trying to come to with the client.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  So, there was a lot left open-ended?
A: Absolutely.
JJ: Would have you wrapped things up differently?  Given that he came in and said this 
was his last session.  Would you have handled that at all differently?
A: Again, I don’t know the context.  I don’t know how many sessions they had before 
that.  You know, in this therapeutic interaction, it was the relationship between the pilot’s 
son and his father.  I don’t know if those were the core things they talked about in the 
past, but I’m assuming it is.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: So, if they were really able to, um, remedy a lot of this stuff and that was the main 
things they talked about other than, you know, civilian casualties, and it sounds like he 
has some PTSD, if that’s it.
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: Then, I would be okay with that because it was something we discussed over and over 
again.  Obviously, the pilot is reflecting a lot more than he had in the first initial session 
because it seems like he was someone who was closed off, um, and they probably had a 
really hard time being open with each other.
JJ: Yeah, um, yeah that’s accurate.
A: Hmm-hm.
JJ:  So, um, you’re not seeing a lot of sort of alternate or alteration from what the 
therapist was doing in the session.  You’re not feeling a lot of sort of, um, I would have 
done this differently or I would have pursued that differently.
A: No, I guess because, you know, what I’m in right now—I’m a voc-rehab counselor 
and our relationships are very concrete, you know, we have certain things we need to do 
in the process and, you know, it’s counseling and guidance, but it’s not directly therapy, 
so I think I’m coming from the opinion of, you know, it’d be difficult unless I know the 
200
perimeters, so I agree with the way that the psychologist handled it.  I don’t think I would 
do anything different.  You know, as far as him asking him to falsify the assessment, and 
even, um, him asking him directly what would you do.  I think he responded well to that.  
He didn’t in any way say you should do this or if I were you this is how I would handle it.
JJ: So, you definitely praise him for that and applaud him for the neutrality he took on the 
issue of advice.
A: Yeah, um, complete neutrality.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  How about the bigger one, though.  That whole assessment?  Did he 
handle that well?
A: I think he could have been a bit more direct with him probably and told him, you 
know, I cannot be biased in this assessment and it’s basically coming back on my 
professionalism; I need to be as unbiased as possible and really be, um, give an accurate 
assessment, so I guess he could be a little more direct and come back to that.  But he 
didn’t give any indication that he wasn’t going to.  He didn’t give any indication that he 
was going to lie in the assessment and kind of push him along and allow him to do, you 
know, continue to fly.
JJ: Yeah, right, he certainly didn’t. He, um, in that sense, was he doing something you 
agree with?  There was a lot of neutrality that you seem to be picking up on?
A: Yeah,  I think, um, the pilot sounds like he’s not so much in the session, but he’s 
aggressive in a lot of situations outside of the session, too.  So, I think that, um, maybe 
the therapist didn’t want to get off on a bad foot that early in the session and tell him 
directly that, you know, this is what I need to do and what I’m going to say.  I’m going to 
neutral and not going to, you know, the opinion of you going in for training and going on 
as a pilot. I think he had to be neutral so they could actually do work in the last session.
JJ: Hmm-hm. Yeah.  Had he come out right away and said, blatantly, this isn’t going to 
happen.
A: Yeah, I think that would have been a wall right there because the pilot is—he seems 
like he has an aggressive personality, you know, going out drinking and looking for a 
fight.  I mean obviously that was circumstantial and might not be a trigger that that’s 
much, sometimes it can put him over the edge, but also, you know, I think he wanted to 
leave everything on a good foot.  He wanted the pilot to realize that, in the end, he did a 
lot of good work and he was brave for doing it.  And I don’t think he could have done it if 
he was direct and said, you know, I’m not going to lie in this assessment.  
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JJ: Yeah, you know what do you think would have happened if he would have said that?
A: I think that whole session would have gone completely different.  I think that the pilot, 
um, there would have been an argument between the two of them and possibly the pilot 
walking out, and I don’t know in the past if there was any kind of aggression.  It could 
have brought out other issues, too.
JJ: There was, yeah.
A: Hmm-hm.
JJ: Yeah, you’re definitely picking up on that.
A: Hmm-hm.
JJ: There was actually a session before, one or two before this one, between this one and 
a session earlier where they actually had a physical confrontation because the pilot 
became pretty aggressive toward him.
A: And you can see that even when they were first talking it seemed very stiff and very 
rigid, you know, here’s my money, and as they kind of dug into the issues, that’s when 
everything there was some warmth and some sharing back and forth.
JJ: What you’re picking up on there with the rigidity, did you feel like you seeing the 
session at the beginning, what was your impression?
A: It just seemed very framed.  It seemed kind of like they were kind of just going along 
with the process.  And then when the therapist I think realized that they were touching on 
core issues that happened between the therapeutic sessions, um, that there was stuff that 
he could kind of relate to what was going on in his past, too.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: So, it kind of gave the therapist a framework, too, um, but yeah, I work with veterans 
now.
JJ: Yeah.
A: And, um, it’s tough.  You have to…you can’t just come out and say what was your 
experience in Iraq  and Afghanistan.  You have to be, you have to build a relationship 
with them before you can get into any of the details because they’re just going to see you 
as a civilian.  There’s a huge thing between talking to each other and talking to a civilian.
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JJ: Yeah.  That brings up an important point.  This was a civilian-soldier situation right 
there.  Did you see anything about the way the therapist was responding and acting and 
treating the situation that maybe you’d have done differently?
A: The big thing was, you know, when he kept referring to faggots.  
JJ: Yeah.
A: He said that a couple of times.
JJ: He did.
A: And, that reminds me a lot of military language.  You know, friends that I have they’ll 
use the language of… they’ll call people retards and stuff like that.  And it’s extremely 
offensive to myself and other people that are a little bit more open minded, but to them 
that’s just how you talk between people in the military, you know, between privates and 
officers, and, um, I don’t think the therapist really needed to address that because it 
wasn’t really pertinent to what they were talking about, but you can tell there’s a 
difference between talking to a civilian and talking to the pilot.  He wasn’t referencing a 
lot of the details of actually flying.  He talked of the dunk tank and, um,…
JJ: As though he was explaining it to a novice?
A: Yeah.
JJ: Or an outsider.
A: Yeah.  He couldn’t be detailed about anything in the military.  All the acronyms and 
everything else.  And, um, but I think that’s good because I think that he struggles with—
the pilot struggles with—the relationship with his dad.  
JJ: Hmm-hm.
A: And even his wife, he had mentioned.  Um, and I think a lot, um, that probably has to 
do with, um, he’s in the military life nine months out of the year, and on a full time basis.  
And when he’s deployed he’s completely wrapped in that, and it’s two different worlds.
JJ: Hmm-hm.  So, again, you’re kind of praising the therapist as handling that pretty well, 
not making an issue out of it, not honing in on it.  Did you pick up on anything else with 
that situation where he was using the word faggot?  Did you see anything else that might 
have been a dilemma that the therapist missed or did not seem to address?
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A: Um…no because I, um, he could have kind of confronted that.  I mean confrontation 
is good, and he could of kind of—not educate—but get a kind of understanding and dig 
into why he’s aggressive when going to a bar and wanting to knock somebody’s teeth out.
JJ: Right.
A: But, I don’t think that those were the core issues.  I think he would have been 
distracting what they were really working at.  And the straight lines of what he was 
talking about, which was is he ready to go back as a pilot.  
JJ: Yeah.
A: Is he just—it really seemed he was trying to get at— is he just brushing aside all his 
personal things that are happening.  And kind of using this as an excuse to kind of get 
away.
JJ: Yeah.  Did it look like he brought that to the fore enough?
A:  No, I don’t think he did.  
JJ: The therapist didn’t?
A: No, I think the therapist hits at that a couple of times and I think the therapist wanted 
him to come to that conclusion himself, but he never did. 
JJ: Yeah.
A: And I don’t know that he will.  I think he—the pilot sees it as— as personality flaws 
between him and his son, and his father, but what the core might be is, you know, him 
really, um, him being away and not being close enough or wanting to be close enough.  I 
mean he brought up a point that his son, is it better for his son to have his father at the 
birthday party or not there at all.
JJ: Right.
A: And, the pilot brushes that off very easily.
JJ: What do you think that was really about?
A: Um, I think it has a lot to do with the time away, you know.  His son growing up at a 
young age when he’s developing and he doesn’t have his father around and he has his 
grandfather around and it seems that they are butting heads on a constant basis.  
JJ: Yeah.
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A: So, um, I think it’s the pilot not understanding his son.
JJ: Yeah.  So, there’s a distance there between them?
A: Yeah, and I don’t think that the therapist really addressed that.  You know, I think he 
was trying to have the pilot come to his own conclusions, but those are times that 
whenever you…the confrontation can be there.  But, then also, if in past sessions there 
was aggression and on that particular subject – and I don’t know what the subject was—
then I don’t know if I would go and poke at it.
JJ: Right.  Hm-hmm.  So, this whole idea of letting the client draw their own conclusions 
that you’re kind of touching on.  
A: Yeah.
JJ: You don’t like that, at least in this situation from what you’re seeing?
A: Um…
JJ: You envision an alternate situation for yourself.  That you as the therapist would not 
do that?
A: Yeah, I think I do like… I think that if you really had a feeling that there was other 
issues, then they need to be brought up, like if the client is not getting it or they keep 
scathing away from it.  I think that would have been a, you know, saying this is the core 
issue.  Why do you keep redirecting? Why do you keep getting this distance from what 
we’re really trying to get at?
JJ: Yeah.
A: And I think you can get at those issues, um, instead of…you know, I think that he 
really let the pilot kind of dictate what was going on.
JJ: Yeah.  So, you’re saying there was passivity there?
A:  Yeah, and I think he was being reflective which is a great thing, and you know, every 
question he was responding with neutrality, and he was responding with collected 
responses.  But I think that he could have directed the conversation a little more.      
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